Showing posts with label Europa. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Europa. Show all posts

03 April 2020

Film review: L'Esprit du vin (2011) by Olympe and Yvon Minvielle **

Synopsys

A film sponsored by Château Lagarette, a biodynamic producer in Bordeaux.

A dozen or so biodynamic wine-growers express their vision of the present and make proposals for the future.

They ask eminently social and even political questions: What food? How Could humanity restore the ideal of living together?

Through their stories, practices, and the accumulation of knowledge from their experiences, the producers of the film and a group of farmers, biodynamic wine-growers, try to open a path. They want to show how the spirit of bio-dynamics could provide answers to these questions.



Review

This film is an all-out passionate defense of biodynamic viticulture. I say defense because most of the interviewees talk as if they are under siege, as if the evil forces of modernity are out to extinguish the feeble flame of tradition. No alternative point of view is presented in the film. If you want to hear alternative voices, skeptical or critical of biodynamic wine, you have to look elsewhere.

Clearly, the growers interviewed are very passionate about their wine, but often they get carried away. Just a few pearls from their statements. A basic theme of the film is a high level of hostility toward "technology": there is "technological" wine, which is artificial and then there is biodynamic wine, which is natural. Oddly, little attention is paid to organic wines, although biodynamic certification requires a wine to be organic to begin with.

A couple of speakers identify "technological" wines as the result of American influence and specifically the work of Robert Parker, while, on the contrary, "Europe" is the custodian of genuine winemaking. Well, Parker has nothing against biodynamic wines and actually promotes it. And, of course, there are lots of American biodynamic producers and in fact the USA is the biggest biodynamic farming producer in the world.

One speaker argues that biodynamic vineyards are better equipped to resist the negative radioactive impact of Chernobyl, thus lumping together as if it was a dogmatic truth a whole host of questionable assumptions.

A major problem for me is when, as several speakers repeat in this film, the argument is put forward that what is important in biodynamic wine is NOT the result, but the relationship between man and nature, a new philosophy of daily life. Assuming the latter is somehow better served in biodynamic farming, for me the end result, ie good and healthy wine, IS WHAT MATTERS.

Technology, a word that is often repeated with a grimace by many interviewees, destroys the relationship man and nature, farmer and vineyard. Biodynamic preparations restore the correct energy flows! A corollary of this argument is the open hostility of one speaker to established wine associations such as the Masters of Wine. In his view, these associations have been created to serve technology against the natural traditions of wine.

One speaker is very honest when he says biodynamic farming is like a religion: you can not demonstrate it, you can only believe it. Another one compares it to acupuncture: not scientifically proven, but many believe it anyway. Not surprising that biodynamic farmers also accept homeopathic principles, as they use extremely diluted solutions in some of their preparations.

A quirky claim toward the end of the film is that biodynamic wine is especially appreciated by women! Maybe so, as a woman grower claims to have produced a "concert wine" in her biodynamic vineyard because both wine and music share a spirituality for people to appreciate.

If you already believe in biodynamic farming this film will make you feel really good. If you are trying to understand more, it will give you only half the picture.

For a wise and cool view of the subject, read Jancis Robinson, one of the world's most respected authorities.

You can watch the film reviewed here on Youtube.

You can buy the DVD (in French as well as English) here on Amazon. Hard to come by and very expensive, however!





24 December 2011

Book Review: Inferno, by James Nachtwey, *****

Synopsis
A document of war and strife during the 1990s, this volume of photographs by the photojournalist James Nachtwey includes dramatic and shocking images of human suffering in Rwanda, Somalia, Romania, Bosnia, Chechnya and India, a well as photographs of the conflict in Kosovo. An essay by the author Luc Sante is included. The book is published to coincide with an exhibition of Nachtwey's work at the International Centre of Photography, New York.

16 September 2010

Meglio un fallimento della Grecia. Per tutti, greci compresi

Nel 2010, per la prima volta dalla creazione della moneta unica, un paese dell’area Euro, la Grecia, si è trovato sull’orlo del fallimento, ed è stato salvato -- per ora, e forse non per molto -- solo dall’intervento coordinato degli altri paesi del’Unione Europea, oltre che dal Fondo Monetario Internazionale (Fmi). La causa dei problemi greci era essenzialmente interna: eccesso di spesa pubblica e manipolazione della contabilità nazionale. In altre parole, tutta una serie di governi greci, negli ultimi decenni, da ancor prima che la Grecia entrasse nell’Euro, ha scialacquato risorse ed truccato i conti.

02 April 2002

Recensione: La rabbia e l'orgoglio (2001) di Oriana Fallaci, *****

You can read an English version of the article on which this book is based here.

Sinossi


Con "La rabbia e l'orgoglio" (2001), Oriana Fallaci rompe un silenzio durato dieci anni, dalla pubblicazione di "Insciallah", epico romanzo sulla missione occidentale di pace nella Beirut dilaniata dallo scontro tra cristiani e musulmani e dalle faide con Israele. Dieci anni in cui la Fallaci sceglie di vivere ritirata nella sua casa newyorchese, come in esilio, a combattere il cancro. Ma non smette mai di lavorare al testo narrativo dedicato alla sua famiglia, quello che lei chiama "il-mio-bambino", pubblicato postumo nel 2008, "Un cappello pieno di ciliege". L'undici settembre le impone di tornare con furia alla macchina da scrivere per dar voce a quelle idee che ha sempre coltivato nelle interviste, nei reportage, nei romanzi, ma che ha poi "imprigionato dentro il cuore e dentro il cervello" dicendosi "tanto-la-gente-non-vuole-ascoltare".

Il risultato è un articolo sul "Corriere della Sera" del 29 settembre 2001, un sermone lo definisce lei stessa, accolto con enorme clamore in Italia e all'estero. Esce in forma di libro nella versione originaria e integrale, preceduto da una prefazione in cui la Fallaci affronta alle radici la questione del terrorismo islamico e parla di sé, del suo isolamento, delle sue scelte rigorose e spietate. La risposta è esplosiva, le polemiche feroci. Mentre i critici si dividono, l'adesione dei lettori, in tutto il mondo, è unanime di fronte alla passione che anima queste pagine. (Prefazione di Ferruccio De Bortoli)


Recensione

Un libro controverso, dai toni feroci, anche troppo, solo in parte giustificabili dalla situazione: Fallaci era a New York al momento degli attacchi dell'11 settembre. A mio avviso Fallaci ha ragione a parlare del pericolo che l'Europa abbassi la guardia sulla propria identità, ma indebolisce le sue argomentazioni quando si lascia trasportare dalle emozioni del momento. Maggiore sangue freddo avrebbe reso i suoi argomenti più lucidi. In ogni caso il libro pone delle domande, scomodissime, su cui il lettore farebbe bene a ragionare. Un libro importante, un grido di dolore di un'italiana che se la prende prima di tutto con gli italiani, e gli europei, non all'altezza del retaggio culturale che gli appartiene.

Il testo dell'articolo si può leggere nell'archivio del Corriere della Sera.


06 November 2000

Recensione: Straneurocrate (2000), di Marco De Andreis, *****

Sinossi

Poche cose risultano più ostiche e tediose dell'Europa comunitaria. D'altra parte l'Unione europea ha un'importanza crescente nella nostra vita: le decisioni che ci riguardano prese a Bruxelles e a Strasburgo sono sempre di più. E poi c'è il fatto che le istituzioni comunitarie non sono state concepite per rendere conto ai cittadini europei, bensì ai governi dei Paesi Membri. Questo libro tenta di colmare la voragine fra il (poco) fascino e la (molta) importanza dell'Unione europea, cercando di spiegare l'utilità e il funzionamento dell'Europa comunitaria. E non in termini astratti: l'autore è stato un "eurocrate" negli anni dal 1995 al 1999, e qui li racconta.


Recensione

Il miglior libro per capire l'Unione Europea senza annoiarsi a morte nel tentativo! Parafrasando il film di Kubrik "Il dottor Stranamore", De Andreis racconta di come "ha imparato a non preoccuparsi e ad amare l'Unione Europea", cioè i suoi anni a Bruxelles, dove ha lavorato come membro del gabinetto della Commissaria Bonino alla fine degli anni novanta. Egli usa l'esperienza personale per sviluppare un lungo ragionamento induttivo sulla macchina comunitaria, da una parte, e sulle politiche europee degli stati membri, dall'altra.

Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sull'Unione Europea ma non avete mai osato chiedere. Anche perché pure se lo aveste chiesto non ve lo avrebbero detto, data la mancanza di trasparenza dei processi decisionali comunitari, dai quali ormai dipende la maggioranza delle nostre leggi nazionali. Questo potrebbe essere un sottotitolo per questo libro, che parla di cose serie senza prendersi troppo sul serio. Anche se scritto dieci anni fa, per cui in parte ovviamente obsoleto, il libro resta attualissimo per penetrare la fitta cortina che oggi come allora nasconde l'apparato comunitario al cittadino comune.

Parafrasando il film di Kubrik "Il dottor Stranamore", De Andreis racconta i suoi anni a Bruxelles, dove ha lavorato come membro del gabinetto della Commissaria Bonino alla fine degli anni novanta. Egli usa l'esperienza personale per sviluppare un lungo ragionamento induttivo sulla macchina comunitaria, da una parte, e sulle politiche europee degli stati membri, dall'altra.

Da europeista convinto quale sono, il libro mi ha confermato una cosa: far gestire le cose a Bruxelles mi piace sempre di meno, ma resta forse il male minore rispetto ad un ritorno di poteri agli stati nazionali, oggi inadeguati a far fronte alle sfide del XXI.

Puoi leggere un'intervista all'autore qui su Gnosis.




31 May 1994

Vital and National Security Interests After the End of the Cold War

This post is the introduction to a collective book I edited in 1994. You can buy the book on Amazon.



Synopsis

Since the end of the Cold War, a contradiction has developed in the way security problems are approached in Europe: on the one hand, there is a generalized tendency toward multilateral solutions to vital European security problems; on the other, a renewed nationalist trend has emerged in the foreign policy focus as many states on both sides of the former Iron Curtain. But this contradic­tion is only apparent and can be resolved if security in Europe is redefined such that vital security interests are no longer national interests, and national security interests are no longer vital. Furthermore, West European and American security interests are more inter­twined in the new geopolitical scenario that emerged from the dissolution of the Eastern bloc than they had been, and the former socialist countries increasingly share their interests as well.

Vital and National Security Interests After the End of the Cold War
by Marco Carnovale

Security Institutions in Europe after the Cold War

Since the Cold War began to fade into history, a wide interna­tional consensus has developed on the need for the establishment of an institutionalized international system of cooperative security. In Europe, this has been particular­ly true among Western states and the Soviet Union—and later also among the states emerging from its dissolu­tion. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev began talking about the desirability of building a `Common European House' rather early on in his tenure, and one of the most common phrases at the twilight of the Cold War was the need for a common security `architecture'.

