Dive 203: Unkai Maru

Military transport ship built in Newcastle in 1905 and sold to a Japanese shipping company in 1921. Requisitioned by Imperial Japanese Navy for the war.

U.S. newspaper aboard from time Japan and U.S. were still neutral

Gas mask

American newspaper from California!

See this video by Rod MacDonald on the Unkai Maru

The New East-West Relations in Europe

Prepared for JIIA/IFRI conference on

Building A Global and Regional Framework for Peace and Prosperity: Political and Economic Security in the New World Order

Tokyo, 2-3 June 1994

revised version

Premise

Since the end of the Cold War, the security of Central and Eastern Europe (C&EE) is a necessary (though not sufficient) conditio sine qua non for the security of Europe as a whole. This is not entirely new: already during Cold War, the West had recognized that its security was contingent upon that of the other half of Europe (of course, as perceived by Moscow). This resulted in some degree of hypocrisy on the part of the West. For example, the USSR got its first bout of détente and the start of CSCE negotiations right after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Today, there is complementarity in place of hostility in new East-West relations, but Europe is far from "whole and free"—as George Bush, among others, proclaimed it as early as 1990. C&EE is increasingly fragmented and, far from being free, many parts of it are at or near war to preserve their freedom. Paradoxically, after the virtual disappearance of any significant military threat, security is an ever rarer commodity in most of Eastern Europe.

In Western Europe, the disappearance of both the massive Soviet deployments in C&EE and (more importantly) of their even more massive reinforcement capabilities, have not produced the results that were hoped for. The perception of security has not improved. War is being waged in parts of the continents, and tensions are high in others, but the danger of conflagration is not clearly definable or predictable. Therefore, such dangers as they exist are not sufficient to mobilize public opinions, though they are clear and present enough to worry most observers. Increasing or nascent threats from the South of Europe's periphery only make things worse.

Under these circumstances, this paper argues first, that the C&EE states are dangerously reverting to nationalist approach in foreign policy; second, that this approach does not augur well for the continent, as today's Europe vital interests are no longer national interests, and vice versa; and third, that, therefore, international institutions should play a pivotal role if C&EE are to be integrated into a future peaceful order in Europe. While their performance has been less than ideal in recent years, the richer and more influential Western countries have no alternative to their strengthening and revival.


East-West (?) Relations in the New Europe

To the extent that it indicated the confrontation between the blocs, the term "East-West" is now obsolete. The very word "Eastern" Europe is generally considered demeaning; to refer to "Balkan" states or peoples is sometimes even taken as insulting by those who geographically belong to those areas. This is considered terminology from Cold War, reflecting obsolete bipolar concepts. The new commonly accepted term, which will obligingly be used here, is C&EE, but changing their definitions rarely solve problems, and declarations of intent do not change geography.

In fact, the term "East-West", though perhaps impolitic in the current parlance, is still valid in some respects. While there is no longer an adversarial relationship between the two "sides" of the word, European countries are not yet parts of a group of states definable as such except in the purest (and least significant) geographical terms. They do not form a working system, let alone a coherent whole.

Within these new East-West relations, the hope for the future is that cooperation and integration can replace confrontation, most importantly between Russia and the rest of Europe. The lack of a solid cooperative relationship between Russia and the rest of Europe is the most serious threat to the stability of the continent in the years to come. That is why the West, regardless of who is in charge in Moscow, will have to continue to devote special care to the security perceptions and economic condition of this country. The NATO-Russia agreement of 22 June 1994 fails to acknowledge a "special role" for Russia within the Partnership for Peace (within which all partners remain on an equal basis) but the accompanying "Summary of Conclusions" provides for Russia-NATO cooperation "beyond" Partnership for Peace. The relationship with Russia is the single most delicate for the West, but not the only preoccupation of post-Cold War Europe.

A second source of potential instability lies in Central and Eastern Europe itself. In the immediate aftermath of the 1989 revolutions, political euphoria overshadowed economic concerns, but it soon faded away as harsh economic realities became clear. Initial illusions about cure-all capitalism settled in. Five years into democracy, a crucial question in C&EE is whether political enthusiasm will be enough to overcome prolonged economic disappointment and hardship. Alternatively, will economic disappointment undermine political achievements? A race between economics and politics in now going on: it is not yet clear whether the post-1989 political capital still available will suffice to overcome current and future economic hardship.

To make matters worse, new regional cleavages have come to the fore after the fall of the wall. Some new cleavages are actually revived old ones, i.e. from the pre-World War II era. Most seriously, most of C&EE has long been anti-Russian before it became anti-Soviet, and it can now express its anti-Russian feelings again. Other regional and local cleavages include that between Hungary and Romania, Czechs and Slovaks, Serbs and Hungarians, beyond, of course, those within former Yugoslavia. One may add an anti-South of the world prejudice, particularly as competition for Western aid becomes more acute. If economic realities beat political sentiments in the race described above, these cleavages might be ignited beyond the plane of peaceful confrontation into violent conflict, and it would be imprudent to assume that the Western half of the continent would not be engulfed in it.

The best hope to avert such an outcome lies in integrating C&EE in the economic, political and security structure of Western Europe. For four decades C&EE peoples have been forced to look at international integration (and, more in general, at any form of internationalism) as one representation of the division of Europe into two divergently integrating blocs (theirs being under the USSR). The so-called "fraternal" relations within the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, a euphemism for Soviet controlled economic and security planning, has left deep scars. Consequently, there is a strong tendency among C&EE to equate nationalism with freedom and independence.

In light of the above, it is not surprising that C&EE electorates and leaderships have little sympathy (or understanding) for true international interdependence. Nationalism (whether it is real or, as is often the case, it is built-up spuriously around "imagined communi­ties" instead of real nations) has blossomed, and nationalism, historically, is likely to be associat­ed with war. It may be a cause or a consequence of war. Most often, and most dangerously, it is used by political élites as a catalyst for the channeling of military and other resources toward the achievement of war aims. Dangerously, C&EE often look to past rather than to future, longing for a restoration of pre-communism, the Soviet occupation being seen as a historical aberration in their national paths to development.

The only magnet for them was initially the EU, which was seen as a locomotive to pull them up from the doldrums of economic stagnation, mainly through infusions of German funds. Subsequently, this enthusiasm dwindled as it became clear that membership was not in the cards for the short term—see chart 5. A EU widening to C&EE is still in the agenda of Western diplomacies, but the time horizon has been pushed back. Subsequently, a strong interest developed for membership in NATO. These two issues will be further discussed below.


National and Vital Interests in Europe

Like most political paradigms (both domestic and interna­tional) the concept of "national interest" has changed since the Cold War. This is especially true in security affairs. An emerging issue in this context has been how to re-define national and international interests in an increasing interdependent world in which international institutions play a greater role—albeit not always satisfactorily so.

Of course, there are genuine national interests which are perfectly compati­ble with a cooperative multination­al approach to security. These may be economic interests (e.g. milk or steel production capacity; or agricultur­al import quotas in the EU). They may be related to the environ­ment (e.g. the regulation of international transit rights for cargo, or control of pollutants that are not usually very respectful of national borders). National interests may also be political, as country A may jostle for political advantage vis-à-vis country B by establish­ing special bilateral ties with country C, (e.g. to push its export products, to obtain special access to C's economic resources or technologies or to foster the rights of its affiliated ethnic community in country C). Finally, there may even be military-related national security interests, as might be the case in future contingen­cies similar to the Falklands war, the US-Libyan clashes of 1981 and 1986, and the US intervention in Grenada or Panama. But the national interests involved in this type of operations can hardly be described as vital.

These interests are definable and defensible at the national level, but they are not vital. In light of the contradic­tion between the need to look at security problems from an international perspective, and the trend toward reinforced nationalist pressures build, it seems appropriate to refer no longer to "national" interests, but, rather, to "vital" inter­ests in the contempo­rary European land­scape. Which are the vital interests of post-Cold War Europe?

The most fundamental vital interest for post-Cold War European states remains the protection of the physical safety and territorial integrity of nation states against the danger of attack from resurgent, residual or wholly new military threats—including internal threats from within existing states. While the Soviet threat is gone, a variety of actual or potential military threats still exists. Newly independent Russia seeks to become a security partner today, and in some circumstances it has proved that it is able to be one, but it is far from certain that this will be true in the future. While the danger of post-Soviet prolifera­tion is usually exaggerated in the press, other nuclear powers might, in time, emerge from the ashes of the USSR. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a distinct possibility around Europe's southern periphery. Any of these develop­ments could threaten the vital security interests of European states. As for threats from within existing states, the example of Yugoslavia speaks for itself: while not likely to be replicated in the same scale, it might not be the last European state to break-up violently, and the repercussions might yet be felt outside of Yugoslavia itself.

The second vital interest is to at a minimum, maintain our standard of living and economic development. This implies, among other things, the preservation of a free market economy, unimpeded access both to sources of raw materials and to foreign markets, and freedom of navigation over the high seas. Recent events in the Gulf have demonstrated (had there been any doubt) that the defense of this vital interest can not quite be taken for granted even after the end of the Soviet threat to NATO sea-lines of communication.

The final, and most important, vital interest lies in the protection of the Western way of life. Despite all its shortcom­ings, is increasingly accepted as a pan-European model. This translates into the preservation of a pluralist democracy, which in turn means freedom of movement for people and informa­tion (and hence open borders) but also support for the social order of civil society (and hence regulation of migration flows).

