Dopo una misera colazione usciamo a piedi per le strade di Tirana, non c’è più la Mercedes blu. In questi giorni andremo a tutti gli appuntamenti sempre a piedi, per fortuna che Tirana non è molto grande, almeno il centro dove sono i luoghi dei nostri incontri, non c’è nessuno per strada ed il tempo è bello. Arriviamo subito piazza Skanderbeg, intitolata al glorioso personaggio della resistenza nazionale, che è totalmente deserta, solo alcuni mezzi pubblici abbandonati, senza carburante o con semiassi rotti, finestrini sfasciati. Fino a pochi mesi fa le auto private erano vietate, ora sono permesse ma ovviamente nessuno se le può permettere al momento. In compenso in questi giorni abbiamo incontrato, in piena città, qualche pastore con le sue pecore. Non ci sono semafori.
Showing posts with label Italy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Italy. Show all posts
31 October 1991
26 June 1987
Book review: Obiettivo Difesa, by Luigi Caligaris and Carlo Maria Santoro, ****
this English review was originally published in Survival, Vol XXIX, No 4, July/August 1987.
Recensione
In the last few years, the international economic and political stature of Italy has increased. One domestic repercussion of this has been a generalized concern about security policy. This renewed interest in security has revitalized a dormant debate along different currents of thought which have long characterized Italian defense thinking. At the risk of oversimplifying, three currents of thought can be identified. At one end of the spectrum there are the nationalists, who want Italy to assume an independent role above and beyond its Alliance commitments In the middle is a group, the "mediators", who want Italy to remain closely aligned with its Western partners, while simultaneously assuming a high diplomatic profile world-wide. At the other end one finds the "integrationists", who stake everything on European and Atlantic cohesion The work of Santoro and Caligaris falls somewhere between the first two groups.
While presented as a cooperative effort, the book is divided into three quide distinct and separately authored parts. The first part, written by Santoro, addresses the broad issue of the geopolitical context of Italy. What transpires here is the desire for both a greater national assertiveness at the regional lever - mainly in the Mediterranean - and a more active involvement in Alliance security and foreign policies at the global level. Santoro sees the world as fundamentally bipolar (p.14), but the implications he draws from that bipolarity are not wholly clear. On the one hand, he believes that should a medium power choose "not to belong to one of the two blocs ... instead of gaining in terms of independence it would see its task become more difficult", because its operating area would remain under the control of one or the other of superpower. He cites India and Yugoslavia as two such medium powers (p.15).
On the other hand, he recognizes that for a medium power the coordination of national interests and alliance obligations can often be problematic, and cites the crises of Suez in 1956, Cyprus in 1974 and Libya in 1986 as examples (p.29).
The implications for Italy are ambiguous: should it attach itself more tightly to NATO, in order to safeguard its freedom within world bipolarism, or should it disregard NATO whenever its national interests conflict with American ones? It does not seem possible to do both, as Santoro seems to wish. Also, it would have been helpful if he had explained why Indian or Yugoslavian foreign polity might have been more "independent" had those countries belonged to one of the two blocs; or how the medium powers involved in the afore-mentioned crises might have been at an advantage had they disregarded their respective blocs.
Santoro points to a possible answer when he writes that Italy should pursue national interests at the regional level in the Mediterranean area while framing its global interests within NATO (p.106). This however poses another set of unanswered questions. First, Italian national interests in a region may be global interests for one or both of the supposedly omnipresent superpowers, thus restricting its room for manoeuvre. Santoro does write that Italy needs a "more manoeuvrable and flexible tactical room for manoeuvre" (p.32) but the meaning of that phrase remains rather enigmatic to this reviewer.
Second, he states the need for Italy to develop a "package of national strategic objectives" which should "stress its natural role as a thermoregulator of the Mediterranean" (p.48). Again, it would have been interesting to read what he has in mind when he speaks of such objectives, and how Italy could impose them upon the Alliance and US, even if only at the regional level.