More recently, Central and Eastern European (C&EE) states have been in the forefront of initiatives to overhaul the European institutional structure. To a significant extent, and despite excruciat­ing subsequent disappointments, this broad consensus on principles has shaped the foreign policies of major interna­tional actors. Conse­quently, it has also influenced the thinking on and the develop­ment of the diplomatic and military instruments which are intended to serve those policies.

The need for a profound restructuring of international security institutions has come forcefully to the fore since the 1989 democrat­ic upheaval in Eastern Europe and the subsequent collapse of the Eastern bloc, which marked the end of the Cold War. These epochal changes highlighted the increasing inadequacy of existing institutions, which had been created to cope with what have now become non-issues: the United Nations (UN) to manage the post-World War II global geopolitical reorganization; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deal with the Soviet threat; the Western European Union (WEU) to forestall the danger of a resurgent Germany and to consolidate a special relationship between France and the UK; and the Conference on Security and Coopera­tion in Europe (CSCE) to mitigate various aspects of a conflictual East-West relationship. Also the role of the European Community (EC), initially concerned only with the integration of member states, has evolved to the point where the nascent foreign and security policy of the European Union (EU) that was inaugurated with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on 1 November 1993 now includes a greater opening toward security issues outside of the Union itself.

The urgency for stronger international security institutions has been further emphasized by the disappointing realization that the end of the Cold War did not make Europe `whole and free'. Rather, it produced a new array of conflicts. As of late 1993, several new post-Cold War wars have either broken out or seem about to explode. In many parts of Eastern Europe, the end of communism has been accompanied not by the flourishing of democracy but mainly by the virulent revival of old, long-repressed cleavages. As several old Cold War problems have been solved (mainly in the field of arms control and confidence-building) new problems have developed, in economic cooperation, sub-regional arms control, human rights, ethnic disputes, border disputes, etc.

International institutions have been widely seen as the most appropriate instruments for dealing with these new problems. In the West, the reasoning has been that the peaceful management of post-Cold War transition from confrontation to cooperation would not have been possible without multilateral arrangements and the momentous break-up of the Soviet bloc. Post-Soviet and East European states themselves, emerging from the isolation of Soviet times, have been eager to join whatever forum the West has been willing to accept them in. Existing institutions have been earmarked for additional responsi­bilities and expanded member­ship, and new institutions, such as the North Atlantic Coopera­tion Council (NACC) have been created ad hoc.

Since the end of the Cold War, international security institu­tions have already evolved; the UN has been increasing­ly active in various parts of the world, so far with mixed results; the CSCE has considerably increased in membership thus becoming truly pan-European; the EU and the WEU have been given increased responsi­bilities, at least on paper; in NATO, the debate among member states over the adaptation of the organization's missions to changing circum­stances is still on-going. The thorny issue of expanded member­ship is still on the table, if somewhat more muted, after the Summit of January 1994.i In some cases, old European institu­tions are even being considered as models for new ones in other parts of the world (e.g. the CSCE, which is sometimes envisaged as a model for the proposed creation of a Conference for Security and Cooperation in Asia).

An additional argument in favor of the multilateralization of security policies is that as contemporary problems become intrinsi­cally multidi­mension­al they require a multilat­eral approach. The more security is defined in economic, political and social terms, beyond purely military considerations, the more individual states are likely not to be prepared to address the complex solutions single­handed­ly.

A final reason to push toward multilateralization in Europe is the sad realization that nationalism (whether it is real or, as is often the case, it is built-up spuriously around `imagined communi­ties'iii instead of real nations) is likely to be associat­ed with war. Such nationalism may be a cause or a consequence of war. Most often, and most dangerously, it is used by political élites as a catalyst for the channeling of military and other resources toward the achieve­ment of war aims.

The Re-nationalization of Security Policies

Paradoxically, while security institutions have gained increasing appeal and face more challenging tasks ahead, the end of the Cold War has also ushered in a trend toward reinforced national outlooks in the foreign and security policies of most major countries, both from the West and from what used to be the Eastern bloc. This trend has been caused by several factors, which vary from country to country, though there are some common denomina­tors. The main question which applies to all countries involved in European security affairs (broadly speaking, members of the CSCE) is: What do states and nations expect of interna­tion­al security institu­tions? The following paragraphs will aim to create a sort of `map' of political forces which are for or against additional security roles for international institutions. It will seek both to analyze how they might be intertwined and to assess their relative strengths and weakness­es. The analysis will cover the major countries from Western Europe, the United States, the Common­wealth of Indepen­dent States, and Eastern Europe.

In the United States, a strong bipartisan support has developed for continued American involvement in world security affairs through international institutions. At the same time, certain tendencies toward unilateralism and isolationism may be observed as well. Some have argued for a unilateral US role as the world's only superpower, able to persuade or compel all others to follow a policy of political democracy, free-market economy, and respect for the rule of law and human rights.vi In European affairs, the US has placed a strong emphasis on the UN and NATO, has been largely skeptical of the CSCE, and has displayed a thinly veiled opposition to a greater EU role in security issues; however, it has generally supported a stronger role for the WEU.

In most of Western Europe, prevailing political forces are still at least nominally in favor of an increasingly multilateral approach to security policies, but there is a lesser degree of consensus than before. Germany is a special case, and is addressed separately below. In the UK, a continued adherence to the Atlantic Alliance clashes with the British reluctance to contribute to the creation of a supranational European pillar within it. In France, a continued propensity toward national solutions contradicts a renewed interest in coordination with the US and NATO. In Italy, there is a continued consensus on the necessity of a NATO and European Union framework of reference, as well as a yet undefined and uneasy mix of nationalist ambitions in the Balkans and the Mediter­ranean.

More or less everywhere in the Western world, there is a diffuse if somewhat rudimentarily articulated feeling that the disappearance of the Soviet enemy means there is no longer any need for common security arrangements, much less for commitment to a common defense. Because the common Soviet threat no lomger exists, the reasoning goes, national priorities among the Allies now prevail over collective ones, and they just happen to diverge, thus requiring unilateral ways and means to address them.

There is abundant evidence of this in recent history—e.g. in the different perceptions among the major Western sates toward the crises in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Eastern Europe and the former USSR. In addition, domestic security problems, such as the survival of a viable national defense industry, are becoming more pressing, and politicians must tackle them on a national basis. Therefore, the proponents of this line of reasoning argue there is now a need to reorient Western security postures toward a revaluation of national instruments to be used for national purposes.

This sentiment becomes manifest in two ways: some argue for a straightforward renationalization of foreign policy in general, and of defense posture and procurement plans in particular. Defense budget cuts also contribute to impairing collaborative procurement pro­grams—though the laws of the economies of scale should suggest otherwise—as each state tries to save a propor­tionally greater slice of a shrinking pie for its national industry.
Others in Western Europe and in the US argue that collective defense arrangements must enlarge their member­ship or risk becoming out-of-date. According to this view, Eastern Europe is no longer a potential enemy, but a security cooperation partner to be integrated as soon as possible in Western security institutions. In some cases, however, this second view might be used by the advocates of the first to provoke a dilution of the effectiveness of interna­tional institutions in security affairs: the British advocacy of a quick EU expansion to the C&EE countries comes to mind.

For Germany, the issue is complicated by the fact that the process of renationaliza­tion of its foreign and security policy is part of the process of its recent re-acquisition of full national sovereign rights. Both processes have catalyzed a marked degree of national reassertion.vii German predominance in the EU has become more manifest, not only in the economic and monetary field, but also in foreign policy. The finest example of this was the diplomatic recognition of the indepen­dence of Slovenia and Croatia, which the EU adopted under strong German pressure—something which would have been unimaginable before reunifica­tion.

In 1992, the decision was taken to send troops out of German territory (for the first time since World War II) when they were earmarked to contribute to the UN operation Restore Hope in Somalia (albeit in a non-combat role). Whether Germany's new activism will be an expression of renewed nationalism or a contribu­tion to collective, multinational and institution­alized Western security policies remains to be seen. An important test-case will be the way Germany handles its increasingly assertive request for permanent member­ship (and right of veto) in the UN Security Council.

Much of the same that was said above with respect to Germany applies, mutatis mutandis, to C&EE and non-Russian former Soviet states. Germany had to accept limited sovereignty and mandatory military integration with the United States for forty years because it had been defeated in World War II. Eastern Europeans see the renationalization of their foreign and security policies as an instrument of emancipation from the forced integration they were subjected to under the Soviet Union's hegemonic influence.

The post-Soviet Russian government has been at the forefront of the efforts by former communist states to gain an increasing role, if not outright cooptation, into Western multilater­al security institutions. In this effort, it has been supported by a majority of opinion makers and security specialists in the country.viii At the same time, again as a result of the rebirth of the Russian nation after the collapse of the USSR, there is an on-going renationaliza­tion of Russian foreign and security policy. Moreover, nationalism in foreign policy is perceived by many in Moscow as a means to maintain world-power status without being forced to compete with the US according to Western rules. More recently, nationalism in security policy has been a tool in the hands of conservatives and would-be restorers of autocracy, who have argued that both the Gorbachev and the Yeltsin leaderships have been selling the country out to the West.

Economic failures, the lack of decisive Western aid, and recent disagree­ments over the role of some international institutions in world crises (most notably in the ex-Yugoslavia) have dangerously reinforced this trend. Whether and how Russia will contribute to the institution­alized and multilateral management of European security in the future will depend to a large extent on the outcome of this domestic political struggle. In short, this struggles resembles the historical juxtaposition between Westernizers and Slavophiles, which has shaped so uch Russian history since Peter the Great. Successful reforms, coupled with effective Western aid, will likely produce a victory for the Westernizers, and this will result in a more internation­ally cooperative and multilaterally-oriented Russia. On the contrary, ineffective or half-hearted reforms, and/or insuffi­cient or ineffecient aid will make a victory of some combination of Slavophile forces easier, and would likely produce a more inward-looking and nationalist attitude.

Much as in Eastern Europe, nationalism in foreign and security affairs has been an instrument of nation-building in many non-Russian ex-Soviet republics. The Central Asian republics have shown a propensity to retain close ties to Moscow. The newly indepen­dent Caucasian and European states initially displayed greater national assertiveness, but were later forced to revise their position and they, too, are again rebulding security connections with Russia. The viability of these national choices remains to be seen, however, and it is hoped that national identities will develop in an institutionally coopera­tive context rather than through the assertion of mutually incompati­ble national claims. The challenge for the West (and for those Western states, like Turkey, which have the greatest influence in that region) is to assess what, if anything, can be done to channel national debates in some of the major non-Russian ex-Soviet states toward the exploitation of the best opportuni­ties for a cooperative rather than a conflictual approach to multilateralism.