Other formulations could be devised, but the above are by and large what the general consensus within the Western civiliza­tion has come to define as "vital interests". But these are not synonymous with "national" interests; none is nationally definable or defensible, by any state, and certainly not by European medium powers. The following paragraphs will discuss why this is true now even more than during the Cold War.

When Europe was divided in two blocs, Western nations had to join up forces to counter the Soviet Union. The possibility always existed, however, that one or more could try to strike a deal with Moscow, in extreme circumstanc­es, for example in order to avoid the escalation of nuclear war on its territory. This possibility applied to the Allies on both sides of the Atlantic: the US at times feared that the Europeans might rather be "red than dead"; the Europeans feared that the US would fight a limited war in Europe but not challenge the Soviets to the point of a reciprocal nuclear exchange. Such fears were based on rational calculations of national interests which took into account the probable behavior of concerned parties, bona fide allies as they might have been. Today, sources of resurgent, residual or new threats (nuclear, conventional, or anything in between, as they might come) are unlikely to be as amenable to the same rational thinking as was the centralized and monolithic Soviet state; hence, it is unlikely that the freedom of "opting out" would still be available to any party in a future continen­tal crisis.

A detailed discussion of increasing international economic interde­pendence is beyond the scope of this paper; suffice it to say that the end of the Cold War has opened far greater opportunities for international economic exchanges—and therefore for growth. As recent vicissi­tudes in the Gulf have demonstrated, however, free access to raw materials must sometimes be guaranteed by collective efforts, including by means of armed force. On a different plane, the GATT negotiations demonstrate how, mutatis mutandis, an equal degree of collective political commitment is necessary to ensure free access to international markets, the other essential ingredient of world economic growth and prosperity.
As for the third of the vital interests considered here, during the Cold War, it was possible, indeed obligatory, to protect democracy in the West while avoiding any determined effort to promote it in the East. Today, without the Iron Curtain, consolidating democracy in the East is increasingly becoming a pre-condition for maintaining it in the West. Indeed, as European borders are wide open to flows of people and information, it would be utopian to think that a privileged island of prosperity and freedom can be maintained only in selected parts of the continent. Again, multilateral effort are indispens­able, for it is unthinkable that any single state, however influential, could pursue such an ambitious goal single-handedly.
The foregoing does not suggest that national interests no longer exist in Europe today; nor does it lead to a prescription of exclusively multilateral solutions. There are interests that can and should be defined at the national level, just as there are other interests that can be defined at the regional, provincial or municipal level. In fact, it is not a coincidence that this time of increasing nationalism is also a time of increasing demand for regional and local autonomy throughout Europe, both East and West.

What is sometimes referred to as the rebirth of "national­ism" in reality is often tribalism, parochialism or fanaticism decorated with a patina of religious fervor. In post-Cold War Europe, the nation-state is in some cases as much in crisis as are international alliances and organizations, if not more so. More Europeans are rediscover­ing the value of local autonomy than are revamping that of national independence. The recent support garnered by Flemish separatists and Northern Italian secessionists are the latest additions to what seemed to be the isolated exceptions of Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. The nineties are more likely to go down in history as a decade of threats to nation-states than as a decade of nation-building.


The Agenda for the West

Eastern requests for integration in Western institutions translate into some degree of Western embarrassment. C&EE states are in a position of demandeur for access to markets, security and political identity. More than anything, they want to join Western institutions, generally seen as the only solution to all three issues. They by and large realize that no single state is equipped to address these new types of problems and help them. They understand that, as the West has often been preaching, the solution to these risks and challenges requires a multinational approach, with contributions from both East and West. This is true in security as well as in economics.

 The answers to the questions posed in the preceding paragraphs carry important implications for Western Europe for its possible repercussions in international relations. If the cleavages discussed above are not resolved, conflict might well spread beyond the region of C&EE. Under these circumstances, the risks to common European security that are coming from this new Europe today can be categorized into four groups. First, there is a danger that local conflicts may lead to region-wide conflagration. As of late 994, this is the case, most seriously, in the Balkans, but to a lesser extent also in the Caucasus.

Second, these conflicts, and the destruction and disorder that they carry along, may provide ammunition to reactionary and/or nostalgic power groups, and thus provoke a backfiring of authoritarianism. This may not be of a communist character, but it may be ultra-nationalistic and perhaps involve the armed forces.
Third, Western Europe may become the target of terrorism, as frustrated extremist groups may seek to attract international attention to this or that ethnic, territorial or "national" cause. Connections with Western European terrorist organizations, such as the IRA or ETA, are to be expected.

Finally, and most seriously, Eastern European conflicts come at a time of delicate transition in the foreign policy relations among Western nations. Cleavages in the East have already provoked diverging attitudes in the West, and may result in a weakening of Western cohesion. The handling of the Yugoslav crisis has already resulted in some damage to the developing process of harmonization of Western European foreign policies.

What can and should the West do to address C&EE's demands, since on the answer that will be given to them depend also our own interests? The West has three instruments for the creation of security conditions around its periphery: wealth, advanced know-how and institutions. Wealth is the least useful one. It can only provide emergency relief, but can not provide economic stability and hence security in the medium-long term. Reforms and time are necessary for this, and too much aid can even be counterproductive if it allows for artificial life-support to be administered to inefficient economic mechanisms. Of course, Western wealth can not buy military security, since all Eastern countries must, on the contrary, reduce their military commitments. As for Western military intervention, in conflicts in Eastern Europe or in the Mediterranean region, the problems there are hardly of a financial nature.

Advanced know-how is potentially more useful than wealth because it helps create an indispensable basis for long-term efficiency and thus social stability. In this respect, managerial know-how will be more relevant than advanced technology. But it, too, does nothing to alleviate immediate political security problems. Much time will be required before organizational restructuring and technology injections will produce appreciable results in the societies of the East.
Institutions remain the only instrument potentially capable of preventing and perhaps repressing European conflicts before they spread too widely. This paper will sketch what three regional institutions (the EU and the WEU, which for the purposes of this paper are considered together; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) could contribute toward continental security.

The nature of the questions involved immediately points to the fact that the required approach will be multidimensional: for analytical purposes, the following analysis will be divided in security, economic and political aspects, though the three are clearly interconnected.


Economic Cooperation

Economic interdependence, long established in Western Europe, is difficult to replicate in the continent as a whole. No doubt, such replication will be profitable (and in any case probably inevitable) in the long run if Western Europe is to be competitive with the US and Japan. But, as John M. Keynes put it, in the long run we will all be dead. The economic integration of Eastern Europe in the pan-European (and therefore world) market can not wait so long.

Therefore, when discussing the extension of economic interdependence to C&EE, the question is not whether, but when and how to do it. The widespread argument that Eastern Europe is not yet ready is only partially true, or, rather, it only explains one half of the problem. The other half is that it is Western Europe which fears losing important markets to cheaper Eastern labor. This is true, first and foremost, in those very sectors in which C&EE economies are stronger: textiles, agriculture and steel. On the one hand, to allow C&EE producers into EU markets might spell the end (or at least a drastic down-sizing) of those industries in the EU. On the other hand, it would both make those products available at cheaper prices (and thus boost productivity) and stimulate competition.

Of course, this approach runs directly against the grain of EU subsidization policies. But the dilemma between narrow-minded national protection and opening to the East will once again have to be faced in the near future: the consequences of the choice that will be made are going to have a strong and lasting impact on the economic relationship between Western Europe and C&EE states. In the latter, it will also have profound political and social consequences which the governments of EU member states will do well to consider before giving in to domestic lobbying and pressures for continued protection.

EU membership remains a coveted ambition for C&EE states, not only for economic but also for political and (in perspective) security reasons. It may provide some degree of political reassurance, but certainly the EU does not have the tools for any military-related task. This may change in the future with the realization of a common security policy and a then of a common defense, but the time frame is far too long. For the next several crucial years, most instruments of security policy will remain in the hands of national governments, while the process toward the creation of a common security and foreign policy continues, hopefully, to overcome national and bureaucratic hurdles.

In any case, even when such a common policy exists, caution will be imperative, because for the Union to provide security to third parties would probably mean to grant accession: "extended deterrence" by the Union or the WEU is definitely not in the cards for the foreseeable future. Accession to the Union presents formidable economic and institutional problems, that fall beyond the scope of this paper, but which are probably going to retain a higher degree of priority with respect to security concerns. A common concern, for example, is that enlargement of the Union will jeopardize its "deepening": therefore, extension of security guarantees, to the extent that it might hasten precipitous enlargement, might weaken the very institution that these guarantees should emanate from.
In conclusion, the EU is most useful for cooperation with the C&EE in the economic, and specifically trade, arena. This cooperation would involve short-term costs, but these will be outweighed by long-term benefits for current EU members as well.


Human Rights and Political Stability

Relations with C&EE and post-Soviet states have another, purely political, dimension: human rights. Of the various "categories" of human rights, those of concern here are the so-called "first generation" human rights, i.e. those indisputable rights of the individual such as the personal inviolability and freedom of information and expression and movement of each citizen. These rights are most easily definable, are the same for all states, and juxtapose the individual citizen (as opposed to, for instance, the member of a given nationality) to his/her government. They are inalienable, or, as they are sometimes referred to, "static". Therefore, they can be considered independently of local political factors of diversity which may be specific of a given state.vii During the Cold War, the West had to ignore them.