Finally, some elaboration would have been welcome as to why, in order to perform its thermoregulating function, Italy could "no longer maintain a low-profile political and military position" (p.42).
The difficulty of defining, before pursuing, national security interests is clearly recognized by Gen. Caligaris in the second part of the book, devoted to an analysis of the problems facing the italian political leadership. But, he points out, this is only one of the challenges facing the Italian leadership. Others include improving a highly deficient defense legislation (it is unclear, for instance, who would hold the High Command in case of war (p.202); creating an environment - for example, in the universities - where a security culture might flourish (p.205); refurbishing the now rather inadequately structured decision-making apparatus, both for day-to-day and for crisis-management purposes; restoring the position of Chief of Defense Staff above the service chiefs (p.287).
Unless these problems are satisfactorily solved, so the main thrust of Caligaris' argument implies, Italy will remain confined to its parochial dimension, wherein it is constantly seeking not to be excluded from international bodies and meetings - especially those restricted to the major industrialized countries - quite irrespective of what it can "say, deny or offer" as its own contributions (p.190).
The last part of the book, also by Caligaris, addresses specifically the issue of the military instrument, seen as an "extremely critical aspect of a national security policy" (p.243). Throughout this part he points to the dual function of force for both the "successful resolution of otherwise unresolvable crises" (war fighting) and the "catalization of effectively mediated solutions" (deterrence) (p.243).
Caligaris, however, betrays an overall uneasiness with the fact that, because of deterrence, military strategy has acquired an "unusual dimension" to the point of having both "lost its identity" (p.249), and weakened the military's commitment to force preparation. Moreover, nuclear deterrence in NATO has brought along a "deresponsibilization" and a "denationalization" of defense, as many countries, including Italy, found it easier to passively accept American protection (p.250).
With Caligaris' concluding chapter the book comes full circle. The main theme that emerges throughout is the perception on the part of the authors that Italy is not playing a role in the management of international security - particularly at the regional level - that is commensurate with its rising international profile, and that this role should increase. On this score, most Italians concerned will agree.
However, he means through which to achieve this end are more varied than the book would lead one to believe. Gen Caligaris does highlight several areas where Italy's defense posture is wanting, and his work is a useful contribution in the rather desolate panorama of Italian security literature. However, the book fails to provide clear prescriptions in terms of security policy objectives. It also does not convince that a higher military - and particularly nuclear (p.160) - profile is needed for Italy to be able to provide a better contribution to international security.
Recensione
In the last few years, the international economic and political stature of Italy has increased. One domestic repercussion of this has been a generalized concern about security policy. This renewed interest in security has revitalized a dormant debate along different currents of thought which have long characterized Italian defense thinking. At the risk of oversimplifying, three currents of thought can be identified. At one end of the spectrum there are the nationalists, who want Italy to assume an independent role above and beyond its Alliance commitments In the middle is a group, the "mediators", who want Italy to remain closely aligned with its Western partners, while simultaneously assuming a high diplomatic profile world-wide. At the other end one finds the "integrationists", who stake everything on European and Atlantic cohesion The work of Santoro and Caligaris falls somewhere between the first two groups.While presented as a cooperative effort, the book is divided into three quide distinct and separately authored parts. The first part, written by Santoro, addresses the broad issue of the geopolitical context of Italy. What transpires here is the desire for both a greater national assertiveness at the regional lever - mainly in the Mediterranean - and a more active involvement in Alliance security and foreign policies at the global level. Santoro sees the world as fundamentally bipolar (p.14), but the implications he draws from that bipolarity are not wholly clear. On the one hand, he believes that should a medium power choose "not to belong to one of the two blocs ... instead of gaining in terms of independence it would see its task become more difficult", because its operating area would remain under the control of one or the other of superpower. He cites India and Yugoslavia as two such medium powers (p.15).
On the other hand, he recognizes that for a medium power the coordination of national interests and alliance obligations can often be problematic, and cites the crises of Suez in 1956, Cyprus in 1974 and Libya in 1986 as examples (p.29).