Thus, the end of the blocs in Europe has not brought about, a romantic cultural renais­sance of pre-Yalta European nations as some naïvely hoped after the revolutions of 1989. Rather, it has resulted in the revamping of national perspectives that might lead to a network of incompati­ble and therefore conflictual claims. In some cases, this is the myopic resurgence of narrow-minded political chauvin­ism, often masqueraded behind the old spiritual and moral values which for centuries pitted Europeans against Europeans in a tragic sequence of negative-sum wargames.

National and Vital Security Interests in Europe

Like most political paradigms (both domestic and interna­tional) the concept of `national interest' has changed since the Cold War. This is especially true in security affairs. Despite the rather bleak picture presented in the preceding paragraphs, there do exist genuine national interests which are perfectly compati­ble with a cooperative multination­al approach to security. These may be economic interests (e.g. milk or steel production capacity; or agricultur­al import quotas in the EU). They may be related to the environ­ment (e.g. the regulation of international transit rights for cargo, or control of pollutants that are not usually very respectful of national borders).

National interests may also be political, as country A may jostle for political advantage vis-à-vis country B by establish­ing special bilateral ties with country C, (e.g. to push its export products, to obtain special access to C's economic resources or technologies or to foster the rights of its affiliated ethnic community in country C). Finally, there may even be military-related national security interests, as might be the case in future contingen­cies similar to the Falklands war, the US-Libyan clashes of 1981 and 1986, and the US intervention in Grenada or Panama. But the national interests involved in this type of operations can hardly be described as vital.

The interests described in the preceding paragraphs are definable and defensible at the national level, but they are not vital. In light of this contradic­tory trend to look at security problems from an international perspective while nationalist pressures build, it seems appropriate to refer no longer to `national' security interests, but, rather, to `vital' security inter­ests in the contempo­rary Europe­an land­scape.

The most fundamental vital interest for post Cold War Europe­an states remains the protection of the physical safety and territorial integrity of nation states against the danger of attack from resur­gent, residual or wholly new military threats—including internal threats from within existing states. While the Soviet threat is gone, a variety of actual or potential military threats still exists. Newly independent Russia seeks to become a security partner today, and in some circumstances it has proved that it is able to be one, but it is far from certain that this will be true in the future. While the danger of post-Soviet prolifera­tion is usually exaggerated in the press, other nuclear powers might emerge from the ashes of the USSR. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a distinct possibility around Europe's southern periphery. Any of these develop­ments could threaten the vital security interests of European states. As for threats from within existing states, the example of Yugoslavia speaks for itself: while not likely to be replicated in the same scale, it might not be the last European state to break-up violently, and the repercussions might yet be felt outside of Yugoslavia itself.

The second vital interest is to maintain a minimum standard of living and economic development. This implies, among other things, the preservation of a free market economy, unimpeded access both to sources of raw materials and to foreign markets, and freedom of navigation over the high seas. Recent events in the Gulf have demonstrated (if there had been any doubt) that the defense of this vital interest can not quite be taken for granted even after the end of the Soviet threat to NATO sea-lines of communication.

The final, and most important, vital interest lies in the protec­tion of the Western way of life. Despite all its shortcom­ings, is increasingly accepted as a pan-European model. This translates into the preservation of a pluralist democracy, which in turn means freedom of movement for people and informa­tion (and hence open borders) but also support for the social order of civil society (and hence regulation of migration flows).

Other formulations could be devised, but the above are by and large what the general consensus within the Western civiliza­tion has come to define as `vital interests'. But these are not synonymous with `national' interests; none is nationally definable or defensible, by any state, but especially not by European medium powers. The following paragraphs will discuss why this is true now even more than during the Cold War.

When two blocs divided Europe, Western nations had to join up forces to counter the Soviet Union. The possibility always existed, however, that one or more could try to strike a deal with Moscow, in extreme circumstanc­es, for example in order to avoid the escalation of nuclear war on its territory. This possibility applied to the Allies on both sides of the Atlantic: the US at times feared that the Europeans might rather be `red than dead'; the Europeans feared that the US would fight a limited war in Europe but not challenge the Soviets to the point of a reciprocal nuclear exchange. Such fears were based on rational calculations of national interests which took into account the probable behavior of con­cerned parties, bona fide allies as they might have been. Today, sources of resurgent, residual or new threats (nuclear, conventional, or anything in between, as they might come) are unlikely to be as amenable to the same rational thinking as was the centralized and monolithic Soviet state; hence, it is unlikely that the freedom of `opting out' would still be available to any party in a future continen­tal crisis.

A discussion of increasing international economic interde­pendence is beyond the scope of this chapter; suffice it to say that the end of the Cold War has opened far greater opportunities for international economic exchanges and therefore for growth. As recent vicissi­tudes in the Gulf have demonstrated, however, free access to raw materials must sometimes be guaranteed by collective efforts, including by means of armed force. On a different plane, the GATT negotiations demonstrate how, mutatis mutandis, an equal degree of collective political commitment is necessary to ensure free access to markets, the other essential ingredient of world economic growth and prosperity.

As for the third of the vital interests considered here, during the Cold War, it was possible, indeed obligatory, to protect democracy in the West while avoiding any determined effort to promote it in the East. Today, without the Iron Curtain, consolidating democracy in the East is increasingly becoming a pre-condition for maintaining it in the West. Indeed, as European borders are wide open to flows of people and information, it would be utopian to think that a privileged island of prosperity and freedom can be maintained only in selected parts of the continent. Again, multilateral effort are indispens­able, for it is unthinkable that any single state, however influential, could pursue such an ambitious goal single-handedly.
The foregoing does not suggest that national interests no longer exist in Europe today; nor does it lead to a prescription of exclu­sively multilateral solutions. There are interests that can and should be defined at the national level, just as there are other interests that can be defined at the regional, provincial or municipal level. In fact, it is not a coincidence that this time of increasing nationalism is also a time of increasing demand for regional and local autonomy throughout Europe, both East and West.

What is sometimes referred to as the rebirth of `national­ism' in reality is often tribalism, parochialism or fanaticism decorated with a patina of religious fervor. In post-Cold War Europe, the nation-state is in some cases as much in crisis than international alliances and organizations, if not more so. More Europeans are rediscover­ing the value of local autonomy than are revamping that of national independence. The recent support build-up garnered by Flemish separatists and Northern Italian secessionists are the latest additions to what seemed to be the isolated exceptions of Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. The nineties are more likely to go down in history as a decade of threats to nationhood than as a decade of nation-building.

Multilateralization vs. Renationalization of Security

The preceding section has argued that national approaches are not adequate for the defense of post-Cold War vital inter­ests, both in Western Europe and in what used to be its political antago­nist. Therefore, there is a need for a renewed multination­al effort directed toward the solution of the new challenges to those interests, especially when it comes to security and de­fense. The major challenge in contemporary European security, then, is not whether, but how to make interna­tional security most effective to address current risks (which are more likely and more controversial than those of the Cold War) before they degenerate or escalate to uncontrollable levels of vio­lence.

Assuming that the future harbors the need for a multination­al approach, the question arises as to how to pursue it. Two basic avenues are possible: the first is that of ad hoc coali­tions, in which, states reserve the right to act on a case-by-case basis.xii The advantage of this type of multilateral action is that it is easier to achieve, as it does not demand any renunciation of national sovereignty by those states which agree to take part in it.

An approach of this kind was adopted in the multilateral response to the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991. It might suffice in extreme circum­stances, such as those which are most threaten­ing, least controversial but also least likely (e.g. the Gulf). But the international community (or even just the Western community) will not enjoy the luxury of operating under such clear-cut circumstanc­es very often. It is more likely that most future security threats will be less extreme, and therefore more controversial. In these cases, improvisa­tion might be risky, and there is a greater need to develop a set of pre-arranged criteria, rules, and standard operating proce­dures; in other words, there is a need for an institution­al­ized approach.

One example in which an improvised decision-making process has failed tragically is the crisis in Yugoslavia. The perceived security threat has been considered (rightly or wrongly) as less than an extreme danger by the US and by Western Europeans (but also by most C&EE countries). Institutions have not been empowered with either the political and legal mandate or the necessary instruments to intervene effectively. Ad hoc collective arrangements have turned out to be half-hearted and failed.xiii States have pre­ferred a largely national approach, and the result has been a nearly complete failure.xiv Some states (as well as journalists and scholars) have unfairly blamed various institu­tions for this failure. There is certainly much that needs to be done at the UN, in NATO and most of all in the EU/WEU to make those organiza­tions better fit to deal with future challenges. But the main responsibili­ty for interna­tional institutional failure rests with the govern­ments of member states which, unlike in the Iraq/Kuwait case, did not put the instruments of those institutions in a position to act effective­ly.

Conclusions

International security institutions are indispensable for an adequate approach to the post-Cold War security problems of Europe. One does not need to be an `idealist of the post-Cold War mend-the-world school'xv to realize that no single state can address, let alone begin to resolve, the complex intricacies of resurgent nationalistic cleavages, civil struggles and potential conflagrations across borders. This emerges with sobering clarity from most of the chapters presented in this volume. Nevertheless, because of the new strength gained by old pre-Cold War (rather than new post-Cold War) thinking, multilateralism is still all too often seen as an unaffordable luxury.xvi But it is Realpoli­tik, not idealism, which calls for a wider and more structured pattern of interna­tional cooperation in order to best serve the vital interests of European democracies (both old and new).xvii It would be naïve idealism to presume that those interests can be served through the romantic restoration of the nation-state to its pre-Cold War preroga­tives, cultural, political or moral as they may be.

To pursue this multilateral approach, all countries of Europe (but the principal responsibility inevitably falls upon Western Europe) need to both deepen and widen international security cooperation. In this, Europe does not have to start from scratch; much was done during the Cold War which can still be utilized if it is properly built upon. NATO is the obvious place to start to maintain a collective security and collective defense apparatus, the first of the three vital interests considered in this study. The WEU has been revived after the end of Cold War, and there is no question that, in time, it might work as the future European pillar of the transatlantic alliance if the political will is there to make that happen. The member states of these two organizations (together, but not individually) clearly possess the necessary military, technolog­ical and economic resources to face the new risks of the post-Cold War world in which Central and Eastern Europe in no longer an enemy but an increasingly effective security partner.

As of mid-1994, however, partnership with the former Eastern adversaries is still fragile. Collective security bridges to Eastern Europe are being built, among others through the NACC and the WEU's Forum for Consultation, but success is not guaranteed. It is not enough to pile economic, military, and technologi­cal resources, to organize conferences and sign agreements. There is a much deeper need to build up political coherence among states and peoples which have long been suspi­cious of and estranged from one another. This will take time, but there is no reason to think that the successful construction of a collective security system in Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s could not be replicat­ed, in the late 1990s and beyond, across the whole continent.

