The
control of the use of nuclear weapons in Europe has long been a
subject of extensive debate in NATO.
Ultimately, however, the US has retained both absolute negative
control over allied dual-key forces and virtually absolute positive
control over its own forces deployed in and around Europe. This
arrangement, adopted in the fifties, has arguably yielded
considerable advantages to the non-nuclear members of NATO Europe.
The most important of these is that it has provided at least some
degree of coupling with the US central nuclear deterrent. Second,
reliance on the US extended deterrent has probably prevented a
proliferation of national nuclear arsenals in NATO Europe.
However,
at least since the Athens and Ann Arbor speeches of 1962 by then US
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, NATO has witnessed a gradual
decrease in the emphasis that was put by the US on the use of nuclear
weapons for the defense of Western Europe. This trend has
progressively eroded the credibility of the extended nuclear
deterrent of the US and poses fundamental challenges for the future
of deterrence in Europe. This paper argues that this trend is not
acceptable for NATO Europe; that it is nonetheless continuing; and
that, if NATO Europeans wish to continue to rely on nuclear
deterrence for the maintenance of peace in Europe--as it is argued
here they should--they will have to assume greater nuclear use
control responsibility. I will first analyze the requirements that
would have to be fulfilled for the achievement of this goal and then
propose an option for the future.
In
an era of rapid political change in Eastern Europe, with the Soviet
Union retreating politically and militarily and the Warsaw Treaty
Organization (WTO) collapsing, one could wonder whether a nuclear
deterrent continues to make sense in the first place. The fact is
that the military threat to peace in Europe is not withering away
with the disgregation of the Soviet bloc. As one authoritative
analyst recently put it, the capability to attack would "vanish
only if weapons and soldiers ceased to exist",
which is not likely to be the case for a long time indeed. In all
other conceivable scenarios, the ability of nuclear weapons to make
war unusable as an instrument of policy can not be replaced. Even
after all on-going and projected nuclear reductions in Europe, the
Soviet Union will retain a plethora of land-, air-, and sea-based
systems with which to inflict a holocaust on Western Europe. While
that intention seems to be a remote one indeed in the minds of the
Soviet leadership today, the capability is there, and the wholly
unpredictable character of future political developments in that
country warrants an insurance policy against it.
In
addition, rising nationalism throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union raises the possibility that, at some yet indefinite point in
the future, one or more of the newly emerging national actors might
decide that nuclear weapons are necessary to its security, and may
well have the capability to make them. This might be the case, for
instance, either with an independent but politically isolated Ukraine
or with a fiercely nationalistic, undemocratic and ostracized
Romania.
In
sum, while the security scene in Europe is changing in ways that are
certainly welcome inasmuch as they reduce Cold War vintage tensions,
uncertainty and instability are increasing. It would be imprudent to
assume that the on-going dramatic geopolitical reshuffle will produce
a new static order that is both Western-friendly and long-lasting. In
the absence of moderating hegemonic spheres of influence, these may
more easily degenerate in armed conflict.
Therefore,
while the US extended deterrent has been eroded, the need for
war-preventing nuclear deterrence has not lessened in Western Europe,
despite current military and political changes in Eastern Europe and
in the USSR. However, all traditionally solid justifications for
keeping US nuclear weapons in Europe (offsetting Soviet conventional
superiority and nuclear forces as well as the ideologically offensive
character of the Soviet state) might soon be invalidated by the
enthusiasm over Gorbachevism. That the US nuclear presence in Europe
will decrease is an ascertained fact. Therefore, NATO Europe urgently
needs to take greater nuclear responsibility off US shoulders.
The thesis of this article is that if NATO Europeans wish to continue
to rely on a nuclear deterrent to guarantee their security, they must
begin to reconsider options for increasing their own nuclear control
responsibilities. This would be a far from uncontroversial process,
and the proposal put forward in this paper would certainly attract
much opposition. But the issues which it raises are the kinds of
questions that Europeans must answer lest they throw up their hands
and just hope that the end of the Cold War is also the end of all
their security concerns. This paper will have served its purpose if
it contributes to generate further debate on the question of the
Europeans' nuclear responsibilities after the Cold War.