The implications for Italy are ambiguous: should it attach itself more tightly to NATO, in order to safeguard its freedom within world bipolarism, or should it disregard NATO whenever its national interests conflict with American ones? It does not seem possible to do both, as Santoro seems to wish. Also, it would have been helpful if he had explained why Indian or Yugoslavian foreign polity might have been more "independent" had those countries belonged to one of the two blocs; or how the medium powers involved in the afore-mentioned crises might have been at an advantage had they disregarded their respective blocs.
Santoro points to a possible answer when he writes that Italy should pursue national interests at the regional level in the Mediterranean area while framing its global interests within NATO (p.106). This however poses another set of unanswered questions. First, Italian national interests in a region may be global interests for one or both of the supposedly omnipresent superpowers, thus restricting its room for manoeuvre. Santoro does write that Italy needs a "more manoeuvrable and flexible tactical room for manoeuvre" (p.32) but the meaning of that phrase remains rather enigmatic to this reviewer.
Second, he states the need for Italy to develop a "package of national strategic objectives" which should "stress its natural role as a thermoregulator of the Mediterranean" (p.48). Again, it would have been interesting to read what he has in mind when he speaks of such objectives, and how Italy could impose them upon the Alliance and US, even if only at the regional level.
Finally, some elaboration would have been welcome as to why, in order to perform its thermoregulating function, Italy could "no longer maintain a low-profile political and military position" (p.42).
The difficulty of defining, before pursuing, national security interests is clearly recognized by Gen. Caligaris in the second part of the book, devoted to an analysis of the problems facing the italian political leadership. But, he points out, this is only one of the challenges facing the Italian leadership. Others include improving a highly deficient defense legislation (it is unclear, for instance, who would hold the High Command in case of war (p.202); creating an environment - for example, in the universities - where a security culture might flourish (p.205); refurbishing the now rather inadequately structured decision-making apparatus, both for day-to-day and for crisis-management purposes; restoring the position of Chief of Defense Staff above the service chiefs (p.287).
Unless these problems are satisfactorily solved, so the main thrust of Caligaris' argument implies, Italy will remain confined to its parochial dimension, wherein it is constantly seeking not to be excluded from international bodies and meetings - especially those restricted to the major industrialized countries - quite irrespective of what it can "say, deny or offer" as its own contributions (p.190).
The last part of the book, also by Caligaris, addresses specifically the issue of the military instrument, seen as an "extremely critical aspect of a national security policy" (p.243). Throughout this part he points to the dual function of force for both the "successful resolution of otherwise unresolvable crises" (war fighting) and the "catalization of effectively mediated solutions" (deterrence) (p.243).
Caligaris, however, betrays an overall uneasiness with the fact that, because of deterrence, military strategy has acquired an "unusual dimension" to the point of having both "lost its identity" (p.249), and weakened the military's commitment to force preparation. Moreover, nuclear deterrence in NATO has brought along a "deresponsibilization" and a "denationalization" of defense, as many countries, including Italy, found it easier to passively accept American protection (p.250).
With Caligaris' concluding chapter the book comes full circle. The main theme that emerges throughout is the perception on the part of the authors that Italy is not playing a role in the management of international security - particularly at the regional level - that is commensurate with its rising international profile, and that this role should increase. On this score, most Italians concerned will agree.
However, he means through which to achieve this end are more varied than the book would lead one to believe. Gen Caligaris does highlight several areas where Italy's defense posture is wanting, and his work is a useful contribution in the rather desolate panorama of Italian security literature. However, the book fails to provide clear prescriptions in terms of security policy objectives. It also does not convince that a higher military - and particularly nuclear (p.160) - profile is needed for Italy to be able to provide a better contribution to international security.
01 August 1980
24 June 1980
End of the semester abroad in Poland
We spend the morning in Venice, just showing Cathy the highlights. I have some rubles left and manage to change them, at a very unfavorable rate, at a money changer in Piazza San Marco.