The second vital interest has been defined here as the mainte­nance of unimpeded access to raw materials and the fostering of market economy. Here, too, there are useful precedents that make good examples: the energy sharing schemes of both the Internation­al Energy Agency (IEA) and the EU have proven largely success­ful. The European system of pipelines guarantees that energy security is a preeminently international end, which will require international means to achieve and maintain. They could be further improved to guarantee access to primary sources and provide a safety net in case of emergency.
Here, too, there is a need to expand the multilateral approach to Eastern Europe. Again, there is some degree of similarity to what was done in Western Europe in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, when the democracies, threatened by rising prices and the two oil crises, effectively overcame their narrowly defined national interests in order to foster the common good.

The strengthening of democracy, the on-going gradual opening of frontiers to movement of goods, people, and ideas strengthen democracy, the third vital interest considered in this paper is concerned. The CSCE and the Council of Europe have contributed to achieve this, and their further strengthening will be useful to accomplish more. But their action, particularly in the case of the CSCE, will need the backing of adequate military force by other institutions if necessary.

Unlike during the Cold War, when the West had to close its eyes to human rights violations because of overrid­ing security concerns, ignoring violations of those human rights today can be a determinant to political instability. During Cold War, stability was a synonym for preservation of the status quo; today, on the contrary, stability can only be maintained through a careful management of change, and there is a change toward increased democracy; change must be actively assisted.

Implications for the Atlantic Alliance

The broad conclusion that emerges from this analysis for North American and European vital interests (as defined in this chapter) is that they are even more inseparable after than they were during the Cold War. It is becoming increasing­ly evident, as argued in several chapters in this volume, that Europe is less than fully prepared to act alone if the US does not lead. It is also evident that the US is not ready to act alone (whether because it can not afford do so—politically or militari­ly—or because domestic politics will not allow it) if Europe does not contribute significantly. If the US can not face post-Cold War security challenges unilaterally, it would be preposterous to think that others can.

Therefore, in the context of the debate over a new European security identity, a true post-Cold War `Europeanist' is an Atlanticist. Because Western Europe is still far from reaching the point where strategic independence from its Atlantic partners is a viable option, an alleged supporter of a European security policy or defense identity who advocates that it be distinct from a North American one is more likely to be a nationalist in disguise.

In recent cases where real post-Cold War security challenges had to be met (e.g. the Iraqi aggression in Kuwait, simmering threats of nuclear and missile prolifera­tion, the break-up of the USSR and Yugoslavia) one lesson has emerged clearly: when the US has become involved, the Europeans have acted; when the US has been recalcitrant, Europeans have hesitated. This will likely be a pattern for the rest of the 1990s and beyond.

Yet, to call for a continued Euro-Atlantic security partnership is not to advocate its immutability. It has changed in the past, and, after the revolutions of 1989-1991, it must change again. While the US inexorably reorients much of its political and economic attention toward the Pacific, Europeans must take up a greater share of both burden and responsibility for the handling of Atlantic security. This means Europeans must expand their security horizon, not contract it as they have gradually been doing since World War II. If Europeans continue to retreat and narrow their security focus to national interests, they will not be able to protect their vital inter­ests.

To assume greater responsibilities in a wider security horizon, Europeans have no choice but to act together, selecting and reinforcing the appropriate institutional military and political instruments as needed. For most Western Europeans, this increased role of international institutions has the additional function of keeping the US involved in European security affairs. In addition, some institutions continue to be the venue for Western Europeans to integrate their own foreign and security policies and postures, implement burden-sharing, build coalitions on an ad hoc basis, and exchange information.

The US, of course, can protect its vital security interests on a national basis to a somewhat greater extent than Europeans can, but not much more; it also requires multilateral political legitimation and allied military cooperation for the protection of its interests, in Europe and elsewhere. In the past, the US has sometimes been less than forthright about its position vis-à-vis the formation of a European identity in foreign and security policy.xix It might be helpful if this ambiguity were soon resolved in favor of an unequivocal recognition that increased European commitments (political, economic, and military) will earn additional European responsi­bilities in the transat­lantic decision-making process on security affairs.

In sum, there is an urgent need for what has been referred to as a `new partnership' between the US and Europe (initially Western Europe). This is necessary to keep the transatlantic alliance strong in these rapidly changing times, and it is therefore also a pre-condition for a fruitful expansion of this historically success­ful partnership eastward. Only a strong and renewed Western alliance will be able to satisfy the quest for collec­tive security (and perhaps, later, collective defense) that is coming from its erstwhile adversar­ies in C&EE and in the former Soviet Union.

29 May 1994

The New East-West Relations in Europe

Prepared for JIIA/IFRI conference on

Building A Global and Regional Framework for Peace and Prosperity: Political and Economic Security in the New World Order

Tokyo, 2-3 June 1994
revised version

Premise

Since the end of the Cold War, the security of Central and Eastern Europe (C&EE) is a necessary (though not sufficient) conditio sine qua non for the security of Europe as a whole. This is not entirely new: already during Cold War, the West had recognized that its security was contingent upon that of the other half of Europe (of course, as perceived by Moscow). This resulted in some degree of hypocrisy on the part of the West. For example, the USSR got its first bout of détente and the start of CSCE negotiations right after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Today, there is complementarity in place of hostility in new East-West relations, but Europe is far from "whole and free"—as George Bush, among others, proclaimed it as early as 1990. C&EE is increasingly fragmented and, far from being free, many parts of it are at or near war to preserve their freedom. Paradoxically, after the virtual disappearance of any significant military threat, security is an ever rarer commodity in most of Eastern Europe.

In Western Europe, the disappearance of both the massive Soviet deployments in C&EE and (more importantly) of their even more massive reinforcement capabilities, have not produced the results that were hoped for. The perception of security has not improved. War is being waged in parts of the continents, and tensions are high in others, but the danger of conflagration is not clearly definable or predictable. Therefore, such dangers as they exist are not sufficient to mobilize public opinions, though they are clear and present enough to worry most observers. Increasing or nascent threats from the South of Europe's periphery only make things worse.

Under these circumstances, this paper argues first, that the C&EE states are dangerously reverting to nationalist approach in foreign policy; second, that this approach does not augur well for the continent, as today's Europe vital interests are no longer national interests, and vice versa; and third, that, therefore, international institutions should play a pivotal role if C&EE are to be integrated into a future peaceful order in Europe. While their performance has been less than ideal in recent years, the richer and more influential Western countries have no alternative to their strengthening and revival.


East-West (?) Relations in the New Europe

To the extent that it indicated the confrontation between the blocs, the term "East-West" is now obsolete. The very word "Eastern" Europe is generally considered demeaning; to refer to "Balkan" states or peoples is sometimes even taken as insulting by those who geographically belong to those areas. This is considered terminology from Cold War, reflecting obsolete bipolar concepts. The new commonly accepted term, which will obligingly be used here, is C&EE, but changing their definitions rarely solve problems, and declarations of intent do not change geography.

In fact, the term "East-West", though perhaps impolitic in the current parlance, is still valid in some respects. While there is no longer an adversarial relationship between the two "sides" of the word, European countries are not yet parts of a group of states definable as such except in the purest (and least significant) geographical terms. They do not form a working system, let alone a coherent whole.

Within these new East-West relations, the hope for the future is that cooperation and integration can replace confrontation, most importantly between Russia and the rest of Europe. The lack of a solid cooperative relationship between Russia and the rest of Europe is the most serious threat to the stability of the continent in the years to come. That is why the West, regardless of who is in charge in Moscow, will have to continue to devote special care to the security perceptions and economic condition of this country. The NATO-Russia agreement of 22 June 1994 fails to acknowledge a "special role" for Russia within the Partnership for Peace (within which all partners remain on an equal basis) but the accompanying "Summary of Conclusions" provides for Russia-NATO cooperation "beyond" Partnership for Peace. The relationship with Russia is the single most delicate for the West, but not the only preoccupation of post-Cold War Europe.

A second source of potential instability lies in Central and Eastern Europe itself. In the immediate aftermath of the 1989 revolutions, political euphoria overshadowed economic concerns, but it soon faded away as harsh economic realities became clear. Initial illusions about cure-all capitalism settled in. Five years into democracy, a crucial question in C&EE is whether political enthusiasm will be enough to overcome prolonged economic disappointment and hardship. Alternatively, will economic disappointment undermine political achievements? A race between economics and politics in now going on: it is not yet clear whether the post-1989 political capital still available will suffice to overcome current and future economic hardship.

To make matters worse, new regional cleavages have come to the fore after the fall of the wall. Some new cleavages are actually revived old ones, i.e. from the pre-World War II era. Most seriously, most of C&EE has long been anti-Russian before it became anti-Soviet, and it can now express its anti-Russian feelings again. Other regional and local cleavages include that between Hungary and Romania, Czechs and Slovaks, Serbs and Hungarians, beyond, of course, those within former Yugoslavia. One may add an anti-South of the world prejudice, particularly as competition for Western aid becomes more acute. If economic realities beat political sentiments in the race described above, these cleavages might be ignited beyond the plane of peaceful confrontation into violent conflict, and it would be imprudent to assume that the Western half of the continent would not be engulfed in it.

The best hope to avert such an outcome lies in integrating C&EE in the economic, political and security structure of Western Europe. For four decades C&EE peoples have been forced to look at international integration (and, more in general, at any form of internationalism) as one representation of the division of Europe into two divergently integrating blocs (theirs being under the USSR). The so-called "fraternal" relations within the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, a euphemism for Soviet controlled economic and security planning, has left deep scars. Consequently, there is a strong tendency among C&EE to equate nationalism with freedom and independence.

In light of the above, it is not surprising that C&EE electorates and leaderships have little sympathy (or understanding) for true international interdependence. Nationalism (whether it is real or, as is often the case, it is built-up spuriously around "imagined communi­ties" instead of real nations) has blossomed, and nationalism, historically, is likely to be associat­ed with war. It may be a cause or a consequence of war. Most often, and most dangerously, it is used by political élites as a catalyst for the channeling of military and other resources toward the achievement of war aims. Dangerously, C&EE often look to past rather than to future, longing for a restoration of pre-communism, the Soviet occupation being seen as a historical aberration in their national paths to development.

The only magnet for them was initially the EU, which was seen as a locomotive to pull them up from the doldrums of economic stagnation, mainly through infusions of German funds. Subsequently, this enthusiasm dwindled as it became clear that membership was not in the cards for the short term—see chart 5. A EU widening to C&EE is still in the agenda of Western diplomacies, but the time horizon has been pushed back. Subsequently, a strong interest developed for membership in NATO. These two issues will be further discussed below.


National and Vital Interests in Europe

Like most political paradigms (both domestic and interna­tional) the concept of "national interest" has changed since the Cold War. This is especially true in security affairs. An emerging issue in this context has been how to re-define national and international interests in an increasing interdependent world in which international institutions play a greater role—albeit not always satisfactorily so.