For a long time, the West sacrificed human rights ideals for the sake of peace and stability: until, that is, in 1989 communist (read Soviet) oppression exhausted its ability to produce stability. While the lack of democracy was a source of stability in Soviet bloc, today, with no overwhelming power to enforce human rights violations, it is a source of instability in post-communist Europe. On the contrary, the political energies which dictatorship had long repressed are now about to explode, create instability and threaten peace. It is for this reason, quite aside from moral considerations, that the protection of human rights is an important factor of security and stability in Europe.

Since the end of the Cold War, most of Europe has accomplished much toward the realization of first category rights, but not enough. The West, and particularly the US, has not always been consistent. It traditionally followed one of three policies in this field. Sometimes, the West has been content with letting its point of view be known, without doing anything about it (this was, for instance, the Nixon approach of pure Realpolitik).

Alternatively, it tried to persuade violators to change their course, but without offending them with public accusation or much fanfare. This approach produced important results, (for example under Carter) when the carrot was used more than the stick. The problem here was that this policy was intermittent and unpredictable.

The third approach has been to accuse violators (or, rather, those who happened to be political adversaries) publicly, to apply diplomatic pressure upon them, to link progress on human rights to other negotiations such as those on arms control or trade (the so-called "linkage" policy). This approach produced little results.
Today, human rights are once again an important factor of foreign policy based on Realpolitik, and as such must be given their just priority. As a former US Secretary of State put it, "human rights must always be on the foreign policy agenda, but never by themselves".viii In this respect, interference in internal affairs becomes justified and necessary, as the UN charter and article 56 stipulate that violations "oblige members to take joint and separate action" to achieve this purpose. While consistent and persistent persuasion will be indispensable to this end, the use of force might at time be required as well. Albeit insufficiently, this has already happened in Yugoslavia. This produces an immediate link between the protection of human rights and military stability and security.


Military Stability and Security

In this field, again, interdependence has been an long established concept, but it is now moving from a confrontational to a cooperative type of interdependence. Europe has shifted its attention from the avoidance of war to the building of peace.

Virtually all of Eastern Europe, including most former Soviet republics, is asking to join NATO. On the one hand, this testifies to the success of NATO. On the other hand, it is a symptom of a widespread illusion that this success would be easily replicated by simply bringing in new members. That is far from being the case. First of all, it would be economically expensive (restructuring of allied commands, re-deployment of forces, additional official languages, harmonization of procedures, etc.) and therefore NATO members would not be likely to accept it. Public opinions would not support such an expansion of responsibility at a time of reduced threat perceptions and declining defense budgets.

More importantly, it might be difficult to establish whom to accept into the Alliance: In other words, who would be defended against whose threat? If this were a way for Central and East Europeans to gain a military security guarantee against Russia, this would signify a perpetuation of the old logic of the two blocs. Some advocated this also in the West, particularly during and immediately after the failed August 1991 coup in Moscow (when authoritative voices were heard urging Western security guarantees to Eastern Europe) but such a stand does not seem to fit into the current status of political relations with the successor states of the USSR.

One could argue that the logic of the blocs is perpetuated by maintaining one the two blocs as a self-contained exclusive entity separated from the now no longer antagonistic remnants of the other bloc. If the Eastern bloc is gone, this logic goes, the Western must offer its umbrella to former enemies who have now embraced its values and goals. A more cogent argument, however, is that the logic of the blocs would be perpetuated by trying to artificially extend one against another that no longer exists. Besides, NATO could not and would not wage war against Russia to save Eastern Europe more than it would have during the Cold War. Russia remains a nuclear state, and for NATO's nuclear powers to provide "extended deterrence" to the Eastern Europeans against Moscow would hardly be credible; it would be more likely a bluff. Let us not forget that even Western Europeans have had this problem of credibility of extended deterrence for forty years; for the new democracies of the East the problem would be much worse.
A second possibility is that NATO should accept all those who might want to accede, Russians included, and offer a security guarantee to all. The question then would be whom to guarantee against whom. If one wanted to guarantee everybody against everybody else, this would probably be a recipe for disaster. It is easy to imagine rather difficult dilemmas emerging from any number of crisis situations. It is also easy to see how false expectations could be created and these could blow on the fire of the nationalist ambitions that were repressed by forty-five years of communism and are now rekindling wildly.

In that context, some argue that NATO might play a moderating role similar to that played between Greece and Turkey, but that bilateral confrontation was easier to deal with than the multilateral situations of Eastern Europe would be. This was because of the common threat that Greeks and Turks both had to face; moreover, the preponderant role of the US in the Greek-Turkish relationship would not be there in Eastern Europe.

As the opinion became more common that NATO should, in one way or another, take on the task of providing security to its former enemies, the organization created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The creation of NACC was the subject of some debate. First, NACC ran the risk of duplicating the confidence-building role of the CSCE. In fact, the exclusion of neutral and non-aligned states makes it less credible than the CSCE for that purpose. The United States argues that CSCE was not sufficient because it lacked the resources; logically, the answer then should have been to give it those resources. But Washington clearly feels it can control NACC better than the CSCE, and has, so far successfully, played a prominent role in the de facto down-playing of the latter organization. Second, NACC is fuelling expectations for full membership. As this is not likely to happen soon, it will create even more frustration than would have resulted from an outright rejection of any membership at this time.
Still, NACC is playing a very useful role. One area where NACC might indeed be useful is in providing military expertise to those nations wishing to restructure their armed forces toward a more defensive model, both to reduce the defense burden and to avoid friction with neighbor states. Eastern European officer corps must be "de-indoctrinated" from Marxism-Leninism. NATO could address all of these concerns through its existing (and expandable) information, scientific and cultural programs, without even addressing the issue of membership.

For this purpose, the launching of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in January 1994 was essential: it provided an instrument for concrete bilateral cooperation between NATO and individual cooperation partners, each of which can tailor its own "Individual Partnership Program" according to its own wishes, capabilities and needs.

In addition, as offered by NATO itself in 1992, NACC could be used to harmonize NATO forces and infrastructure with those of C&EE states which could then be offered for joint peacekeeping actions under the CSCE auspices. The first joint maneuvers to this end were held in the Summer of 1994. Initiatives along these lines would tap on NATO's comparative advantages, provide support to the current soul-searching effort within the Alliance, and avoid the danger that acrimonies among Eastern Europeans might clog NATO's own operation. NATO could provide the necessary infrastructure and logistical base, as has been offered recently. Non-NATO troops could be employed and be supported by the NATO infrastructure, early warning systems, etc. Even armed forces from non-European states might then be called upon, as been the case already in former Yugoslavia. The old prejudice for which Europeans could serve to keep the peace among non-Europeans, but non-Europeans would not be needed to come and help in "civilized" Europe seems, alas, to be fading away.

From a political point of view, the CSCE might also contribute security for Eastern Europe. So far, however, it has not been given the necessary instruments, either military or political. The Vienna-based Center for the Prevention of Conflicts (CPC) is woefully unprepared to deal with the fermenting European problems, as it is understaffed, underbudgeted and underpowered. It should be strengthened, both financially and in terms of political endorsement by the member states. Its competence should be expanded to include a capability for political action toward crisis prevention, as its very name suggests it should, and not only crisis management.

The growing membership in CSCE dilutes the effectiveness of the decision-making process. The consensus rule is less and less adequate. There is a need to move to majority rule, at least for some kinds of decision, among which perhaps there could be the dispatch of peace-keeping forces to troubled areas. For this purpose, some have proposed the creation of a CSCE Security Council, and to allow it to take operational decisions without waiting all other member states to agree, and if necessary against the wished of some of them.
This body might include the UK, the US, Germany, France, Russia, as permanent members with a veto right. Perhaps Italy, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Spain could enjoy some kind of semi-permanent status. This Council would eliminate the unpredictability associated with China's behavior in the UN, while at the same time including the absolutely essential role of Germany. Its powers would be rather circumscribed at the start, but it could sanction conflict-prevention initiatives and peace-keeping operations, including those that may involve military force. Its chances of being effective could be encouraging in a time where the end of the East-West division of Europe has created a high degree of convergence in the political goals of the major powers in the continent. However, under no circumstances should the CSCE be allowed to become the overarching umbrella structure with overall coordinating powers that Russia would like it to be.


Conclusions

The solution to the problems of the new geopolitical situation in Europe will require an approach that must be both multilateral and multidimensional. International security institutions are indispensable for an adequate approach to the post-Cold War security problems of Europe. One does not need to be an "idealist of the post-Cold War mend-the-world school"ix to realize that no single state can address, let alone begin to resolve, the complex intricacies of resurgent nationalistic cleavages, civil struggles and potential conflagrations across borders. Nevertheless, because of the new strength gained by old pre-Cold War (rather than new post-Cold War) thinking, multilateralism is still all too often seen as an unaffordable luxury.x But it is Realpoli­tik, not idealism, which calls for a wider and more structured pattern of interna­tional cooperation in order to best serve the vital interests of European democracies (both old and new).xi It would be naïve idealism to presume that those interests can be served through the romantic restoration of the nation-state to its pre-Cold War preroga­tives, cultural, political or moral as they may be.