The
option proposed here is the establishment of a NATO European Nuclear
Force (NEF) within the integrated military structure of the Alliance.
A small survivable force could be constituted as a separate Major
NATO Command, equivalent in rank to the Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe (SACEUR) and to the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
(SACLANT), and to be headed by a European general, who would be
either French or British for the time being, but whose nationality
could later be chosen on a rotational basis if greater European
political unity will make it feasible to do so. This post would be
assigned solely nuclear retaliatory missions. In case of confirmed
Soviet nuclear attack against NATO territory, the commander
would have the pre-delegated authority to fire, at his discretion.
Pre-requisites
for a NEF
Several
conditions would have to be met to make a NEF a workable political,
military and economic proposition: (i) the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG), or a united Germany, would have to be involved but,
for political reasons, at this time it would not desire--and should
not be given--an independent nuclear trigger; (ii) the
Nonproliferation Treaty regime should not be weakened; (iii) the cost
of any nuclear control rearrangement should be acceptable to those
concerned; (iv) such rearrangement does not need to be an
alternative to the European-North American alliance or even to just
the US military presence in Europe, and should therefore be
acceptable to the US; (v) nuclear responsibility rearrangements
in NATO should not be seen by the Soviets to be deliberately
provocative; (vi) the force should be acceptable at the domestic
political level in the countries involved.
The
issue of German nuclear control is a contradictory one in NATO. On
the one hand, few Europeans, Eastern or Western, not to mention the
two superpowers, are eager to see a German national trigger for
nuclear weapons. As of 1990, few have that desire in Germany as well.
But the geopolitical equilibria in Europe are changing as a result of
both political transformations in Eastern Europe and continued
US nuclear withdrawal from NATO Europe. The new Germany which is
emerging as an economic and political superpower in Europe might one
day decide to develop a national nuclear arsenal. Should they do so,
they would ultimately be able to withstand foreign opposition:
therefore, the task for the West is to prevent any development in
this direction.
On
the other hand, it would be politically and militarily inconceivable
to structure any nuclear deterrent in Europe without some kind of
prominent German participation, since the central front remains the
crucial area of the East-West military equilibrium. For this reason,
most West Europeans who believe in nuclear deterrence as an element
of their security have been concerned by the growing sentiment in
some sectors of the German polity against the presence of US nuclear
weapons in Germany. It is difficult to determine exactly to what
extent this sentiment is anti-nuclear per
se
or is just resentment against the US ability to wage nuclear war in
Germany. It is certainly a combination of the two. In any case, any
measure intended to take some nuclear responsibility away from the US
and into Europe--including Germany--should help contain it.
Put
another way, most West Europeans and Americans fear both the prospect
of a fully nuclear Germany (a traditional concern which may be raised
anew by a reunified Germany) and that of a denuclearized one (a
relatively new concern).
A NEF would have to balance these two contradictory aspects.
The
second problem is constituted by the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
With the recent accession of Spain, all non-nuclear European NATO
members are parties to the NPT. The treaty has long performed an
important role in stabilizing the military situation in Europe and
elsewhere. It would be a mistake to weaken it, perhaps decisively, as
the withdrawal of some NATO Europeans in the pursuit of a European
deterrent most likely would.
Yet,
the creation of the NEF would not require the withdrawal from the
treaty by countries participating in the proposed new forces. Italy
and the FRG, for example, introduced reservation clauses at the time
of signing to the effect that their participation in a European
nuclear force created as a follow-on to the current French and
British national forces would not be prejudiced by the treaty.
Hence, an integrated NEF would not be incompatible with the NPT if it
is created as a successor, albeit a partial one, to the current
French and British national arsenals.