Of course, there are genuine national interests which are perfectly compati­ble with a cooperative multination­al approach to security. These may be economic interests (e.g. milk or steel production capacity; or agricultur­al import quotas in the EU). They may be related to the environ­ment (e.g. the regulation of international transit rights for cargo, or control of pollutants that are not usually very respectful of national borders). National interests may also be political, as country A may jostle for political advantage vis-à-vis country B by establish­ing special bilateral ties with country C, (e.g. to push its export products, to obtain special access to C's economic resources or technologies or to foster the rights of its affiliated ethnic community in country C). Finally, there may even be military-related national security interests, as might be the case in future contingen­cies similar to the Falklands war, the US-Libyan clashes of 1981 and 1986, and the US intervention in Grenada or Panama. But the national interests involved in this type of operations can hardly be described as vital.

These interests are definable and defensible at the national level, but they are not vital. In light of the contradic­tion between the need to look at security problems from an international perspective, and the trend toward reinforced nationalist pressures build, it seems appropriate to refer no longer to "national" interests, but, rather, to "vital" inter­ests in the contempo­rary European land­scape. Which are the vital interests of post-Cold War Europe?

The most fundamental vital interest for post-Cold War European states remains the protection of the physical safety and territorial integrity of nation states against the danger of attack from resurgent, residual or wholly new military threats—including internal threats from within existing states. While the Soviet threat is gone, a variety of actual or potential military threats still exists. Newly independent Russia seeks to become a security partner today, and in some circumstances it has proved that it is able to be one, but it is far from certain that this will be true in the future. While the danger of post-Soviet prolifera­tion is usually exaggerated in the press, other nuclear powers might, in time, emerge from the ashes of the USSR. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a distinct possibility around Europe's southern periphery. Any of these develop­ments could threaten the vital security interests of European states. As for threats from within existing states, the example of Yugoslavia speaks for itself: while not likely to be replicated in the same scale, it might not be the last European state to break-up violently, and the repercussions might yet be felt outside of Yugoslavia itself.

The second vital interest is to at a minimum, maintain our standard of living and economic development. This implies, among other things, the preservation of a free market economy, unimpeded access both to sources of raw materials and to foreign markets, and freedom of navigation over the high seas. Recent events in the Gulf have demonstrated (had there been any doubt) that the defense of this vital interest can not quite be taken for granted even after the end of the Soviet threat to NATO sea-lines of communication.

The final, and most important, vital interest lies in the protection of the Western way of life. Despite all its shortcom­ings, is increasingly accepted as a pan-European model. This translates into the preservation of a pluralist democracy, which in turn means freedom of movement for people and informa­tion (and hence open borders) but also support for the social order of civil society (and hence regulation of migration flows).

Other formulations could be devised, but the above are by and large what the general consensus within the Western civiliza­tion has come to define as "vital interests". But these are not synonymous with "national" interests; none is nationally definable or defensible, by any state, and certainly not by European medium powers. The following paragraphs will discuss why this is true now even more than during the Cold War.

When Europe was divided in two blocs, Western nations had to join up forces to counter the Soviet Union. The possibility always existed, however, that one or more could try to strike a deal with Moscow, in extreme circumstanc­es, for example in order to avoid the escalation of nuclear war on its territory. This possibility applied to the Allies on both sides of the Atlantic: the US at times feared that the Europeans might rather be "red than dead"; the Europeans feared that the US would fight a limited war in Europe but not challenge the Soviets to the point of a reciprocal nuclear exchange. Such fears were based on rational calculations of national interests which took into account the probable behavior of concerned parties, bona fide allies as they might have been. Today, sources of resurgent, residual or new threats (nuclear, conventional, or anything in between, as they might come) are unlikely to be as amenable to the same rational thinking as was the centralized and monolithic Soviet state; hence, it is unlikely that the freedom of "opting out" would still be available to any party in a future continen­tal crisis.

A detailed discussion of increasing international economic interde­pendence is beyond the scope of this paper; suffice it to say that the end of the Cold War has opened far greater opportunities for international economic exchanges—and therefore for growth. As recent vicissi­tudes in the Gulf have demonstrated, however, free access to raw materials must sometimes be guaranteed by collective efforts, including by means of armed force. On a different plane, the GATT negotiations demonstrate how, mutatis mutandis, an equal degree of collective political commitment is necessary to ensure free access to international markets, the other essential ingredient of world economic growth and prosperity.
As for the third of the vital interests considered here, during the Cold War, it was possible, indeed obligatory, to protect democracy in the West while avoiding any determined effort to promote it in the East. Today, without the Iron Curtain, consolidating democracy in the East is increasingly becoming a pre-condition for maintaining it in the West. Indeed, as European borders are wide open to flows of people and information, it would be utopian to think that a privileged island of prosperity and freedom can be maintained only in selected parts of the continent. Again, multilateral effort are indispens­able, for it is unthinkable that any single state, however influential, could pursue such an ambitious goal single-handedly.
The foregoing does not suggest that national interests no longer exist in Europe today; nor does it lead to a prescription of exclusively multilateral solutions. There are interests that can and should be defined at the national level, just as there are other interests that can be defined at the regional, provincial or municipal level. In fact, it is not a coincidence that this time of increasing nationalism is also a time of increasing demand for regional and local autonomy throughout Europe, both East and West.

What is sometimes referred to as the rebirth of "national­ism" in reality is often tribalism, parochialism or fanaticism decorated with a patina of religious fervor. In post-Cold War Europe, the nation-state is in some cases as much in crisis as are international alliances and organizations, if not more so. More Europeans are rediscover­ing the value of local autonomy than are revamping that of national independence. The recent support garnered by Flemish separatists and Northern Italian secessionists are the latest additions to what seemed to be the isolated exceptions of Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. The nineties are more likely to go down in history as a decade of threats to nation-states than as a decade of nation-building.


The Agenda for the West

Eastern requests for integration in Western institutions translate into some degree of Western embarrassment. C&EE states are in a position of demandeur for access to markets, security and political identity. More than anything, they want to join Western institutions, generally seen as the only solution to all three issues. They by and large realize that no single state is equipped to address these new types of problems and help them. They understand that, as the West has often been preaching, the solution to these risks and challenges requires a multinational approach, with contributions from both East and West. This is true in security as well as in economics.

 The answers to the questions posed in the preceding paragraphs carry important implications for Western Europe for its possible repercussions in international relations. If the cleavages discussed above are not resolved, conflict might well spread beyond the region of C&EE. Under these circumstances, the risks to common European security that are coming from this new Europe today can be categorized into four groups. First, there is a danger that local conflicts may lead to region-wide conflagration. As of late 994, this is the case, most seriously, in the Balkans, but to a lesser extent also in the Caucasus.

Second, these conflicts, and the destruction and disorder that they carry along, may provide ammunition to reactionary and/or nostalgic power groups, and thus provoke a backfiring of authoritarianism. This may not be of a communist character, but it may be ultra-nationalistic and perhaps involve the armed forces.
Third, Western Europe may become the target of terrorism, as frustrated extremist groups may seek to attract international attention to this or that ethnic, territorial or "national" cause. Connections with Western European terrorist organizations, such as the IRA or ETA, are to be expected.

Finally, and most seriously, Eastern European conflicts come at a time of delicate transition in the foreign policy relations among Western nations. Cleavages in the East have already provoked diverging attitudes in the West, and may result in a weakening of Western cohesion. The handling of the Yugoslav crisis has already resulted in some damage to the developing process of harmonization of Western European foreign policies.

What can and should the West do to address C&EE's demands, since on the answer that will be given to them depend also our own interests? The West has three instruments for the creation of security conditions around its periphery: wealth, advanced know-how and institutions. Wealth is the least useful one. It can only provide emergency relief, but can not provide economic stability and hence security in the medium-long term. Reforms and time are necessary for this, and too much aid can even be counterproductive if it allows for artificial life-support to be administered to inefficient economic mechanisms. Of course, Western wealth can not buy military security, since all Eastern countries must, on the contrary, reduce their military commitments. As for Western military intervention, in conflicts in Eastern Europe or in the Mediterranean region, the problems there are hardly of a financial nature.

Advanced know-how is potentially more useful than wealth because it helps create an indispensable basis for long-term efficiency and thus social stability. In this respect, managerial know-how will be more relevant than advanced technology. But it, too, does nothing to alleviate immediate political security problems. Much time will be required before organizational restructuring and technology injections will produce appreciable results in the societies of the East.
Institutions remain the only instrument potentially capable of preventing and perhaps repressing European conflicts before they spread too widely. This paper will sketch what three regional institutions (the EU and the WEU, which for the purposes of this paper are considered together; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) could contribute toward continental security.

The nature of the questions involved immediately points to the fact that the required approach will be multidimensional: for analytical purposes, the following analysis will be divided in security, economic and political aspects, though the three are clearly interconnected.


Economic Cooperation

Economic interdependence, long established in Western Europe, is difficult to replicate in the continent as a whole. No doubt, such replication will be profitable (and in any case probably inevitable) in the long run if Western Europe is to be competitive with the US and Japan. But, as John M. Keynes put it, in the long run we will all be dead. The economic integration of Eastern Europe in the pan-European (and therefore world) market can not wait so long.

Therefore, when discussing the extension of economic interdependence to C&EE, the question is not whether, but when and how to do it. The widespread argument that Eastern Europe is not yet ready is only partially true, or, rather, it only explains one half of the problem. The other half is that it is Western Europe which fears losing important markets to cheaper Eastern labor. This is true, first and foremost, in those very sectors in which C&EE economies are stronger: textiles, agriculture and steel. On the one hand, to allow C&EE producers into EU markets might spell the end (or at least a drastic down-sizing) of those industries in the EU. On the other hand, it would both make those products available at cheaper prices (and thus boost productivity) and stimulate competition.

Of course, this approach runs directly against the grain of EU subsidization policies. But the dilemma between narrow-minded national protection and opening to the East will once again have to be faced in the near future: the consequences of the choice that will be made are going to have a strong and lasting impact on the economic relationship between Western Europe and C&EE states. In the latter, it will also have profound political and social consequences which the governments of EU member states will do well to consider before giving in to domestic lobbying and pressures for continued protection.

EU membership remains a coveted ambition for C&EE states, not only for economic but also for political and (in perspective) security reasons. It may provide some degree of political reassurance, but certainly the EU does not have the tools for any military-related task. This may change in the future with the realization of a common security policy and a then of a common defense, but the time frame is far too long. For the next several crucial years, most instruments of security policy will remain in the hands of national governments, while the process toward the creation of a common security and foreign policy continues, hopefully, to overcome national and bureaucratic hurdles.