To pursue this multilateral approach, all countries of Europe (but the principal responsibility inevitably falls upon Western Europe) need to both deepen and widen international cooperation. In this, Europe does not have to start from scratch; much was done during the Cold War which can still be utilized if it is properly built upon. NATO is the obvious place to start to maintain a collective security and collective defense apparatus, the first of the three vital interests considered in this study. The WEU has been revived after the end of Cold War, and there is no question that, in time, it might work as the future European pillar of the transatlantic alliance if the political will is there to make that happen. The member states of these two organizations (together, but not individually) clearly possess the necessary military, technolog­ical and economic resources to face the new risks of the post-Cold War world in which C&EE in no longer an enemy but an increasingly effective security partner.

As of late 1994, however, partnership with the former Eastern adversaries is still fragile. Collective security bridges to Eastern Europe are being built, among others through the NACC and the WEU's Forum for Consultation, but success is not guaranteed. The Partnership for Peace provides for conrete cooperation programs that are specifically tailored to the needs of specific partners. But it is not enough to pile economic, military, and technologi­cal resources, to organize conferences and sign agreements. There is a much deeper need to build up political coherence among states and peoples which have long been suspi­cious of and estranged from one another. This will take time, but there is no reason to think that the successful construction of a collective security system in Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s could not be replicat­ed, in the late 1990s and beyond, across the whole continent.

The second vital interest has been defined here as the maintenance of unimpeded access to raw materials and the fostering of market economy. Here, too, there are useful precedents that make good examples: the energy sharing schemes of both the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the EU have proven largely successful. The European system of pipelines guarantees that energy security is a preeminently international end, which will require international means to achieve and maintain. They could be further improved to guarantee access to primary sources and provide a safety net in case of emergency.

Here, too, there is a need to expand the multilateral approach to Eastern Europe. Again, there is some degree of similarity to what was done in Western Europe in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, when the democracies, threatened by rising prices and the two oil crises, effectively overcame their narrowly defined national interests in order to foster the common good.

The strengthening of democracy, the on-going gradual opening of frontiers to movement of goods, people, and ideas strengthen democracy, the third vital interest considered in this paper is concerned. The CSCE and the Council of Europe have contributed to achieve this, and their further strengthening will be useful to accomplish more. But their action, particularly in the case of the CSCE, will need the backing of adequate military force by other institutions if necessary. The EU, on its part, should accept short-term economic costs (in the form of granting greater market access) for long-term political (stability) and economic (efficiency) gains.

Unlike during the Cold War, when the West had to close its eyes to human rights violations because of overrid­ing security concerns, ignoring violations of those human rights today can be a determinant to political instability. During Cold War, stability was a synonym for preservation of the status quo; today, on the contrary, stability can only be maintained through a careful management of change, and there is a change toward increased democracy; change must be actively assisted.

Sviluppi in Russia e Yugoslavia

Comunità degli Stati Indipendenti

Nel periodo in esame si è assistito alla frammentazione dell'URSS e alla costituzione da parte di undici delle ex-repubbliche (escluse le tre baltiche e la Georgia) della Comunità degli Stati Indipendenti (CSI). La creazione della CSI è stata sin dall'inizio parvasa da ambiguità istituzionali: la sovrapposizione di competenze (ovvero il vuoto delle medesime) tra istituzioni della Comunità e dei singoli stati ha fatto sì che nel corso del 1992 siano rimaste in una sorta di limbo numerose e vitali questioni di carattere politico, economico e militare.

Dovendo semplificare, si nota come i problemi principali nella divisione hanno toccato in primo luogo il territorio e le minoranze etniche. Prima fra tutte si ricorda la contesa sulla Crimea tra Ucraina e Russia, ma nel sottofondo si intravvedono problemi ancora più gravi tra Russia e Kazakhstan e tra Moldova e Ucraina. La guerra tra armeni e azeri ha continuato a piagare il Caucaso meridionale, mentre in Georgia settentrionale sono esplose violentemente—anche se rimangono circoscritte—le rivendicazioni degli osseti e degli abkhazi.

In secondo luogo, le ex-repubbliche sovietiche hanno negoziato la ripartizione delle forze armate ex-sovietiche. In questo ambito si sono raggiunti accordi (la cui implementazione però richiederà tempo) sulla riassegnazione delle forze nucleari strategiche alla Russia (quelle tattiche sono state tutte trasferite in territorio russo durante la prima metà dell'anno) e sulla suddivisione delle quote di forze convenzionali cui aveva diritto l'URSS in base al trattato CFE.

Infine, numerose trattative sono state avviate sulla suddivisione delle infrastrutture ex-sovietiche, dei beni mobili e immobili e del debito estero. Alla fine del 1992, con tutte queste trattative ancora in fase di risoluzione o di implementazione, i rapporti tra gli stati della CSI rimangono caratterizzati da incertezza diffusa, anche se si prende atto che nessuna disputa connessa alla disgregazione sovietica è risultata ancora in guerra aperta tra le repubbliche. 

Per il 1993, le prospettive sono quindi contraddittorie. In alcuni settori, primo fra tutti quello militare, si prefigura una risoluzione del contenzioso sulla flotta del mar Nero ed una stabilizzazione del processo di ripartizione delle altre forze armate, che saranno comunque ridotte da tutti gli attori principali. Il problema più grave sarà invece quello di controllare l'esportazione del sovrappiù verso paesi terzi, che si sta già verificando e comporta seri problemi di proliferazione, specialmente in Medio oriente.

In altri settori il panorama è meno incoraggiante: si delinea chiaramente il fallimento della riforma economica in Russia, con gravi possibili conseguenze sociali. Il pericolo di un ritorno di fiamma autoritario, acceso da quella che sta diventando una bizzarra alleanza tra militari, burocrati ex-comunisti e nazionalisti di destra, potrebbe essere reso più grave dal disorientamento politico generale, dal crollo della popolarità di Eltsin, da contenziosi nazionalistici alla periferia della federazione e dalla mancanza di credibili alternative democratiche.

Relativamente stabilizzata la situazione nelle altre repubbliche europee, mentre verso est e verso sud si nota il ristabilimento, o meglio il mantenimento, di una forte influenza russa. In Asia centrale Mosca sta trovando una inaspettata intesa politica con la Turchia. In queste repubbliche, c'è un rafforzamento al potere degli apparati ex-sovietici, tutti contraddistinti, se pur in misura variabile, dall'inalberamento della bandiera nazionalista (o persino religiosa, si noti il battesimo del presidente goergiano Shevardnadze!) al posto di quella comunista.

Balcani

Contemporaneamente al disfacimento istituzionale dell'URSS, si ratifica nel gennaio 1992, con il riconoscimento europeo a Croazia e Slovenia, lo smembramento definitivo della Jugoslavia. Risolto il conflitto sloveno già nell'estate del 1991, quello croato si bloccava nel corso della prima metà del 1992 con un sostanziale stallo militare che vedeva le forze serbe occupare circa un terzo della Croazia e le forze del corpo di interposizione ONU (UNPROFOR) attestarsi in regioni contese della Croazia orientale e meridionale. 

Il riconoscimento senza condizioni, contrariamente a quanto raccomandato dallo stesso rapporto comunitario "Badinter", apriva la strada ad una complessa problematica regionale legata al rafforzamento del principio del diritto allo stato nazionale, precedente pericoloso e foriero di un'inestricabile matassa di irredentismi intrecciati. Il riconoscimento, voluto fortemente da Bonn, e contemporaneo all'inizio in dicembre di una politica monetaria tedesca generalmente percepita come in contrasto con gli accordi di Maastricht appena firmati, è stato un segnale importante anche in ambito intra-occidentale: ha segnato la prima decisa riasserzione della politica estera nazionale della Germania unificata.

In primavera si assisteva all'espansione del conflitto alla Bosnia-Erzegovina, riconosciuta dall'occidente in Aprile, con gli slavi musulmani stretti fra un'equivoca alleanza tra serbi, croati e milizie irregolari autoctone filo-serbe. Gli orrori di questo conflitto, particolarmente cruento e senza apparente solubilità, hanno fatto crescere un senso di frustrazione e di impotenza in Occidente, in contrasto con la motivazione che aveva spinto all'intervento contro l'Iraq nel 1991. Al crescente consenso sulla necessità di fare qualcosa, si abbinava infatti la realizzazione che un impegno militare sarebbe stato ben più impegnativo e pericoloso di quello in Kuwait dell'anno precedente.

Prospettive

L'Occidente ha sempre identificato la stabilità con il mantenimento dello status-quo: invece, appariva chiaro almeno dalla fine del 1990 che lo status-quo gorbacioviano non era stabilizzante ma comprimeva (ritardandola, ma allo stesso tempo rendendola più potente) una epocale esplosione dello stato e del partito. 

Gorbaciov ha svolto il suo ruolo storico nel dare il primo, decisivo scossone all' elefantiaco impero sovietico, ma non voleva (e comunque non avrebbe saputo) gestire la transizione verso la democrazia ed il mercato. 

Parimenti, l'Occidente appoggia oggi Eltsin nella convinzione che la sua caduta sarebbe foriera di destabilizzazione; ma Eltsin, che ha svolto il suo ruolo storico nel cancellare il regime sovietico, rivoluzionario di indubbie doti carismatiche e trascinatore di popolo, non è uno statista in grado di governare una democrazia. 

Il problema oggi per i democratici sovietici (che l'Occidente vorrebbe aiutare) non è mantenere al potere Eltsin ma trovare rapidamente un credibile successore.