While
such a succession will obviously not be easy to work out politically,
recent renewed political emphasis on European defence cooperation
(and particularly Franco-German and Franco-British initiatives) are
encouraging. A greater degree of joint nuclear control need not be
the result of full European political unification and defence
integration, but, rather, could act as a catalyst for it. A good, if
limited, precedent is set by the gradual turn-over of economic
sovereignty with the Single Act, which will produce a united market
by 1993. After all, European unification will not be born overnight,
but must go forward in steps, and there is no reason not to gradually
pursue incremental steps in the defence realm as well.
Threshold
countries outside Europe can be expected to seize on the issue to
restate the discriminatory character of the NPT, particularly in
light of the upcoming 1995 debate over the extension of the treaty,
but there is little reason to think they would change their nuclear
policies as a result. In the past, the history of the
nonproliferation regime shows that nuclear weapon decisions have
consistently been taken on the basis of perceived national security
interests, and not simply by following the example of other distant
states. The NEF would not influence the security environment of any
nuclear weapon threshold state such as Argentina, Pakistan, South
Korea or South Africa. Consequently, no major change in the nuclear
weapon choices of these countries as a result of its creation is to
be expected.
At
a time of severe budget constraints for all Western governments, the
cost of a NEF would have to be low to be acceptable. Yet, since the
force could be small in size and might utilize in large part the
existing logistical infrastructure and weapons of NATO, this
requirement should not be prohibitive.
The
force should not be seen as an alternative to the overall US security
tie to Western Europe. In particular, it would have to be compatible
with a continued US nuclear presence in Europe. In fact, a continued
US conventional and nuclear presence in Europe would be essential to
the feasibility of the NEF. As will be shown below, the NEF proposed
in this paper must be backed by conventional and short-range nuclear
forces, under the existing NATO commands, which can be guaranteed
only by a continued US contribution. In addition, the US military
presence in Europe serves a political purpose which still retains the
support of the overwhelming majority of Europeans. Finally, US
technical cooperation and targeting coordination, while probably not
essential--much as it is not essential today for the French and the
British--would be advisable. Even if the strategic rationales of the
new force would be different from those of US forces, a minimum of
coordination would be desirable to avoid both fratricide and
operations at cross purposes. Therefore, a NEF would not require, nor
should it encourage, an erosion of the European-American security
partnership in NATO. Indeed, one of its purposes would be to
reinforce the partnership by avoiding false illusions on each side
about what such a partnership can and can not provide to its
participants.
A
NEF would have to be structured in such a way that it is not regarded
as unduly provocative by the Soviets. Several problems might arise in
this regard. The USSR has traditionally been very sensitive to the
idea of West European, and particularly German, nuclear use control.
Several Soviet strategic analysts
emphasize that Moscow can not but be concerned about any type of West
European defence cooperation because, in their view, it would be
directed mainly or even, arguably, solely against the USSR. This is
all the more worrisome, from the Soviet point of view, when nuclear
weapons are involved. But the argument for greater European nuclear
control, presented here, would not be to increase the offensive
capability of NATO against the Warsaw Pact--or whatever will be left
of it. Indeed, given its small size, the warfighting value of the NEF
would and should be negligible.
The
Soviets could see a NEF as a disruption of the current rather stable
bilateral nuclear relationship with the US. Yet, Moscow should
realize that any move toward a Europeanization of the British and
French national deterrents, to the extent that it would prepare the
way for the eventual renunciation of their national trigger (to be
achieved when a true West European political entity is created)
could, in time, simplify rather than complicate the Soviet nuclear
problem in Europe.
Finally,
it has been pointed out that a greater West European nuclear role may
pose political problems because the Soviets could not match it with
an organization of their own among their Eastern European allies.
Traditionally, the USSR has never shared nuclear use control with its
allies. With the current de
facto
dissolution of the Pact this has become a mute question.
On
the other hand, there are several reasons to believe that the Soviets
might, in time, perceive some benefits in the creation of an
integrated NATO-European nuclear force. It would not be the first
time that the Soviets belatedly recognize that there is something to
be gained from policies they have long opposed on political grounds.