In any case, even when such a common policy exists, caution will be imperative, because for the Union to provide security to third parties would probably mean to grant accession: "extended deterrence" by the Union or the WEU is definitely not in the cards for the foreseeable future. Accession to the Union presents formidable economic and institutional problems, that fall beyond the scope of this paper, but which are probably going to retain a higher degree of priority with respect to security concerns. A common concern, for example, is that enlargement of the Union will jeopardize its "deepening": therefore, extension of security guarantees, to the extent that it might hasten precipitous enlargement, might weaken the very institution that these guarantees should emanate from.
In conclusion, the EU is most useful for cooperation with the C&EE in the economic, and specifically trade, arena. This cooperation would involve short-term costs, but these will be outweighed by long-term benefits for current EU members as well.


Human Rights and Political Stability

Relations with C&EE and post-Soviet states have another, purely political, dimension: human rights. Of the various "categories" of human rights, those of concern here are the so-called "first generation" human rights, i.e. those indisputable rights of the individual such as the personal inviolability and freedom of information and expression and movement of each citizen. These rights are most easily definable, are the same for all states, and juxtapose the individual citizen (as opposed to, for instance, the member of a given nationality) to his/her government. They are inalienable, or, as they are sometimes referred to, "static". Therefore, they can be considered independently of local political factors of diversity which may be specific of a given state.vii During the Cold War, the West had to ignore them.

For a long time, the West sacrificed human rights ideals for the sake of peace and stability: until, that is, in 1989 communist (read Soviet) oppression exhausted its ability to produce stability. While the lack of democracy was a source of stability in Soviet bloc, today, with no overwhelming power to enforce human rights violations, it is a source of instability in post-communist Europe. On the contrary, the political energies which dictatorship had long repressed are now about to explode, create instability and threaten peace. It is for this reason, quite aside from moral considerations, that the protection of human rights is an important factor of security and stability in Europe.

Since the end of the Cold War, most of Europe has accomplished much toward the realization of first category rights, but not enough. The West, and particularly the US, has not always been consistent. It traditionally followed one of three policies in this field. Sometimes, the West has been content with letting its point of view be known, without doing anything about it (this was, for instance, the Nixon approach of pure Realpolitik).

Alternatively, it tried to persuade violators to change their course, but without offending them with public accusation or much fanfare. This approach produced important results, (for example under Carter) when the carrot was used more than the stick. The problem here was that this policy was intermittent and unpredictable.

The third approach has been to accuse violators (or, rather, those who happened to be political adversaries) publicly, to apply diplomatic pressure upon them, to link progress on human rights to other negotiations such as those on arms control or trade (the so-called "linkage" policy). This approach produced little results.
Today, human rights are once again an important factor of foreign policy based on Realpolitik, and as such must be given their just priority. As a former US Secretary of State put it, "human rights must always be on the foreign policy agenda, but never by themselves".viii In this respect, interference in internal affairs becomes justified and necessary, as the UN charter and article 56 stipulate that violations "oblige members to take joint and separate action" to achieve this purpose. While consistent and persistent persuasion will be indispensable to this end, the use of force might at time be required as well. Albeit insufficiently, this has already happened in Yugoslavia. This produces an immediate link between the protection of human rights and military stability and security.


Military Stability and Security

In this field, again, interdependence has been an long established concept, but it is now moving from a confrontational to a cooperative type of interdependence. Europe has shifted its attention from the avoidance of war to the building of peace.

Virtually all of Eastern Europe, including most former Soviet republics, is asking to join NATO. On the one hand, this testifies to the success of NATO. On the other hand, it is a symptom of a widespread illusion that this success would be easily replicated by simply bringing in new members. That is far from being the case. First of all, it would be economically expensive (restructuring of allied commands, re-deployment of forces, additional official languages, harmonization of procedures, etc.) and therefore NATO members would not be likely to accept it. Public opinions would not support such an expansion of responsibility at a time of reduced threat perceptions and declining defense budgets.

More importantly, it might be difficult to establish whom to accept into the Alliance: In other words, who would be defended against whose threat? If this were a way for Central and East Europeans to gain a military security guarantee against Russia, this would signify a perpetuation of the old logic of the two blocs. Some advocated this also in the West, particularly during and immediately after the failed August 1991 coup in Moscow (when authoritative voices were heard urging Western security guarantees to Eastern Europe) but such a stand does not seem to fit into the current status of political relations with the successor states of the USSR.

One could argue that the logic of the blocs is perpetuated by maintaining one the two blocs as a self-contained exclusive entity separated from the now no longer antagonistic remnants of the other bloc. If the Eastern bloc is gone, this logic goes, the Western must offer its umbrella to former enemies who have now embraced its values and goals. A more cogent argument, however, is that the logic of the blocs would be perpetuated by trying to artificially extend one against another that no longer exists. Besides, NATO could not and would not wage war against Russia to save Eastern Europe more than it would have during the Cold War. Russia remains a nuclear state, and for NATO's nuclear powers to provide "extended deterrence" to the Eastern Europeans against Moscow would hardly be credible; it would be more likely a bluff. Let us not forget that even Western Europeans have had this problem of credibility of extended deterrence for forty years; for the new democracies of the East the problem would be much worse.
A second possibility is that NATO should accept all those who might want to accede, Russians included, and offer a security guarantee to all. The question then would be whom to guarantee against whom. If one wanted to guarantee everybody against everybody else, this would probably be a recipe for disaster. It is easy to imagine rather difficult dilemmas emerging from any number of crisis situations. It is also easy to see how false expectations could be created and these could blow on the fire of the nationalist ambitions that were repressed by forty-five years of communism and are now rekindling wildly.

In that context, some argue that NATO might play a moderating role similar to that played between Greece and Turkey, but that bilateral confrontation was easier to deal with than the multilateral situations of Eastern Europe would be. This was because of the common threat that Greeks and Turks both had to face; moreover, the preponderant role of the US in the Greek-Turkish relationship would not be there in Eastern Europe.

As the opinion became more common that NATO should, in one way or another, take on the task of providing security to its former enemies, the organization created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The creation of NACC was the subject of some debate. First, NACC ran the risk of duplicating the confidence-building role of the CSCE. In fact, the exclusion of neutral and non-aligned states makes it less credible than the CSCE for that purpose. The United States argues that CSCE was not sufficient because it lacked the resources; logically, the answer then should have been to give it those resources. But Washington clearly feels it can control NACC better than the CSCE, and has, so far successfully, played a prominent role in the de facto down-playing of the latter organization. Second, NACC is fuelling expectations for full membership. As this is not likely to happen soon, it will create even more frustration than would have resulted from an outright rejection of any membership at this time.
Still, NACC is playing a very useful role. One area where NACC might indeed be useful is in providing military expertise to those nations wishing to restructure their armed forces toward a more defensive model, both to reduce the defense burden and to avoid friction with neighbor states. Eastern European officer corps must be "de-indoctrinated" from Marxism-Leninism. NATO could address all of these concerns through its existing (and expandable) information, scientific and cultural programs, without even addressing the issue of membership.

For this purpose, the launching of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in January 1994 was essential: it provided an instrument for concrete bilateral cooperation between NATO and individual cooperation partners, each of which can tailor its own "Individual Partnership Program" according to its own wishes, capabilities and needs.

In addition, as offered by NATO itself in 1992, NACC could be used to harmonize NATO forces and infrastructure with those of C&EE states which could then be offered for joint peacekeeping actions under the CSCE auspices. The first joint maneuvers to this end were held in the Summer of 1994. Initiatives along these lines would tap on NATO's comparative advantages, provide support to the current soul-searching effort within the Alliance, and avoid the danger that acrimonies among Eastern Europeans might clog NATO's own operation. NATO could provide the necessary infrastructure and logistical base, as has been offered recently. Non-NATO troops could be employed and be supported by the NATO infrastructure, early warning systems, etc. Even armed forces from non-European states might then be called upon, as been the case already in former Yugoslavia. The old prejudice for which Europeans could serve to keep the peace among non-Europeans, but non-Europeans would not be needed to come and help in "civilized" Europe seems, alas, to be fading away.

From a political point of view, the CSCE might also contribute security for Eastern Europe. So far, however, it has not been given the necessary instruments, either military or political. The Vienna-based Center for the Prevention of Conflicts (CPC) is woefully unprepared to deal with the fermenting European problems, as it is understaffed, underbudgeted and underpowered. It should be strengthened, both financially and in terms of political endorsement by the member states. Its competence should be expanded to include a capability for political action toward crisis prevention, as its very name suggests it should, and not only crisis management.

The growing membership in CSCE dilutes the effectiveness of the decision-making process. The consensus rule is less and less adequate. There is a need to move to majority rule, at least for some kinds of decision, among which perhaps there could be the dispatch of peace-keeping forces to troubled areas. For this purpose, some have proposed the creation of a CSCE Security Council, and to allow it to take operational decisions without waiting all other member states to agree, and if necessary against the wished of some of them.
This body might include the UK, the US, Germany, France, Russia, as permanent members with a veto right. Perhaps Italy, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Spain could enjoy some kind of semi-permanent status. This Council would eliminate the unpredictability associated with China's behavior in the UN, while at the same time including the absolutely essential role of Germany. Its powers would be rather circumscribed at the start, but it could sanction conflict-prevention initiatives and peace-keeping operations, including those that may involve military force. Its chances of being effective could be encouraging in a time where the end of the East-West division of Europe has created a high degree of convergence in the political goals of the major powers in the continent. However, under no circumstances should the CSCE be allowed to become the overarching umbrella structure with overall coordinating powers that Russia would like it to be.


Conclusions

The solution to the problems of the new geopolitical situation in Europe will require an approach that must be both multilateral and multidimensional. International security institutions are indispensable for an adequate approach to the post-Cold War security problems of Europe. One does not need to be an "idealist of the post-Cold War mend-the-world school"ix to realize that no single state can address, let alone begin to resolve, the complex intricacies of resurgent nationalistic cleavages, civil struggles and potential conflagrations across borders. Nevertheless, because of the new strength gained by old pre-Cold War (rather than new post-Cold War) thinking, multilateralism is still all too often seen as an unaffordable luxury.x But it is Realpoli­tik, not idealism, which calls for a wider and more structured pattern of interna­tional cooperation in order to best serve the vital interests of European democracies (both old and new).xi It would be naïve idealism to presume that those interests can be served through the romantic restoration of the nation-state to its pre-Cold War preroga­tives, cultural, political or moral as they may be.

To pursue this multilateral approach, all countries of Europe (but the principal responsibility inevitably falls upon Western Europe) need to both deepen and widen international cooperation. In this, Europe does not have to start from scratch; much was done during the Cold War which can still be utilized if it is properly built upon. NATO is the obvious place to start to maintain a collective security and collective defense apparatus, the first of the three vital interests considered in this study. The WEU has been revived after the end of Cold War, and there is no question that, in time, it might work as the future European pillar of the transatlantic alliance if the political will is there to make that happen. The member states of these two organizations (together, but not individually) clearly possess the necessary military, technolog­ical and economic resources to face the new risks of the post-Cold War world in which C&EE in no longer an enemy but an increasingly effective security partner.