Di fronte a queste difficoltà di Mosca, l'atteggiamento dell'Occidente è stato politicamente e soprattutto economicamente cauto. All'appoggio entusiasta verso l'ammorbidimento gorbacioviano del comunismo prima, e al colpo di grazia infertogli da Eltsin poi, non faceva infatti riscontro il massiccio impegno economico e finanziario che era stato richiesto dall'URSS prima e dalla Russia e dalla altre repubbliche poi. Gli aiuti economici sono stati esigui, e gli investimenti hanno stentato a decollare a causa dell'elevato rischio politico del paese.

A European nuclear force in NATO

The control of the use of nuclear weapons in Europe has long been a subject of extensive debate in NATO.¹ Ultimately, however, the US has retained both absolute negative control over allied dual-key forces and virtually absolute positive control over its own forces deployed in and around Europe. This arrangement, adopted in the fifties, has arguably yielded considerable advantages to the non-nuclear members of NATO Europe. The most important of these is that it has provided at least some degree of coupling with the US central nuclear deterrent. Second, reliance on the US extended deterrent has probably prevented a proliferation of national nuclear arsenals in NATO Europe.

However, at least since the Athens and Ann Arbor speeches of 1962 by then US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, NATO has witnessed a gradual decrease in the emphasis that was put by the US on the use of nuclear weapons for the defense of Western Europe. This trend has progressively eroded the credibility of the extended nuclear deterrent of the US and poses fundamental challenges for the future of deterrence in Europe. This paper argues that this trend is not acceptable for NATO Europe; that it is nonetheless continuing; and that, if NATO Europeans wish to continue to rely on nuclear deterrence for the maintenance of peace in Europe--as it is argued here they should--they will have to assume greater nuclear use control responsibility. I will first analyze the requirements that would have to be fulfilled for the achievement of this goal and then propose an option for the future.

In an era of rapid political change in Eastern Europe, with the Soviet Union retreating politically and militarily and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) collapsing, one could wonder whether a nuclear deterrent continues to make sense in the first place. The fact is that the military threat to peace in Europe is not withering away with the disgregation of the Soviet bloc. As one authoritative analyst recently put it, the capability to attack would "vanish only if weapons and soldiers ceased to exist",² which is not likely to be the case for a long time indeed. In all other conceivable scenarios, the ability of nuclear weapons to make war unusable as an instrument of policy can not be replaced. Even after all on-going and projected nuclear reductions in Europe, the Soviet Union will retain a plethora of land-, air-, and sea-based systems with which to inflict a holocaust on Western Europe. While that intention seems to be a remote one indeed in the minds of the Soviet leadership today, the capability is there, and the wholly unpredictable character of future political developments in that country warrants an insurance policy against it.

In addition, rising nationalism throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union raises the possibility that, at some yet indefinite point in the future, one or more of the newly emerging national actors might decide that nuclear weapons are necessary to its security, and may well have the capability to make them. This might be the case, for instance, either with an independent but politically isolated Ukraine or with a fiercely nationalistic, undemocratic and ostracized Romania.

In sum, while the security scene in Europe is changing in ways that are certainly welcome inasmuch as they reduce Cold War vintage tensions, uncertainty and instability are increasing. It would be imprudent to assume that the on-going dramatic geopolitical reshuffle will produce a new static order that is both Western-friendly and long-lasting. In the absence of moderating hegemonic spheres of influence, these may more easily degenerate in armed conflict.

Therefore, while the US extended deterrent has been eroded, the need for war-preventing nuclear deterrence has not lessened in Western Europe, despite current military and political changes in Eastern Europe and in the USSR. However, all traditionally solid justifications for keeping US nuclear weapons in Europe (offsetting Soviet conventional superiority and nuclear forces as well as the ideologically offensive character of the Soviet state) might soon be invalidated by the enthusiasm over Gorbachevism. That the US nuclear presence in Europe will decrease is an ascertained fact. Therefore, NATO Europe urgently needs to take greater nuclear respon­sibility off US shoulders. The thesis of this article is that if NATO Europeans wish to continue to rely on a nuclear deterrent to guarantee their security, they must begin to reconsider options for increasing their own nuclear control responsibilities. This would be a far from uncontroversial process, and the proposal put forward in this paper would certainly attract much opposition. But the issues which it raises are the kinds of questions that Europeans must answer lest they throw up their hands and just hope that the end of the Cold War is also the end of all their security concerns. This paper will have served its purpose if it contributes to generate further debate on the question of the Europeans' nuclear responsibilities after the Cold War.

The option proposed here is the establishment of a NATO European Nuclear Force (NEF) within the integrated military structure of the Alliance. A small survivable force could be constituted as a separate Major NATO Command, equivalent in rank to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and to the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), and to be headed by a European general, who would be either French or British for the time being, but whose nationality could later be chosen on a rotational basis if greater European political unity will make it feasible to do so. This post would be assigned solely nuclear retaliatory missions. In case of confirmed Soviet nuclear attack against NATO ter­ritory, the commander would have the pre-delegated authority to fire, at his discretion.

Pre-requisites for a NEF

Several conditions would have to be met to make a NEF a workable political, military and economic proposition: (i) the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), or a united Germany, would have to be involved but, for political reasons, at this time it would not desire--and should not be given--an independent nuclear trigger; (ii) the Nonproliferation Treaty regime should not be weakened; (iii) the cost of any nuclear control rearrangement should be acceptable to those concerned; (iv) such rearrange­ment does not need to be an alternative to the European-North American alliance or even to just the US military presence in Europe, and should therefore be acceptable to the US; (v) nuclear responsibility rearrange­ments in NATO should not be seen by the Soviets to be deliberately provoca­tive; (vi) the force should be acceptable at the domestic political level in the countries involved.

The issue of German nuclear control is a contradictory one in NATO. On the one hand, few Europeans, Eastern or Western, not to mention the two superpowers, are eager to see a German national trigger for nuclear weapons. As of 1990, few have that desire in Germany as well. But the geopolitical equilibria in Europe are changing as a result of both politi­cal transformations in Eastern Europe and continued US nuclear withdrawal from NATO Europe. The new Germany which is emerging as an economic and political superpower in Europe might one day decide to develop a national nuclear arsenal. Should they do so, they would ultimately be able to withstand foreign opposition: therefore, the task for the West is to prevent any development in this direction.³

On the other hand, it would be politically and militarily inconceiv­able to structure any nuclear deterrent in Europe without some kind of prominent German participation, since the central front remains the crucial area of the East-West military equilibrium. For this reason, most West Europeans who believe in nuclear deterrence as an element of their security have been concerned by the growing sentiment in some sectors of the German polity against the presence of US nuclear weapons in Germany. It is difficult to determine exactly to what extent this sentiment is anti-nuclear per se or is just resentment against the US ability to wage nuclear war in Germany. It is certainly a combination of the two. In any case, any measure intended to take some nuclear responsibility away from the US and into Europe--including Germany--should help contain it.

Put another way, most West Europeans and Americans fear both the prospect of a fully nuclear Germany (a traditional concern which may be raised anew by a reunified Germany) and that of a denuclearized one (a relatively new concern).⁴ A NEF would have to balance these two contradictory aspects.

The second problem is constituted by the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). With the recent accession of Spain, all non-nuclear European NATO members are parties to the NPT. The treaty has long performed an important role in stabilizing the military situation in Europe and elsewhere. It would be a mistake to weaken it, perhaps decisively, as the withdrawal of some NATO Europeans in the pursuit of a European deterrent most likely would.

Yet, the creation of the NEF would not require the withdrawal from the treaty by countries participating in the proposed new forces. Italy and the FRG, for example, introduced reservation clauses at the time of signing to the effect that their participation in a European nuclear force created as a follow-on to the current French and British national forces would not be prejudiced by the treaty.⁵ Hence, an integrated NEF would not be incompatible with the NPT if it is created as a successor, albeit a partial one, to the current French and British national arsenals.

While such a succession will obviously not be easy to work out politically, recent renewed political emphasis on European defence coopera­tion (and particularly Franco-German and Franco-British initiatives) are encouraging. A greater degree of joint nuclear control need not be the result of full European political unification and defence integration, but, rather, could act as a catalyst for it. A good, if limited, precedent is set by the gradual turn-over of economic sovereignty with the Single Act, which will produce a united market by 1993. After all, European unification will not be born overnight, but must go forward in steps, and there is no reason not to gradually pursue incremen­tal steps in the defence realm as well.

Threshold countries outside Europe can be expected to seize on the issue to restate the discriminatory character of the NPT, particularly in light of the upcoming 1995 debate over the extension of the treaty, but there is little reason to think they would change their nuclear policies as a result. In the past, the history of the nonproliferation regime shows that nuclear weapon decisions have consistently been taken on the basis of perceived national security interests, and not simply by following the example of other distant states. The NEF would not influence the security environment of any nuclear weapon threshold state such as Argentina, Pakistan, South Korea or South Africa. Consequently, no major change in the nuclear weapon choices of these countries as a result of its creation is to be expected.

At a time of severe budget constraints for all Western governments, the cost of a NEF would have to be low to be acceptable. Yet, since the force could be small in size and might utilize in large part the existing logistical infrastructure and weapons of NATO, this requirement should not be prohibitive.