This has been the case with recent shifts in Soviet in arms control
positions and with their official recognition that a free Eastern
Europe, anathema until recently and accepted by default, actually
contributes to enhance their security.
First,
a long-range NEF would reduce, though not eliminate, current NATO
reliance on US Short Range nuclear forces (SNF) for battlefield use,
thereby reducing the incentives to hasty action in a crisis and
enhancing strategic and crisis stability. The latter is a declared
Soviet goal as it is for the West, and there is no reason to think it
will change. As a gesture to prove its genuine interests in common
security and stability, parallel to the creation of the NEF NATO
could continue to reduce its reliance in SNF.
Second,
a NEF, with its renewed emphasis on nuclear deterrence, would reduce
pressures for costly conventional improvements in NATO. One should
keep in mind that, despite the recent reduction of defense budgets
and deployed in both NATO and in the Soviet Union, the latter in
still pursuing vigorous technological upgrading of its conventional
forces. A marked NATO shift away from conventional improvements would
further reduce the likelihood of a continuing expensive
investment in conventional forces on the part of the Soviets, thus
freeing precious resources for their domestic economic needs. In
particular, a NEF would, ceteris
paribus,
reduce pressure on defence-related technological improvements by
NATO, particularly as pertains to conventional forces. In fact,
there is currently a tendency to improve NATO's technological
edge in the conventional sphere so as to strengthen conventional
capabilities in light of the declining credibility of its nuclear
deterrent. While the NEF would hardly stop the momentum of defence
technology research, it would only need to slow it down to be
beneficial for the Soviets. This might relieve them from a
technological competition to some extent, and particularly in
Emerging Technologies (ET), which would drain their R&D resources
and which they would probably lose.
Third,
the NEF could serve to bring the French and British arsenals into the
arms control process. Along with its creation, NATO might propose to
set alliance-to-alliance limits on all INF--including also air-borne
and sea-based systems in and around Europe capable of hitting Soviet
territory. In practice, this would mean a NATO-USSR deal, since
Eastern Europeans are hardly likely to have any role in nuclear
control in the WTO. If anything, current developments make one wonder
whether the WTO will even continue to exist as a viable military
entity. Such a NATO-WTO deal would, however, thwart a traditional
Soviet objection, namely that NATO third country forces (i.e. the UK
and France) unrestrained by arms control agreements, circumvent the
INF treaty.
Finally,
a NEF would further strengthen the integration of the FRG into NATO
nuclear affairs, thus repressing potential future stimuli toward an
independent German nuclear force. The latter has been a most serious
Soviet concern in the nuclear field over the years. As mentioned
above, while the issue is simply not topical in the FRG at this time,
it might become so in the not so distant future. The resurgence
of a German political and economic superpower could make such a
prospect a more concrete one in this decade. The Soviets would
certainly feel particularly threatened should the Germans decide to
proceed with a national nuclear option; they would be likely to exert
strong pressure to prevent it, but they would probably be unable to
impede its creation.
Quite
aside from the strategic merits of the NEF which will be discussed in
this article, two further kinds of preliminary political objections
might be raised against the case for increasing European nuclear
responsibility in NATO. One possible political problem with respect
to the broader implications of greater European nuclear control
responsibility is that it might fuel renewed global geopolitical
ambitions for Western Europeans, which might be destabilizing and
should be avoided.
However, increasing European nuclear decision-making power according
to a scheme such as that proposed in this study does not need to
involve greater geopolitical ambitions. In fact, in no way would NATO
Europe need to redefine its global political or military role in
order to provide for a more autonomous nuclear deterrent. The only
purpose of such greater nuclear responsibility should be to provide a
nuclear deterrent against any kind of war in Europe, which the US
guarantee is increasingly failing to provide.
Another
political problem would be to make the proposal acceptable at the
domestic political level in the various countries concerned. The
domestic political acceptability would depend on many factors which
are difficult to estimate, such as the perception of the Soviet
threat, the status of West European integration, and the costs
involved. This paper will not speculate in depth on each of these;
the main purpose of this study is to suggest a possible solution to
the strategic and military aspect of NATO's nuclear deterrent
problem. This is the fundamental security problem in NATO Europe.