As of late 1994, however, partnership with the former Eastern adversaries is still fragile. Collective security bridges to Eastern Europe are being built, among others through the NACC and the WEU's Forum for Consultation, but success is not guaranteed. The Partnership for Peace provides for conrete cooperation programs that are specifically tailored to the needs of specific partners. But it is not enough to pile economic, military, and technologi­cal resources, to organize conferences and sign agreements. There is a much deeper need to build up political coherence among states and peoples which have long been suspi­cious of and estranged from one another. This will take time, but there is no reason to think that the successful construction of a collective security system in Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s could not be replicat­ed, in the late 1990s and beyond, across the whole continent.

The second vital interest has been defined here as the maintenance of unimpeded access to raw materials and the fostering of market economy. Here, too, there are useful precedents that make good examples: the energy sharing schemes of both the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the EU have proven largely successful. The European system of pipelines guarantees that energy security is a preeminently international end, which will require international means to achieve and maintain. They could be further improved to guarantee access to primary sources and provide a safety net in case of emergency.

Here, too, there is a need to expand the multilateral approach to Eastern Europe. Again, there is some degree of similarity to what was done in Western Europe in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, when the democracies, threatened by rising prices and the two oil crises, effectively overcame their narrowly defined national interests in order to foster the common good.

The strengthening of democracy, the on-going gradual opening of frontiers to movement of goods, people, and ideas strengthen democracy, the third vital interest considered in this paper is concerned. The CSCE and the Council of Europe have contributed to achieve this, and their further strengthening will be useful to accomplish more. But their action, particularly in the case of the CSCE, will need the backing of adequate military force by other institutions if necessary. The EU, on its part, should accept short-term economic costs (in the form of granting greater market access) for long-term political (stability) and economic (efficiency) gains.

Unlike during the Cold War, when the West had to close its eyes to human rights violations because of overrid­ing security concerns, ignoring violations of those human rights today can be a determinant to political instability. During Cold War, stability was a synonym for preservation of the status quo; today, on the contrary, stability can only be maintained through a careful management of change, and there is a change toward increased democracy; change must be actively assisted.

04 August 1993

Ruolo futuro per la CSCE

Preparato all'Istituto Affari Internazionali

3 Agosto 1993


Introduzione


Questo appunto si propone di fornire alcuni spunti di riflessione sulle potenzialità della CSCE che potrebbero essere valorizzate dalla prossima presidenza italiana di questa organizzazione, e di indicare alcune priorità tra le svariate iniziative che si potrebbero intraprendere a questo fine. In linea generale, si possono individuare quattro modalità attraverso le quali le varie istituzioni preposte alla sicurezza in Europa possono oggi contribuire alla stabilizzazione del terremoto geopolitico succeduto alla Guerra Fredda. Queste modalità sono riassunte come segue:

1) Le istituzioni possono fornire un grado di rassicurazione politica che potrebbe contribuire a raffreddare i conflitti, specialmente tra i paesi di nuova indipendenza. Questa è una funzione importante soprattutto nell'attuale periodo di transizione, subito dopo il riconoscimento di molti nuovi stati, e serve a consolidare senso di identità statuale. Si deve registrare un sostanziale fallimento finora in Jugoslavia, mentre un certo successo è stato ottenuto in ex-URSS e Europa orientale.

Si tratta qui di una funzione di prevenzione educativa, di cui è difficile da valutare l'efficacia ma che è indispensabile al consolidamento dello stato di diritto e quindi dei diritti umani e della stabilità politica. Il ruolo della CSCE può essere centrale a questi fini.

2) Inoltre, le istituzioni potrebbero fornire garanzie di sicurezza (intesa in senso lato) ai paesi (o ai popoli e minoranze) più minacciati. Non si tratta qui tanto di garanzie di protezione militare, quanto di attenzione ai problemi di sicurezza in senso lato: sociale, economica, ed in materia di diritti umani. La diplomazia preventiva della CSCE può essere fondamentale in questo contesto. In campo strettamente militare, la CSCE può altresì capitalizzare sui risultati ottenuti dal 1986 in poi in campo del "confidence-building".

3) Le istituzioni possono poi provvedere ad azioni di "peace-keeping" o "peace-making". Per tali azioni si deve pensare prima ad una fase di legittimazione politica e quindi ad una fase di implementazione militare, o operativa. Così come accade a livello nazionale, le due fasi non devono necessariamente essere affidate alla stessa organizzazione. Per la CSCE si prevede qui un ruolo essenzialmente legittimante, e solo marginalmente operativo.

4) Infine, le istituzioni possono favorire il processo di riconversione militare verso strutture meno onerose e più difensive, il che è reso necessario sia per motivi di bilancio che per favorire la stabilizzazione militare in Europa. Per quest'ultima funzione si ritiene che l'organismo più adatto, per competenze oggettive, sia il Consiglio di Cooperazione del Nord Atlantico (NACC) e non si discuterà quindi del pur possibile impiego della CSCE.

Per una più chiara ed efficiente ripartizione dei compiti tra le istituzioni di sicurezza—necessaria per evitare dannose logiche competitive e spreco di risorse—è essenziale che ciascuna di esse tenda a sviluppare un suo campo specifico di intervento. La CSCE sembra particolarmente adatta a operare nei settori dell'early-warning e della diplomazia preventiva. A Helsinki le capacità dell'organizzazione sono state rafforzate soprattutto in questi settori. In effetti, le principali iniziative intraprese dalla CSCE dopo Helsinki hanno riguardato la prevenzione, più che la gestione dei conflitti. Quest'ultima funzione, per la quale la CSCE manca di una capacità operativa e di adeguate procedure decisionali, ha continuato a essere attribuita ad altre istituzioni più solide e collaudate.

Questa tendenziale specializzazione della CSCE non deve essere considerata negativamente. Essa andrebbe anzi ulteriormente promossa. Occorre sempre più valorizzare, in particolare, l'originale connessione che si realizza, in seno alla CSCE, tra controllo del rispetto dei diritti umani e prevenzione dei conflitti (connessione che una serie di decisioni assunte a Helsinki—creazione dell'Alto Commissario per le minoranze nazionali, nuove competenze dell'Ufficio di Varsavia, ecc.. - hanno contribuito a rafforzare).

La scelta della specializzazione dovrebbe favorire, come si è detto, il rapporto con le altre istituzioni con competenze nel campo della sicurezza. Sia per l'early-warning che per la diplomazia preventiva è essenziale che si sviluppi sempre più organicamente il rapporto di cooperazione con l'ONU, partendo dall'accordo raggiunto recentemente. Anche la cooperazione con la NATO sembra impostata su basi promettenti. Essendo sprovvista di proprie capacità militari, la CSCE dovrà necessariamente affidarsi a quelle di cui dispone la NATO o di cui potrebbe dotarsi in futuro l'UEO.


Rassicurazione politica

Non è un caso che tutti i paesi di nuova indipendenza dell'Europa orientale abbiano immediatamente chiesto di far parte della CSCE. L'appartenenza a questa camera di compensazione è unanimemente percepita come un requisito essenziale per la partecipazione alla vita politica del continente, e come preparatoria ad una più stretta integrazione in altre, più impegnative, istituzioni di sicurezza.

Mentre tutti i paesi europei (al di fuori della ex-Jugoslavia) sono oggi membri della CSCE—assieme ad alcuni paesi asiatici la cui "europeità" è quanto meno opinabile—non tutti hanno dimostrato di averne fatto propri i principi ispiratori. È quindi importante che la CSCE continui ad insistere nel lavoro di formazione alla sicurezza collettiva e comprensiva (oltre che delle questioni militari anche degli aspetti economici e della dimensione umana) che nessun'altra istituzione è in grado di fornire. La rassicurazione politica va quindi vista in una duplice luce: sia come catalizzatrice di un "senso di appartenenza", che rafforzi la convinzione dell'inevitabile interdipendenza internazionale, sia come educazione politica vera e propria ai valori della democrazia.

A questo proposito, di potrebbe considerare anche l'ipotesi di stabilire delle condizioni per l'appartenenza alla CSCE, analogamente a quanto accade per il Consiglio d'Europa. Tuttavia, ci sembra che al momento convenga soprassedere, salvo situazioni assolutamente eccezionali come quella della Jugoslavia, mirando invece a mantenere la CSCE come camera di compensazione onnicomprensiva.

In questo contesto, si potrebbe anche pensare ad un allargamento verso Sud (Mediterraneo) della CSCE. Infatti, sia con lo status di osservato­re conferito al Giappone (che, se non altro per motivi finanziari, è probabil­mente destinato a rafforzarsi), sia con l'entrata dei paesi centro-asiatici ex-sovietici, la CSCE ha cessato di essere un'organizzazione rigorosamente europea. Il fallimento del'iniziativa CSCM, e le evidenti difficoltà del processo di pace tra Arabi e Israele, portano a ripensare all'opportunità di favorire anche per il Maghreb e per alcuni paesi del Medio Oriente l'adesione alla CSCE. In fondo, è senz'altro più europea la Tunisia del Kirgizstan.

Un problema collegato all'allargamento della CSCE durante la Guerra Fredda era che avrebbe diluito la sua missione fondamentale, che era quella di trovare il maggior denominatore comune tra i due blocchi contrapposti. Ma oggi la CSCE non deve più mediare tra blocchi contrapposti. Un altro ostacolo era che un maggior numero di stati, a ragione della regola del consenso, avrebbe fatto rischiare la paralisi. Ma il numero degli stati (e la reale indipendenza di molti) è già aumentato al punto che la regola del consenso deve comunque essere abbandonata, almeno in alcune circostan­ze.


Garanzie di Sicurezza

La CSCE è l'istituzione meglio equipaggiata a favorire una realistica, se pur limitata, diffusione di garanzie di sicurezza comprensiva. Non ci riferiamo qui, ovviamente, a garanzie di intervento per la difesa collettiva, del tipo di quelle contenute negli Artt. V dei trattati NATO e UEO.

In primo luogo, la CSCE dovrebbe capitalizzare sui notevoli risultati già ottenuti nel campo delle "confidence-building measures" (CSBM). Di queste c'è oggi più bisogno che mai, sia per prevenire percezioni aggressive, sia per ricomporre conflitti attualmente in corso quando cesseranno le ostilità. Si potrebbe inoltre pensare a dare alla CSCE una qualche misura di responsabilità per conflitti interni a paesi membri. A questo scopo, la CSCE è meglio equipaggiata del NACC, per due motivi: primo, del NACC non fanno parte molti stati che saranno invece interessati alle CSBM; secondo, gli attriti che si dovessero venire a creare attorno alla creazione o all'implementazione di tale regime non coinvolgerebbero la NATO.