After lunch we get back into Giallina one last time for the home stretch to Rome. Mum, dad and my brother Fabio are waiting at our apartment in Via dei Mille, and a genuine Italian home-made dinner prepared by our family chef Anna concludes our trip.
It is over.
But I know it is not really over. I know I will return to Poland in the future, for personal and professional reasons. Borzena is scheduled to come and visit this Summer. Marian and Ewa surely will be in touch and we'll try to make some money together trading goods between Italy and Poland.
It's been the most instructive period of my life. I went to Poland because I was interested in the "real" socialism. Never a socialist myself, as a political scientist in the making I wanted to understand the thinking beyond the wall. I thought better knowledge could foster mutual understanding, and peace.
The problem is, no one in Poland seemed to care about socialism. Those who did speak about it hardly ever said anything positive. It was different in the USSR, where some of those we met did seem to believe in their official ideology.
We'll see, for now it's time to take in a good night sleep in my own bed!
After lunch we get back into Giallina one last time for the home stretch to Rome. Mum, dad and my brother Fabio are waiting at our apartment in Via dei Mille, and a genuine Italian home-made dinner prepared by our family chef Anna concludes our trip.
It is over.
But I know it is not really over. I know I will return to Poland in the future, for personal and professional reasons. Borzena is scheduled to come and visit this Summer. Marian and Ewa surely will be in touch and we'll try to make some money together trading goods between Italy and Poland.
It's been the most instructive period of my life. I went to Poland because I was interested in the "real" socialism. Never a socialist myself, as a political scientist in the making I wanted to understand the thinking beyond the wall. I thought better knowledge could foster mutual understanding, and peace.
The problem is, no one in Poland seemed to care about socialism. Those who did speak about it hardly ever said anything positive. It was different in the USSR, where some of those we met did seem to believe in their official ideology.
We'll see, for now it's time to take in a good night sleep in my own bed!
23 June 1980
Driving back through Yugoslavia and on to Italy
Left Balaton lake at 10.00am. It would have been nice to spend more time here, after four intense months, and relax a bit, take in the cool atmosphere and sip Hungarian wine, by far the best that is coming from the brotherhood of socialist countries. (Georgians might disagree, and I must admit I don't know Georgian wine much.) Much better than the Crimean "champagne" we had in the USSR.
The road is just OK and we proceed slowly toward Yugoslavia. No problem with this border. Two socialist countries, in theory ideological siblings. In practice, Yugoslavia has long been pursuing its own version of socialism, quite open to the West and relatively more relaxed at home.
Surprisingly, the roads in Yugoslavia are worse than in Hungary or Poland. At least the ones we drive on today. Once we reach Nova Gorica, the Yugoslav half of Gorizia, I pull into a service station to fill up Giallina. Gasoline is much cheaper here that in Italy. The man at the pump speaks Italian and says he only agrees to sell us fuel because he sees Giallina has a Roman plate. He refuses to sell to Italians from Trieste and Gorizia, who just cross the border to take advantage of subsidized fuel. Border inhabitants of both Italy and Yugoslavia can go shopping in each other's country fairly easily, and while Yugoslavs go to Italy to buy what they can't find at home, Italians hop beyond the border to buy cheap subsidized staples, fuel first of all.
We reach Mestre at about 9:00pm and get a couple of rooms at the "Garibaldi" hotel. Then out for pizza. Nice to be back in Italy, I enjoy hearing Italian and soaking the warm air, though everything now seems soooo expensive! A pizza here is more expensive than a gourmet fine dining experience in Warsaw!
Surprisingly, the roads in Yugoslavia are worse than in Hungary or Poland. At least the ones we drive on today. Once we reach Nova Gorica, the Yugoslav half of Gorizia, I pull into a service station to fill up Giallina. Gasoline is much cheaper here that in Italy. The man at the pump speaks Italian and says he only agrees to sell us fuel because he sees Giallina has a Roman plate. He refuses to sell to Italians from Trieste and Gorizia, who just cross the border to take advantage of subsidized fuel. Border inhabitants of both Italy and Yugoslavia can go shopping in each other's country fairly easily, and while Yugoslavs go to Italy to buy what they can't find at home, Italians hop beyond the border to buy cheap subsidized staples, fuel first of all.