Should Europeans agree on how to solve it, their governments should
then fit the solution into the more general framework of European
defence cooperation which is taking shape today. West European
establishments are moving toward a consensus on the desirability for
greater cooperation in defence matters. For the first time since its
withdrawal from the NATO integrated military structure, this trend
involves France as well.
To
make it politically acceptable to the European public, the NEF
arrangement proposed here should be presented as the Europeanization
of the existing French and British forces. NATO should point out that
this would not mean their proliferation but rather their
harmonization into the more general new East-West security
architecture of Europe. In time, this may also mean bringing these
forces into the arms control process, though at a date which might
indeed be far into the future.
In
addition, it should be pointed out that one of the main reasons for
public uneasiness with nuclear weapons in Europe has been that they
are American-controlled. In France, national control has historically
contributed to shaping and consolidating a strong national
consensus for nuclear weapons, and to a large extent the same has
been true for the UK. In the rest of NATO Europe, the INF debate in
the early eighties showed how popular opposition to their deployment
was in large measure opposition to giving the US the ability to
unleash nuclear war in Europe.
A
NATO-European Nuclear Force (NEF): A Proposal
Many
proposals for increased NATO European nuclear control have been
discussed in the past, either officially (such as the European
Defense Community and the Multilateral Force) or in the strategic
literature.
For different reasons, they all failed to be adopted by NATO. The
remainder of this paper will explore a possible structure for a NATO
European nuclear force. The following paragraphs do not purport to
provide a detailed operational proposition. They do intend to outline
the broad contours of a possible arrangement which would satisfy the
widely perceived necessity for NATO Europeans to acquire greater
responsibility for their defence while maintaining both a nuclear
deterrent and an American presence in Europe.
A
NATO-European Nucleaer Forces (NEF) should be organized as a separate
Major NATO Command (MNC), headed by a Supreme
Allied Commander, Nuclear European Force (SACNEF),
who would be equivalent in rank to SACEUR (the Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe) and SACLANT (the Supreme Allied Commander in the
Atlantic). SACNEF would command exclusively nuclear forces and would
be assigned a purely deterrent, second-strike mission. Because its
mission would be to deter attack against all allies, SACNEF would not
be assigned to any specific geographic area of responsibility.
Forces
and Costs
In light of the simplicity of its strategy (see below) the size
of the NEF would be small. The purpose of the force would be neither
to survive nor to fight any kind of war, but to deter it by being
able to add credibility to NATO's willingness to ignite strategic
nuclear escalation against an aggressor. For this, some two hundred
survivable warheads (approximately equivalent to the currently
programmed combined French and British SSBN arsenals) would be
sufficient.
While this number is obviously arbitrary, it should be underlined
that the purpose of the NEF would be far less ambitious than flexible
response today. The NEF should only be capable of bringing
escalation to the territory of the USSR, thus making it more credible
that in case of war NATO's deterrent would be involved as a whole.
Submarines
would be the most appropriate systems for the NEF in that they are
invulnerable and the most penetrating of all French and British
forces. Their major shortcoming, i.e. detectability after the first
launch, would not be a problem in light of the extreme circumstance
under which they would be used--see below. They would also avoid, at
least in part, the political problems connected with the visibility
of any land-basing decision in NATO.
France
and Britain would not necessarily have to turn in all of their
national nuclear arsenals to SACNEF. They could still retain a
portion of it (perhaps the air-borne and land-based legs of their
triads) under exclusively national control. French and British
nuclear forces could thus be developed as a basis for a future
European Community nuclear deterrent, the exact form of which we can
not yet be defined. In this way, while the discussion of
Franco-British cooperation has usually been limited to development
and procurement--such as with the recent case of negotiations over
the Long-range Air-to-Surface missile--it would be aimed at ensuring
the triggering of nuclear escalation in case of Soviet attack in the
continent.