Finito il tempo dei grandi accordi di disarmo su scala europea occorre concentrarsi soprattutto sulla dimensione sub-regionale, promuovendo accordi fra paesi della stessa area (per esempio, i Balcani o l'Asia ex-sovietica). La regionalizzazione del controllo degli armamenti è espressa­mente prevista nel programma di lavoro del Foro di cooperazione per la sicurezza creato a Helsinki. Più in generale, occorre stabilire una più stretta connessione tra controllo degli armamenti e prevenzione dei conflitti. Il sistema delle misure di fiducia e sicurezza (Csbm) può essere ulteriormente migliorato e allargato, ma è essenziale che le nuove misure siano collegate con gli altri meccanismi.

In secondo luogo, è in ambito CSCE che si dovrà perseguire una più strenua difesa dei diritti umani come fattore di sicurezza. Questa difesa si dovrà concretizzare prima di tutto con mezzi politici, ma anche, ove necessario, con mezzi militari. Durante la Guerra Fredda, l'Occidente ha dovuto accettare imbarazzanti compromessi in materia di diritti umani, sacrificati sull'altare di una "real-politik" che era in larga parte dettata dalla necessità di convivere pacificamente con l'impero sovietico. In altre parole, c'era una sorta di "trade-off" tra diritti umani e sicurezza.

Oggi, al contrario, l'Occidente ha più mezzi a disposizione per esercitare pressioni sui quei paesi che violano i diritti umani. L'uso di questi mezzi non sarebbe esente da costi. Ma evitare di far ricorso a questi mezzi oggi non permetterebbe di ottenere in cambio stabilità politica, come accadeva prima del 1989. Al contrario, svariati paesi che oggi violano i diritti umani sono anche portatori di instabilità politica internazionale: interessi di "real-politik" e principi umanitari convergono quindi nell'imporre all'Occidente una concreta difesa dei diritti umani, se necessario anche tramite lo strumento militare. A questo scopo, la CSCE dovrà essere dotata dei necessari strumenti decisionali di vertice che possano fornire, se possibile di concerto con l'ONU, la necessaria legittimazione agli interventi, nazionali ed internazionali, volti a difendere questi interessi.


Procedure decisionali: legittimazione del "peace-keeping/making"

L'obiettivo strategico centrale della presidenza italiana dovrebbe essere lo sviluppo di quel processo di razionalizzazione istituzionale della CSCE che è ormai unanimemente riconosciuto come un'esigenza inderoga­bile. Occorre affermare il principio che il rafforzamento della CSCE e la semplificazione della sua struttura e dei suoi meccanismi sono due aspetti non solo conciliabili, ma, in larga misura, interconnessi. Se ne tratta in questa sezione e nella seguente.

Si è detto che l'accresciuto numero di nuovi stati in Europa, ed il fatto che molti di essi siano effettivamente indipendenti, diluisce l'operatività della CSCE. La regola del consenso è sempre meno adeguata. Ciò sarebbe solo marginalmente più vero in caso si verificasse l'allargamento che si auspicava sopra. C'è quindi bisogno di passare all'approvazione a maggio­ranza (magari qualificata) almeno per alcuni tipi di decisioni ed interventi. Alternativamente, si potrebbe pensare ad ipotesi di maggioranza ponderata, che terrebbero conto delle ineludibili differenze di peso geopolitico tra i paesi membri.

É stata talvolta anche paventata l'idea di creare nella CSCE, parallelamente a quanto avviene all'ONU, un Consiglio di Sicurezza, che possa decidere operativamente senza aspettare il consenso di tutti gli stati membri e se necessario contro uno o più di essi. Tale Consiglio potrebbe una notevole utilità, in quanto porterebbe autorevolezza alle decisioni esecutive. Il rischio è che rischierebbe di duplicare il ruolo del Consiglio di Sicurezza dell'ONU, e quindi di indebolirlo. A questo rischio si potrebbe ovviare sottolineando che comunque, per statuto, il Consiglio CSCE rimarrebbe subordinato a quello dell'ONU.

I membri permanenti del Consiglio, con diritto di veto, potrebbero essere USA, Russia, Regno Unito, Francia e Germania. Italia, Spagna, Ucraina (e forse Kazakistan) potrebbero avere uno status di membri permanenti, o semi-permanenti, ma senza diritto di veto. Questo Consiglio eliminerebbe l'imprevedibilità della Cina nel Consiglio ONU, ed allo stesso tempo faciliterebbe l'essenziale coinvolgimento della Germania. I poteri del Consiglio potrebbero essere limitati, almeno all'inizio, all'area delle operazioni di prevenzione dei conflitti e di peace-making. Fino a che perdurerà l'attuale sostanziale convergenza di prospettive tra le maggiori potenze europee, eventuali risoluzioni del Consiglio avrebbero notevoli possibilità di influenzare favorevolmente lo sviluppo delle iniziative di risoluzione dei conflitti.


Razionalizzazione Istituzionale della CSCE

Finora la moltiplicazione di organi e di strumenti non si è tradotta in un rafforzamento delle capacità operative dell'organizzazione. Le stesse decisioni di Helsinki hanno avuto, sotto questo profilo, un carattere contraddittorio: da un lato sono state gettate le basi per un'attività più ordinata e sistematica—soprattutto attraverso il potenziamento degli organi di direzione politica, coordinamento e supervisione (Caf, Presidente in carica). Ma si è ulteriormente accentuata la tendenza a una moltiplicazione degli organi. L'urgente necessità della razionalizzazione istituzionale è stata messa in evidenza anche dall'esperienza delle iniziative intraprese dopo Helsinki. Qualora questa contraddizione tra una struttura istituzionale iperestesa e una ridotta capacità operativa dovesse perpetuarsi, si rischierebbe un'erosione del consenso politico che è vitale per l'avvenire di ogni organizzazione.

Vanno pertanto sostenute le proposte miranti a una riorganizzazione della CSCE su basi più razionali:

1) La concentrazione di attività e istituzioni della CSCE in un'unica sede (la più adatta appare Vienna). La dispersione delle istituzioni in più sedi aveva senso all'indomani del 1989 come strumento per promuovere le nuove democrazie. Oggi appaiono invece prioritarie le misure intese a favorire più rapidità e sistematicità. Alcuni temono che la scelta di un'unica sede possa portare a quella burocratizzazione della CSCE che è stata finora sempre esclusa nei documenti ufficiali. Ma un certo rafforzamento dell'apparato burocratico—posto che sia funzionale a un effettivo potenzia­mento operativo—appare inevitabile e comunque preferibile, anche dal punto di vista dell'immagine, all'attuale dispersione in quattro capitali diverse (Vienna, Varsavia, Praga e Ginevra).

2) L'ulteriore potenziamento degli organi di direzione e coordinamento. A tal fine appaiono necessarie:

a) la sostituzione del Comitato degli Alti Funzionari con un comitato politico permanente (il primo passo in questa direzione è stato compiuto con la creazione del gruppo Caf di Vienna decisa dal Consiglio nella riunione di Stoccolma);

b) In questa luce, la designazione di un Segretario Generale della CSCE deve essere vista con favore. Anche se attualmente non è previsto un ruolo politico per il Segretario, egli dovrà essere in futuro dotato di più ampie responsabilità, ed anche di iniziativa politica. Altrimenti, si correrà il rischio che l'azione della CSCE sarà intralciata da ogni piccolo dissidio tra gli stati membri (che sarebbe inevitabilmente riflesso nelle discussioni del Caf). È fondamentale che la CSCE abbia un suo centro motore in grado di operare in maniera almeno parzialmente autonoma dagli organi in cui sono rappresentati tutti i governi e all'interno dei quali, anche se si riusciranno ad apportare delle modifiche alle procedure decisionali, sarà comunque sempre richiesto un consenso molto ampio. Il Segretario Generale potrebbe svolgere questo ruolo, in analogia a quello dell'Onu (o, se si vuole, della NATO). Durante il periodo di presidenza italiana si dovrebbe pertanto valorizzare, nei limiti del possibile, la funzione del Segretario Generale, stabilendo uno stretto rapporto di consultazione e cooperazione tra quest'ultimo e il Presidente in carica. Il timore che ciò possa portare a un condizionamento della Presidenza italiana da parte del Segretario Generale non appare giustificato. In ogni caso, sarebbe sbagliato sacrificare l'obiettivo strategico di dotare la CSCE di una figura istituzionale forte a interessi di prestigio di più corto respiro.

3) L'eliminazione di alcune ridondanze. La più vistosa continua a essere quella tra il Comitato degli Alti Funzionari e il CPC per quanto attiene alla consultazione sulle situazioni d'emergenza. Si dovrebbe concentrare tutta l'attività di consultazione politica nel Caf e limitare il Cpc a una funzione più strettamente tecnico-operativa.

4) Una più solida struttura organizzativa per il sostegno operativo alle varie missioni CSCE. Tale compito tende sempre più ad essere attribuito al Centro di prevenzione dei conflitti. Si potrebbe pertanto decidere di trasformare il Cpc in una sorta di agenzia operativa per l'organizzazione delle missioni.


Capacità operative della CSCE: peace-keeping e peace-making

Il Centro per la Prevenzione dei Conflitti di Vienna è assoluta­mente inadeguato, disponendo solo di uno staff simbolico e di un bilancio irrisorio. Dovrebbe essere notevolmente ed immediatamente rafforzato. Il CPC è stato ingiustamente accusato di aver fallito nella crisi jugoslava: in realtà non ha avuto né i mezzi né il mandato per intervenire in tempo.

È infatti nel campo della prevenzione dei conflitti che la CSCE può sfruttare il proprio vantaggio comparato di camera di compensazione politica. In questo senso, il "peace-keeping" della pace deve essere qui visto nel suo senso più proprio, come obiettivo da perseguire prima che scoppi la guerra (early-warning). Finora, invece, il mantenimento della pace era stato interpretato in maniera ristretta, come mantenimento di più o meno fragili tregue che seguivano al conflitto armato tra i contendenti.

Se pur in misura limitata, le capacità operative della CSCE sono state già sperimentate, se pur con risultati deludenti, in varie parti della ex-Jugoslavia. Non crediamo che questo sia un ambito di competenza promettente per la CSCE, che dovrebbe invece attingere per questi scopi dalle risorse disponibili presso altre organizzazioni, quali la UEO e, soprattutto, la NATO.

Più in generale, a livello militare sono sufficienti gli strumenti già esistenti, e soprattutto l'infrastruttura della NATO. Ciò è ancora più vero se si considera che la NATO ha offerto esplicitamente i propri servizi alla CSCE (e all'ONU). La complementarità tra strumento militare NATO e mandato politico CSCE è evidente. Ogni duplicazione sarebbe dispersiva politicamen­te, costosa economicamente e controproducente militarmente.