We reach Mestre at about 9:00pm and get a couple of rooms at the "Garibaldi" hotel. Then out for pizza. Nice to be back in Italy, I enjoy hearing Italian and soaking the warm air, though everything now seems soooo expensive! A pizza here is more expensive than a gourmet fine dining experience in Warsaw!
13 February 1980
From Venice to Salzburg under the Alps
 |
| Crossing the Alps |
After refueling and changing the windshield wipers we cross into Austria and the Grossgloeckner glacier presents itself to us in all its mighty beauty. Normally one would drive up the pass and enjoy the drive but there is too much snow and the road is closed. No choice but to return to Winklern, then Obervellach where we can put Giallina on a train car that takes us through a tunnel to the other side of the Alps, and finally we reach Badgastein. Andrew and I alternate at driving.
When we get there we can't miss a typical local Wurstel. Ann sprains an ankle. We get to Salzburg in the early evening and after looking around for an inexpensive accommodation we settle for a room in the "Wolf" B&B, near the Mozartplatz. Right, Mozart, the enduring champion of Salzburg.
 |
| Salzburg in Mozart's time |
Salzburg only became part of Austria after the Congress of Vienna, over twenty years after Mozart's death. That Wolfgang Amadeus worked in Vienna for much of his life did not make him a citizen.
Quiet evening in town.
12 February 1980
Visiting Venice and Murano
In the afternoon we visited Murano and its world famous glass blowers where I bought a new key-chain for Giallina, a small multifaceted crystal sphere for our trusted bright yellow VW beetle that will lead us through this trip.Long day of walking, interrupted only by a couple of snacks and a good gelato. In the evening we eat some bread and cheese in the hotel room, and end the day with a game of scopa and a bottle of pinot noir. Hit the sack by 11:30, tomorrow it's going to be a driving day to Austria.
11 February 1980
Departure from Rome to Poland for an academic semester abroad
By way of background
I was a student at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service from 1978 to 1981. In the Spring semester of 1980 I wanted to enroll in G.U.'s "semester abroad" program. Among various options, G.U. offered an exchange with Poland. Well, it was a one-way "exchange", in that no Polish students were allowed to the U.S.
It was not a happy time, the USSR had just invaded Afghanistan and NATO was about to deploy its euromissiles in Europe. One day I was having lunch in our cafeteria with my friend Andrew, and talked to him about this opportunity. "Would you go? I am not sure I am into spending a semester in a Communist country on my own" I said. He replied "Well I am not sure I would either, but if you go, I'll go".
 |
| Author and Andrew in Rome with Giallina |
***********
So the moment of truth has arrived, after months of preparation we are off to start our semester abroad.
Andrew, Ann and I depart from Rome at about 9:30am. We reach Florence at about 2:00pm where we stop for a short walk in the old city. Start again and after having the car's tires checked we drive on until Mestre, just outside Venice. I was looking for an Agip motel but it's no longere there. We book a room at the "Vivit" and then we go to Venice to explore.
 |
| In Florence |
Walking around this magic city is always an experience to remember for life. One most memorable moment is when we approach Piazza San Marco late in the evening, at about 1:00am. It is totally empy! An eerie sensation. The ground is shiny from the rain of the day and the lamp posts emanate a tenuous light. We stand in silence for a long moment before heading back to the ferry that will take us back to Mestre for the night.
16 April 1977
Scambi interscolastici Italia-Finlandia
Articolo da me scritto e pubblicato su "Piazza di Spagna", rivista quadrimestrale del Collegio S. Giuseppe - istituto De Merode. Anno XXVI, N. 2-3, giugno-ottobre 1977. L'articolo è solo indirettamente collegato ad un viaggio. Infatti esso nasce dalla visita di una mia amica finlandese in Italia, dopo che io avevo visitato la sua famiglia, e la sua scuola, qualche mese prima.
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