The force should not be seen as an alternative to the overall US security tie to Western Europe. In particular, it would have to be com­patible with a continued US nuclear presence in Europe. In fact, a con­tinued US conventional and nuclear presence in Europe would be essential to the feasibility of the NEF. As will be shown below, the NEF proposed in this paper must be backed by conventional and short-range nuclear forces, under the existing NATO commands, which can be guaranteed only by a continued US contribution. In addition, the US military presence in Europe serves a political purpose which still retains the support of the over­whelming majority of Europeans. Finally, US technical cooperation and targeting coordination, while probably not essential--much as it is not essential today for the French and the British--would be advisable. Even if the strategic rationales of the new force would be different from those of US forces, a minimum of coordination would be desirable to avoid both fratricide and operations at cross purposes. Therefore, a NEF would not require, nor should it encourage, an erosion of the European-American security partnership in NATO. Indeed, one of its purposes would be to reinforce the partnership by avoiding false illusions on each side about what such a partnership can and can not provide to its participants.

A NEF would have to be structured in such a way that it is not regarded as unduly provocative by the Soviets. Several problems might arise in this regard. The USSR has traditionally been very sensitive to the idea of West European, and particularly German, nuclear use control. Several Soviet strategic analysts⁶ emphasize that Moscow can not but be concerned about any type of West European defence cooperation because, in their view, it would be directed mainly or even, arguably, solely against the USSR. This is all the more worrisome, from the Soviet point of view, when nuclear weapons are involved. But the argument for greater European nuclear control, presented here, would not be to increase the offensive capability of NATO against the Warsaw Pact--or whatever will be left of it. Indeed, given its small size, the warfighting value of the NEF would and should be negligible.

The Soviets could see a NEF as a disruption of the current rather stable bilateral nuclear relationship with the US. Yet, Moscow should realize that any move toward a Europeanization of the British and French national deterrents, to the extent that it would prepare the way for the eventual renunciation of their national trigger (to be achieved when a true West European political entity is created) could, in time, simplify rather than complicate the Soviet nuclear problem in Europe.

Finally, it has been pointed out that a greater West European nuclear role may pose political problems because the Soviets could not match it with an organization of their own among their Eastern European allies.⁷ Traditionally, the USSR has never shared nuclear use control with its allies. With the current de facto dissolution of the Pact this has become a mute question.

On the other hand, there are several reasons to believe that the Soviets might, in time, perceive some benefits in the creation of an integrated NATO-European nuclear force. It would not be the first time that the Soviets belatedly recognize that there is something to be gained from policies they have long opposed on political grounds. This has been the case with recent shifts in Soviet in arms control positions and with their official recognition that a free Eastern Europe, anathema until recently and accepted by default, actually contributes to enhance their security.

First, a long-range NEF would reduce, though not eliminate, current NATO reliance on US Short Range nuclear forces (SNF) for battlefield use, thereby reducing the incentives to hasty action in a crisis and enhancing strategic and crisis stability. The latter is a declared Soviet goal as it is for the West, and there is no reason to think it will change. As a gesture to prove its genuine interests in common security and stability, parallel to the creation of the NEF NATO could continue to reduce its reliance in SNF.

Second, a NEF, with its renewed emphasis on nuclear deterrence, would reduce pressures for costly conventional improvements in NATO. One should keep in mind that, despite the recent reduction of defense budgets and deployed in both NATO and in the Soviet Union, the latter in still pursuing vigorous technological upgrading of its conventional forces. A marked NATO shift away from conventional improvements would further reduce the likeli­hood of a continu­ing expensive investment in conventional forces on the part of the Soviets, thus freeing precious resources for their domestic economic needs. In particular, a NEF would, ceteris paribus, reduce pressure on defence-related technological improve­ments by NATO, particular­ly as pertains to conventional forces. In fact, there is current­ly a tendency to improve NATO's technological edge in the conventional sphere so as to strengthen conventional capabilities in light of the declining credibility of its nuclear deterrent. While the NEF would hardly stop the momentum of defence technology research, it would only need to slow it down to be beneficial for the Soviets. This might relieve them from a technological competition to some extent, and particularly in Emerging Technologies (ET), which would drain their R&D resources and which they would probably lose.

Third, the NEF could serve to bring the French and British arsenals into the arms control process. Along with its creation, NATO might propose to set alliance-to-alliance limits on all INF--including also air-borne and sea-based systems in and around Europe capable of hitting Soviet territory. In practice, this would mean a NATO-USSR deal, since Eastern Europeans are hardly likely to have any role in nuclear control in the WTO. If anything, current developments make one wonder whether the WTO will even continue to exist as a viable military entity. Such a NATO-WTO deal would, however, thwart a traditional Soviet objection, namely that NATO third country forces (i.e. the UK and France) unrestrained by arms control agreements, circumvent the INF treaty.

Finally, a NEF would further strengthen the integration of the FRG into NATO nuclear affairs, thus repressing potential future stimuli toward an independent German nuclear force. The latter has been a most serious Soviet concern in the nuclear field over the years. As mentioned above, while the issue is simply not topical in the FRG at this time, it might become so in the not so distant future. The resur­gence of a German political and economic superpower could make such a prospect a more concrete one in this decade. The Soviets would certainly feel particularly threatened should the Germans decide to proceed with a national nuclear option; they would be likely to exert strong pressure to prevent it, but they would probably be unable to impede its creation.

Quite aside from the strategic merits of the NEF which will be discussed in this article, two further kinds of preliminary political objections might be raised against the case for increasing European nuclear responsibility in NATO. One possible political problem with respect to the broader implications of greater European nuclear control responsibility is that it might fuel renewed global geopolitical ambitions for Western Europeans, which might be destabilizing and should be avoided.⁸ However, increasing European nuclear decision-making power according to a scheme such as that proposed in this study does not need to involve greater geopolitical ambitions. In fact, in no way would NATO Europe need to redefine its global political or military role in order to provide for a more autonomous nuclear deterrent. The only purpose of such greater nuclear responsibility should be to provide a nuclear deterrent against any kind of war in Europe, which the US guarantee is increasingly failing to provide.

Another political problem would be to make the proposal acceptable at the domestic political level in the various countries concerned. The domestic political acceptability would depend on many factors which are difficult to estimate, such as the perception of the Soviet threat, the status of West European integration, and the costs involved. This paper will not speculate in depth on each of these; the main purpose of this study is to suggest a possible solution to the strategic and military aspect of NATO's nuclear deterrent problem. This is the fundamental security problem in NATO Europe. Should Europeans agree on how to solve it, their governments should then fit the solution into the more general framework of European defence cooperation which is taking shape today. West European establishments are moving toward a consensus on the desirability for greater cooperation in defence matters. For the first time since its withdrawal from the NATO integrated military structure, this trend involves France as well.⁹

To make it politically acceptable to the European public, the NEF arrangement proposed here should be presented as the Europeanization of the existing French and British forces. NATO should point out that this would not mean their proliferation but rather their harmonization into the more general new East-West security architecture of Europe. In time, this may also mean bringing these forces into the arms control process, though at a date which might indeed be far into the future.

In addition, it should be pointed out that one of the main reasons for public uneasiness with nuclear weapons in Europe has been that they are American-controlled. In France, national control has historically con­tributed to shaping and consolidating a strong national consensus for nuclear weapons, and to a large extent the same has been true for the UK. In the rest of NATO Europe, the INF debate in the early eighties showed how popular opposition to their deployment was in large measure opposition to giving the US the ability to unleash nuclear war in Europe.

A NATO-European Nuclear Force (NEF): A Proposal

Many proposals for increased NATO European nuclear control have been discussed in the past, either officially (such as the European Defense Community and the Multilateral Force) or in the strategic literature.¹⁰ For different reasons, they all failed to be adopted by NATO. The remainder of this paper will explore a possible structure for a NATO European nuclear force. The following paragraphs do not purport to provide a detailed operational proposition. They do intend to outline the broad contours of a possible arrangement which would satisfy the widely perceived necessity for NATO Europeans to acquire greater responsibility for their defence while maintaining both a nuclear deterrent and an American presence in Europe.

A NATO-European Nucleaer Forces (NEF) should be organized as a separate Major NATO Command (MNC), headed by a Supreme Allied Commander, Nuclear European Force (SACNEF), who would be equivalent in rank to SACEUR (the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe) and SACLANT (the Supreme Allied Commander in the Atlantic). SACNEF would command exclusively nuclear forces and would be assigned a purely deterrent, second-strike mission. Because its mission would be to deter attack against all allies, SACNEF would not be assigned to any specific geographic area of responsibility.¹¹

Forces and Costs In light of the simplicity of its strategy (see below) the size of the NEF would be small. The purpose of the force would be neither to survive nor to fight any kind of war, but to deter it by being able to add credibility to NATO's willingness to ignite strategic nuclear escalation against an aggressor. For this, some two hundred survivable warheads (approximately equivalent to the currently programmed combined French and British SSBN arsenals) would be sufficient.¹² While this number is obviously arbitrary, it should be underlined that the purpose of the NEF would be far less ambitious than flexible response today. The NEF should only be capable of bringing escalation to the territory of the USSR, thus making it more credible that in case of war NATO's deterrent would be involved as a whole.

Submarines would be the most appropriate systems for the NEF in that they are invulnerable and the most penetrating of all French and British forces. Their major shortcoming, i.e. detectability after the first launch, would not be a problem in light of the extreme circumstance under which they would be used--see below. They would also avoid, at least in part, the political problems connected with the visibility of any land-basing decision in NATO.