The
UK and France would benefit from this change in several ways. First,
the credibility of their deterrents would increase because their
launch would automatically involve other allies. Knowing this in a
crisis, the Soviets would be deterred from attacking all NATO states
participating in the NEF at least as much as they are from attacking
the UK and France today. If the Soviets could not ascertain that NEF
had executed the attack, they would have to assume that the US were
involved, with the obvious, and welcome, coupling effect of that.
Second,
the UK and France would be able to save financial resources, since
part of their current expenditures on nuclear weapons could and
should be shifted toward the allies participating in the NEF. While
in the past both France and Britain have enjoyed a strong national
consensus on the need to pay for national nuclear forces, current
budgetary pressures, particularly in the UK, may put it in doubt in
the future.
There
would also be other major advantages for the Alliance as a whole in
utilizing the French and British arsenals. One would be to allow for
the creation of a European nuclear force without violating the NPT.
Another would be that if France and Britain coordinated the patrols
of a joint submarine force, much higher patrol ratios could be
obtained than the two countries combined can achieve now separately.
Joint targeting could offer attractive returns to scale. Coordinated
deployments would help to maximize survivability.
Finally, the NEF would prevent France and the UK from being
"singularized" as the sole nuclear powers in Europe in case
of substantial US SNF withdrawals from the continent.
The
NEF would also contribute to stabilizing the nuclear situation in
Germany, since any German national nuclear ambitions could be more
solidly frozen by the additional margin of security it could provide.
After being integrated into the NEF, the Germans would have a more
direct role in the security destiny of their own country than they do
now under the US umbrella. At a time of increasing German uneasiness
about the presence of US nuclear forces on their territory, the NEF
might allay at least some anti-nuclear sentiments in the country. On
the other hand, the NEF would prevent the possible denuclearization
of Germany which might result from future short-range nuclear arms
control agreements between the superpowers.
A
NATO-Europe nuclear force would also be a logical and essential step
forward in the currently on-going process of increased defence
cooperation among Western Europeans, and notably France and Germany.
Otherwise, their bilateral efforts, of which the joint Franco-German
brigade created in 1987 is a symbolic prototype, are bound to hit a
dead end. As the size and scope of such joint forces are expanded,
the issue of nuclear weapons will inevitably arise. The question
of who will ultimately control those joint forces will then be
increasingly difficult to avoid.
SACNEF
would command exclusively
nuclear forces.
This would allow him to concentrate attention on the management
of a purely retaliatory mission, which would greatly simplify the
nuclear decision-execution process. It would also relieve
dual-capable commanders from the burden of having to worry about the
cumbersome security and safety regulations that come with nuclear
missions.
Nuclear-conventional separation would also make it possible for the
NEF not be integrated with the military structure of NATO's other
supreme commands,
which would make it easier for the French to participate without
renouncing their prerogative of remaining outside the NATO structure.
The
range
of NEF systems should also be sufficient to reach Soviet territory,
so as to reduce the perceptions of "calculability" of a war
in Europe, thus providing additional coupling between the US and
NATO-Europe. In order to avoid an unacceptable return to a trip-wire
strategy, however, SACNEF would best be backed by conventional
forces
under SACEUR's command, sufficient to hold the line long enough until
negotiations could terminate hostilities. Thirty days has been
suggested as a desirata for NATO's conventional defensive
capabilities for this purpose.
The
question of the relationship of the NEF to the US interests and
nuclear posture in NATO Europe is a delicate one. The former might
worry that the latter was preparing a scheme to draw it into
nuclear escalation against its will. This would not be the case; to
avoid misunderstandings, the strategy of the NEF would leave it to
the US to shoot the first nuclear strike on the NATO side, without
which SACNEF could not launch. Secondly, it would be rather odd, and
politically difficult, to create a NATO command without any
participation of US forces; but the NEF, by definition, would include
no US nuclear warheads. Should the US so desire, some American manned
delivery systems could be assigned for European warheads in the
NEF--a reversed "dual-key" arrangement.