France and Britain would not necessarily have to turn in all of their national nuclear arsenals to SACNEF. They could still retain a portion of it (perhaps the air-borne and land-based legs of their triads) under exclusively national control. French and British nuclear forces could thus be developed as a basis for a future European Community nuclear deterrent, the exact form of which we can not yet be defined. In this way, while the discussion of Franco-British cooperation has usually been limited to development and procurement--such as with the recent case of negotiations over the Long-range Air-to-Surface missile--it would be aimed at ensuring the triggering of nuclear escalation in case of Soviet attack in the continent.¹³

The UK and France would benefit from this change in several ways. First, the credibility of their deterrents would increase because their launch would automatically involve other allies. Knowing this in a crisis, the Soviets would be deterred from attacking all NATO states participating in the NEF at least as much as they are from attacking the UK and France today. If the Soviets could not ascertain that NEF had executed the attack, they would have to assume that the US were involved, with the obvious, and welcome, coupling effect of that.

Second, the UK and France would be able to save financial resources, since part of their current expenditures on nuclear weapons could and should be shifted toward the allies participating in the NEF. While in the past both France and Britain have enjoyed a strong national consensus on the need to pay for national nuclear forces, current budgetary pressures, particularly in the UK, may put it in doubt in the future.

There would also be other major advantages for the Alliance as a whole in utilizing the French and British arsenals. One would be to allow for the creation of a European nuclear force without violating the NPT.¹⁴ Another would be that if France and Britain coordinated the patrols of a joint submarine force, much higher patrol ratios could be obtained than the two countries combined can achieve now separately.¹⁵ Joint targeting could offer attractive returns to scale. Coordinated deployments would help to maximize survivability.¹⁶ Finally, the NEF would prevent France and the UK from being "singularized" as the sole nuclear powers in Europe in case of substantial US SNF withdrawals from the continent.

The NEF would also contribute to stabilizing the nuclear situation in Germany, since any German national nuclear ambitions could be more solidly frozen by the additional margin of security it could provide. After being integrated into the NEF, the Germans would have a more direct role in the security destiny of their own country than they do now under the US umbrella. At a time of increasing German uneasiness about the presence of US nuclear forces on their territory, the NEF might allay at least some anti-nuclear sentiments in the country. On the other hand, the NEF would prevent the possible denuclearization of Germany which might result from future short-range nuclear arms control agreements between the superpowers.

A NATO-Europe nuclear force would also be a logical and essential step forward in the currently on-going process of increased defence cooperation among Western Europeans, and notably France and Germany. Otherwise, their bilateral efforts, of which the joint Franco-German brigade created in 1987 is a symbolic prototype, are bound to hit a dead end. As the size and scope of such joint forces are expanded, the issue of nuclear weapons will inevitab­ly arise. The question of who will ultimately control those joint forces will then be increasingly difficult to avoid.

SACNEF would command exclusively nuclear forces. This would allow him to concentrate attention on the manage­ment of a purely retaliatory mission, which would greatly simplify the nuclear decision-execution process. It would also relieve dual-capable commanders from the burden of having to worry about the cumbersome security and safety regulations that come with nuclear missions.¹⁷ Nuclear-conventional separation would also make it possible for the NEF not be integrated with the military structure of NATO's other supreme commands,¹⁸ which would make it easier for the French to participate without renouncing their prerogative of remaining outside the NATO structure.

The range of NEF systems should also be sufficient to reach Soviet territory, so as to reduce the perceptions of "calculability" of a war in Europe, thus providing additional coupling between the US and NATO-Europe. In order to avoid an unacceptable return to a trip-wire strategy, however, SACNEF would best be backed by conventional forces under SACEUR's command, sufficient to hold the line long enough until negotiations could terminate hostilities. Thirty days has been suggested as a desirata for NATO's conven­tional defensive capabilities for this purpose.¹⁹

The question of the relationship of the NEF to the US interests and nuclear posture in NATO Europe is a delicate one. The former might worry that the latter was prepar­ing a scheme to draw it into nuclear escalation against its will. This would not be the case; to avoid misunderstandings, the strategy of the NEF would leave it to the US to shoot the first nuclear strike on the NATO side, without which SACNEF could not launch. Secondly, it would be rather odd, and politically difficult, to create a NATO command without any participation of US forces; but the NEF, by definition, would include no US nuclear warheads. Should the US so desire, some American manned delivery systems could be assigned for European warheads in the NEF--a reversed "dual-key" arrangement.

Third, the command and control network of the NEF should remain tied to the current US/NATO apparatus. This would preclude unnecessary duplica­tions and expenses and, what is most important, the network's vulnerability would strengthen the coupling of the force with the rest of the NATO forces and the national forces of the US, whose central C³I is dependent on numerous facilities either located in Europe or dedicated to NATO.²⁰ However, since the Europeans would be using an increased part of the system's capability, it would be fair for them to contribute a larger share of its cost. A necessary addition might include a survivable, perhaps airborne, command post, from which SACNEF would be able to order the launch of the force.

The Seat of Authority Perhaps the most contentious issue in the creation of the NEF would be to decide who would command it and with what powers. The nationality of SACNEF could be rotated among generals from several of the European allies who would express an interest in the position. France and the UK would be the most obvious candidates, at least in the initial years, for their holding the top post would be essential to make the whole idea acceptable in the domestic political scene of those countries. The subordinate commanders to SACNEF would be from interested countries, including the US and Canada, as would the personnel manning the nuclear delivery vehicles. This would ensure that no country in addition to the current nuclear-weapon states would, under any circumstances, acquire the capability to unilaterally use the force without the active cooperation of the others.

SACNEF, more than SACEUR today, should have day-to-day authority to mobilize and alert forces, but not to launch them. This would simplify decision-making in times of crisis, and help overcome likely initial political hesitancies among some of the allies, without however raising the prospect of politically unauthorized nuclear use. Mobilization during crises could be a problem if the opponent should perceive it as a step toward war. However, in the case of the submerged and undetected NEF, mobilization would entail virtually no visibility, and should not therefore precipitate Soviet reactions. In order to make this possible, NEF person­nel, much like today's Allied Mobile Force is for SACEUR, should be permanently assigned to SACNEF's command.

Needless to say, it would be extremely damaging if the US should perceive that the Europeans wanted to manipulate the possibility of unauthorized use as a means to increase the probability of nuclear escala­tion in a conventional war. However, SACNEF would be delegated authority to use forces only in all cases of confirmed nuclear strikes, even the most limited one, against any of NATO's members. That such confirmation would come through the NATO-wide warning system, of which the US and Canada are also a part, would be at the same time both a further instrument of transatlantic coupling and a way to reassure the US (and Canada) that they would not be drawn into nuclear escalation in Europe against their will.

Similarly to what happens in NATO's European Command today, the capability to activate the forces, i.e. the warhead release codes, would be in the custody of SACNEF at all times,²¹ both to ensure delivery in case of incapacitation of the relevant NCAs and to smooth execution procedures. The custodial units of the NEF would be vertically integrated with the force (i.e. it would be completely separated from other NATO nuclear custodial units) and they would be internationally manned as well, so that there would be no danger of any single alliance member acting unilaterally.

Strategy The main goal of the NEF should be to strengthen the deterrent role of nuclear weapons in an evolving strategic situation in Europe in which the threat of massive Soviet attack is giving way to that of more limited wars. In brief, the purpose of the NEF, in an era of arms reductions and politi­cal instability in Eastern Europe, would be to add credibility to the NATO deterrent and thus stress the unusability of war as an instrument of policy in Europe.

The doctrine and operational strategy of the NEF should be drawn somewhat along the lines of the "inflexible response" suggested by François de Rose. He suggested that NATO build its conventional forces to withstand an attack only for a period--perhaps several weeks--sufficient to explore possibilities to terminate the war without returning to a trip-wire strategy. Failing that, NATO should use nuclear forces in a strictly tactical fashion, against Soviet forces either on or near NATO territory. However, if the Soviets still not stop aggression and respond instead with their own nuclear weapons, then NATO should escalate to nuclear strikes against Soviet territory itself, thus bringing the risks and costs of war to the homeland of the aggressor. de Rose proposes that the final escalatory step against the USSR should be taken by the US.²²

The well-known problem here is that, while a US tactical use of nuclear weapons in the battle areas of Europe might be credible, US control would likely prevent NATO from escalating to the point that the USSR would no longer have any incentive for refraining from striking the US itself. If it is to be a credible NATO doctrine, therefore, inflexible response would have to be backed by European control of forces capable of reach­ing the USSR, as only Europeans might credibly risk Soviet strategic responses even after Soviet limited nuclear strikes against their territory. Therefore, the European SACNEF should be authorized to launch, though only after confirmed Soviet nuclear attack against NATO territory.

That SACNEF should not launch his forces until after the Soviets have in no way implies a "No-First-Use" pledge. But it does mean that the decision of NATO's first nuclear use would be left to the present-day nuclear powers, and not to SACNEF. This would guarantee that no new peacetime nuclear triggers would be created in Europe. In the end, the threat of US tactical nuclear first use against advancing Soviet forces--a relatively credible one--should be maintained. In addition, the Soviets would have to account for a pan-European strategic response if they in turn use nuclear weapons.

Conclusions

Increased European nuclear use control within the integrated military structure of NATO in the form presented in this study would have several positive consequences. First, it would strengthen and stabilize deterrence of any war in Europe providing for a nuclear force which would ensure a high likelihood of escalation, and hence a credible deterrent, even against limited aggression. By increasing the credibility of NATO's deterrent, it would strengthen the case for caution in any potential future crisis. In doing so, the NEF would reverse the trend toward NATO's conven­tionalization of its defense posture, which is leading toward a greater degree of warfighting options in Europe. To this end, the doctrinal rationale behind NEF should be made clear to all allies and potential adversaries alike: keeping it secret or ambiguous would defeat its pur­pose. NATO has often argued that doctrinal ambiguity is useful in that it increases uncertainty, but this justification is not a logical one. Ambiguity is useful only when clarification reveals either indecision or disagree­ment over diverging strategic interests. Otherwise, it can be argued that certainty of unacceptable costs would deter more. The NEF would not achieve deterrent certainty; nothing could. But it would come closer to it than today's arrangements.

Second, an NEF would put one more bridle on the potential resurgence of national nuclear weapon ambitions in Europe and reduce the pressure which might mount against the nonproliferation regime in the face of gradually decreasing US nuclear commitment in Europe. The non-nuclear nations of NATO Europe have long disappeared from the list of the so-called "threshold" countries which threaten the current nonproliferation regime, but they might join that list again if they should perceive that the US continues to decrease the nuclear emphasis of its commitment in Europe in a situation of growing political instability around the continent.

In conclusion, a NEF, while not a panacea for the problems of nuclear deterrence in Europe, would address all of the traditional main European concerns about nuclear deterrence--with respect to strategy, organization, coupling and cost. At the same time, it would not pose any provocative threat of aggression to the Soviets, and thus it would not be a cause for a deterioration of East-West relations.

The most important aspect of the NEF is that it would respond to the numerous US calls for NATO Europeans to assume greater responsibility for the defence of their own territories. While the US has usually referred to the need for greater European defence expenditures, Washington must realize that as the post-war scenario of a Europe in ruins, completely dependent on the US for its security fades definitively away, Europeans also need to acquire greater responsibilities for their own defence. On their part, and for the same reason, Europeans must realize that the strategic sustainabil­ity of nuclear free-riding has gradually but steadily been fading for many years now. In fact, it began to wither away almost immediately after it was instituted.

In the post-Cold War era Europeans must still grapple with the issue of a nuclear USSR at their side. The eventual inclusion of former Easter European satellites in Western European political and economic mechanisms might actually contribute to bring the Western-USSR border closer to the West. If both nuclear proliferation and denuclearization are to be avoided, NATO Europeans must now make a new concerted effort to assume greater nuclear responsibilities.

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1This paper is a revised version of a chapter of the author's Ph.D. dissertation, completed at the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1989. For useful comments and criticism on earlier drafts of this paper, the author is indebted to George Rathjens, William Griffith, Jack Ruina, Carlo Jean, Stefano Silvestri, Trevor Taylor, Harald Müller, Sean Lynn-Jones, Guido Lenzi, Roberto Zadra, Ettore Greco and Guido Venturoni.

2Kaiser, Karl: "Why Nuclear Weapons in Times of Disarmament?", in The World Today, Vol. 45, No. 8-9, August/September 1989, p. 136.

3Yet, there are some analysts who argue that German control is needed for an effective deterrent. See Treverton, Gregory: Making the Alliance Work (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), p.158. Others take an even more extreme view and argue that not only is German control necessary, but it is necessary outside of the current alliance framework. One analyst suggests that it would be advisable to give nuclear weapons to the FRG after dissolving the alliance so as to push Bonn, Paris and London closer into nuclear cooperation arrangements. See Layne, Christopher: "Atlanticism Without NATO", in Foreign Policy, No. 67, Summer 1987. Another, less extreme, proposal is outlined in Garnham, David: "Extending Deterrence With German Nuclear Weapons", in International Security, Vol. 10, No. 1, Summer 1985, p.108. These views, however, are rare, at least for the time being. Their adoption, at present highly unlikely, might have major destructive repercussions on the political cohesion among the allies.

4In recent years, the anti-nuclearism of the Social Democrats seems to have somewhat softened. While still advocating nuclear disarmament in the long term, they would support, for example, a shift to a sea-based deterrent in the shiort term. See Asmus, Ronald D.: "West Germany Faces Nuclear Modernizat­ion", in Survival, Vol. XXX, No.6, November-December 1988, p.508.

5Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: Yearbook of World Armament and Disarmament 1968/69 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1978), p. 160. For the text of the Italian reservation, see Text of the Italian Declara­tion to the UN General Assembly, 12 June 1968, reprinted in Bettini, Emilio (Ed.): Il Trattato Contro la Proliferazione Nucleare (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1968), p.129. For an Italian parliamentary resolution which explicitly underlined "the necessity that [with Italy's accession to the Treaty] the possibility for collective control of nuclear weapons [among members of the European Community] should be guaranteed", see the Text on the Non­proliferat­ion Treaty approved by the Italian Chamber of Deputies on 26 July 1968, reprinted in Bettini (Ed.): op. cit., p.139.

6Personal communications.

7Burrows, Bernard and Geoffrey Edwards: The Defence of Western Europe, (London: Butterworth, 1982), p.76.

8Bull, Hedley: "European Self-Reliance and the Reform of NATO", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No.4, Spring 1983, p. 848.

9At least since 1976 France has begun talking about an "enlarged sanctuary", which erodes the originally purely national rationale for the force de frappe. See Lellouche, Pierre: "The Transformation of NATO: Parallel European Cooperation" in Broadhurst, Arlene I. (Ed.): The Future of European Alliance Systems, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982), p.100. This is now a matter of consensus in France. The consensus has consolidated itself also at the government level, as demonstrated by Defense Minister Chevènement's declaration, in January 1990, that with greater European political unity the "vital interests" of France will cover an expanded geographical area beyond its borders. See "Non-accès de l'Allemagne aux armes nucléaires", Le Point, 8 January 1990. The author is indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to him.

10For example, see Gliksman, Alex: "Three Keys for Europe's Bombs" in Foreign Policy, No. 39, Summer 1980, for a proposal to establish a "triple-key" arrangement involving both nuclear and non nuclear allies; an idea for a multilateral force with majority voting for launch is proposed by Robinson, David: "A European Coordinated Force", in Orbis, vol. IX, No.3, Fall 1965.

11Thus, in addition to its primary mission of increasing the credibi­lity of the NATO nuclear deterrent in Europe, the NEF would provide a kind of reverse extended deterrence for the US and Canada as well. While the size of the US arsenal would make this European guarantee little more than a merely symbolic measure, it would nonetheless be an important one, for two reasons. First, it would underline the basic principle of collective security in NATO at a time when the creation of the NEF would put it under questioning. Second, it would likely serve to buy some public and congres­sional support for the NEF in the US.

12One possibility would be to have a force of, say, six submarines, at least two of which would be at sea at all times with sixteen missiles each. Assuming an average of six warheads for each missile, this would result in one-hundred and ninety-two warheads. Subtracting an average twenty percent failure rate, about one-hundred and fifty warheads would reach their targets. (2 on-station-subs x 16 missiles x 6 warheads - 20% failure = 150 warheads.) I am indebted to Dr. Trevor Taylor for this calculation.

13Lellouche, Pierre: "The Transformation of NATO: Parallel European Cooperation" in Broadhurst, Arlene I.: The Future of European Alliance Systems, op. cit., p.108.

14Several European NATO members, upon acceding to the treaty, reserved the right to participate in a European nuclear force should one be created in the future as a step toward the creation of a West European political entity as a successor to the French and British national forces. See Ducci, Roberto: "Tentativi e Speranze di Una Forza di Dissuasione Europea", in Affari Esteri, Anno XIII, No.52.

15Smart, Ian: Future Conditional: The Prospect for Anglo-French Nuclear Cooperation, Adelphi Paper No. 78, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 15-16.

16Joshua, Wynfred and Walter F. Hahn: Nuclear Politics: America, France and Britain, The Washington Papers, No. 9, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1973), p.67.

17Sandoval, Robert: Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Dilemmas and Illusions, unpublished manuscript, 1985, p.292; Kaufmann, William W.: "Nuclear Deterrence in Central Europe", in Steinbruner, John D. and Leon V. Sigal: Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-use Question (Washington, DC: Brookings Institutions, 1983), pp.41-42; interest­ingly, this thesis is supported also by some analysts who do not favor relying on nuclear weapons. See for example Halperin, Morton: "Deterrence Cannot Rely on Nuclear Arms", in International Herald Tribune, 29 June 1987.

18The only exception might be a common early-warning system and some common communication facilities. In this case, economies of scale would probably make the cost of dedicated systems a prohibitive one.

19Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the US Senate Armed Services Commit­tee, has suggested that if conventional forces were able to hold the line for a period of thirty days this would be an adequate time buffer to avoid using nuclear weapons too early. See interview in The International Herald Tribune, 15 February 1988, p.2. The same parameter value could be agreed to by the Europeans to be a reasonable nuclear threshold for SACNEF as well.

20In fact, it has been argued that the chances of escalation to all-out war of a war in Europe might be reduced by separating to the extent possible the US C³I network from NATO's. On the other hand, keeping the integration of the NATO European C³I network with that of the US will increase the likelihood of such escalation and therefore improve coupling. See Ball, Desmond: Controlling Theater Nuclear War, Working Paper # 138, Strategic and Defence Studies Center (Canberra: Australian National University, October 1987), p.37.

21Neither NATO nor the US have officially confirmed that US warhead release codes are under US custody in Europe, but this was the unanimous opinion among a number of current and former NATO officers interviewed by the author.

22de Rose, François: "Inflexible Response", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No.1, Fall 1982, passim; see especially p. 143ff.

This article was first published in "Orbis" in 1990.