Third,
the command
and control network
of the NEF should remain tied to the current US/NATO apparatus. This
would preclude unnecessary duplications and expenses and, what
is most important, the network's vulnerability would strengthen the
coupling of the force with the rest of the NATO forces and the
national forces of the US, whose central C3I
is dependent on numerous facilities either located in Europe or
dedicated to NATO.
However, since the Europeans would be using an increased part of the
system's capability, it would be fair for them to contribute a larger
share of its cost. A necessary addition might include a survivable,
perhaps airborne, command post, from which SACNEF would be able to
order the launch of the force.
The
Seat of Authority
Perhaps the most contentious issue in the creation of the NEF would
be to decide who would command it and with what powers. The
nationality of SACNEF could be rotated among generals from several of
the European allies who would express an interest in the position.
France and the UK would be the most obvious candidates, at least in
the initial years, for their holding the top post would be essential
to make the whole idea acceptable in the domestic political scene of
those countries. The subordinate commanders to SACNEF would be from
interested countries, including the US and Canada, as would the
personnel manning the nuclear delivery vehicles. This would ensure
that no country in addition to the current nuclear-weapon states
would, under any circumstances, acquire the capability to
unilaterally use the force without the active cooperation of the
others.
SACNEF,
more than SACEUR today, should have day-to-day authority
to mobilize and alert
forces, but not to launch them. This would simplify decision-making
in times of crisis, and help overcome likely initial political
hesitancies among some of the allies, without however raising the
prospect of politically unauthorized nuclear use. Mobilization during
crises could be a problem if the opponent should perceive it as a
step toward war. However, in the case of the submerged and undetected
NEF, mobilization would entail virtually no visibility, and should
not therefore precipitate Soviet reactions. In order to make this
possible, NEF personnel, much like today's Allied Mobile Force
is for SACEUR, should be permanently assigned to SACNEF's command.
Needless
to say, it would be extremely damaging if the US should perceive that
the Europeans wanted to manipulate the possibility of unauthorized
use as a means to increase the probability of nuclear escalation
in a conventional war. However, SACNEF would be delegated
authority to use forces only in all cases of confirmed nuclear
strikes,
even the most limited one, against any of NATO's members. That such
confirmation would come through the NATO-wide warning system, of
which the US and Canada are also a part, would be at the same time
both a further instrument of transatlantic coupling and a way to
reassure the US (and Canada) that they would not be drawn into
nuclear escalation in Europe against their will.
Similarly
to what happens in NATO's European Command today, the capability
to activate the forces, i.e. the warhead release codes, would be in
the custody of SACNEF at all times,
both to ensure delivery in case of incapacitation of the relevant
NCAs and to smooth execution procedures. The custodial units of the
NEF would be vertically integrated with the force (i.e. it would be
completely separated from other NATO nuclear custodial units) and
they would be internationally manned as well, so that there would be
no danger of any single alliance member acting unilaterally.
Strategy
The main goal of the NEF should be to strengthen the deterrent role
of nuclear weapons in an evolving strategic situation in Europe in
which the threat of massive Soviet attack is giving way to that of
more limited wars. In brief, the purpose of the NEF, in an era of
arms reductions and political instability in Eastern Europe,
would be to add credibility to the NATO deterrent and thus stress the
unusability of war as an instrument of policy in Europe.
The
doctrine and operational strategy of the NEF should be drawn somewhat
along the lines of the "inflexible
response"
suggested by François de Rose. He suggested that NATO build its
conventional forces to withstand an attack only for a period--perhaps
several weeks--sufficient to explore possibilities to terminate the
war without returning to a trip-wire strategy. Failing that, NATO
should use nuclear forces in a strictly tactical fashion, against
Soviet forces either on or near NATO territory. However, if the
Soviets still not stop aggression and respond instead with their own
nuclear weapons, then NATO should escalate to nuclear strikes against
Soviet territory itself, thus bringing the risks and costs of war to
the homeland of the aggressor. de Rose proposes that the final
escalatory step against the USSR should be taken by the US.
The
well-known problem here is that, while a US tactical use of nuclear
weapons in the battle areas of Europe might be credible, US control
would likely prevent NATO from escalating to the point that the USSR
would no longer have any incentive for refraining from striking the
US itself. If it is to be a credible NATO doctrine, therefore,
inflexible response would have to be backed by European control of
forces capable of reaching the USSR, as only Europeans might
credibly risk Soviet strategic responses even after Soviet limited
nuclear strikes against their territory. Therefore, the European
SACNEF should be authorized to launch, though only after confirmed
Soviet nuclear attack against NATO territory.
That
SACNEF should not launch his forces until after the Soviets have in
no way implies a "No-First-Use" pledge. But it does mean
that the decision of NATO's first nuclear use would be left to the
present-day nuclear powers, and not to SACNEF. This would guarantee
that no new peacetime nuclear triggers would be created in Europe. In
the end, the threat of US tactical nuclear first use against
advancing Soviet forces--a relatively credible one--should be
maintained. In addition, the Soviets would have to account for a
pan-European strategic response if they in turn use nuclear weapons.
Conclusions
Increased
European nuclear use control within the integrated military structure
of NATO in the form presented in this study would have several
positive consequences. First, it would strengthen
and stabilize deterrence of any war in Europe
providing for a nuclear force which would ensure a high likelihood of
escalation, and hence a credible deterrent, even against limited
aggression. By increasing the credibility of NATO's deterrent, it
would strengthen the case for caution in any potential future crisis.
In doing so, the NEF would reverse the trend toward NATO's
conventionalization of its defense posture, which is leading
toward a greater degree of warfighting options in Europe. To this
end, the doctrinal
rationale behind NEF should be made clear to all allies and potential
adversaries alike: keeping it secret or ambiguous would defeat its
purpose.
NATO has often argued that doctrinal ambiguity is useful in that it
increases uncertainty, but this justification is not a logical one.
Ambiguity is useful only when clarification reveals either indecision
or disagreement over diverging strategic interests. Otherwise,
it can be argued that certainty
of unacceptable costs would deter more. The NEF would not achieve
deterrent certainty; nothing could. But it would come closer to it
than today's arrangements.
Second,
an NEF would put one more bridle
on the potential resurgence of national nuclear weapon ambitions in
Europe
and reduce the pressure which might mount against the
nonproliferation regime in the face of gradually decreasing US
nuclear commitment in Europe. The non-nuclear nations of NATO Europe
have long disappeared from the list of the so-called "threshold"
countries which threaten the current nonproliferation regime, but
they might join that list again if they should perceive that the US
continues to decrease the nuclear emphasis of its commitment in
Europe in a situation of growing political instability around the
continent.
In
conclusion, a NEF, while not a panacea for the problems of nuclear
deterrence in Europe, would address all of the traditional main
European concerns about nuclear deterrence--with respect to strategy,
organization, coupling and cost. At the same time, it would not pose
any provocative threat of aggression to the Soviets, and thus it
would not be a cause for a deterioration of East-West relations.
The
most important aspect of the NEF is that it would respond to the
numerous US calls for NATO Europeans to assume greater responsibility
for the defence of their own territories. While the US has usually
referred to the need for greater European defence expenditures,
Washington must realize that as the post-war scenario of a Europe in
ruins, completely dependent on the US for its security fades
definitively away, Europeans also need to acquire greater
responsibilities for their own defence. On their part, and for the
same reason, Europeans must realize that the strategic
sustainability of nuclear free-riding has gradually but steadily
been fading for many years now. In fact, it began to wither away
almost immediately after it was instituted.
In
the post-Cold War era Europeans must still grapple with the issue of
a nuclear USSR at their side. The eventual inclusion of former Easter
European satellites in Western European political and economic
mechanisms might actually contribute to bring the Western-USSR border
closer
to the West. If both nuclear proliferation and denuclearization are
to be avoided, NATO Europeans must now make a new concerted effort to
assume greater nuclear responsibilities.
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