31 March 1990

EAST-WEST COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

A version of this paper was presented as part of a Joint Research Project by the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, and the Institute for the World Economy and International Relations, Moscow, March 1990

INTRODUCTION
This paper will deal with the implications for security in South-Eastern Europe of those NATO and WTO forces which are excluded from the current CFE talks in Vienna. It will concentrate on two types of forces, namely naval and nuclear weapons. While not all air-forces are formally included in the CFE talks, for purposes of this project will be treated in the paper dealing with those negotiations.
The main thesis argued here is that, while negotiations on both categories of weapons would be advisable and should be encouraged, nuclear and naval weapons serve important strategic and political purposes in Europe which require their continued presence for the foreseeable future.

NUCLEAR FORCES
Nuclear forces are not formally part of CFE negotiations. "Dual capable" forces, however, have not been excluded. This is a compromise formula which was reached in order to reconcile on the one hand NATO's insistence not to initiate, after the INF treaty, a new formal negotiation on nuclear weapons before substantial results are achieved with conventional force reductions; and on the other hand, the desire of the Warsaw Pact not to exclude what is left of nuclear forces of the two alliances in Europe. The Pact did not, moreover, accept to exclude "dual capable" systems only because they had a nuclear role, among other reasons because the Soviets argue NATO has a marked superiority in this field.

This paper starts from the premise that the nuclear problem of South-Eastern Europe is not divisible from that of the rest of Europe. Because of the nature of the weapons, it does not make any strategic sense to try and devise nuclear-tight compartments among the various sub-regions of Europe. Therefore, as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, the reasoning proposed here applies to the East-West military relationship in Europe as a whole as much as to the South-Eastern region.

Nuclear weapons can be seen as accomplishing a purely deterrent or also one of warfighting in case of failure of the deterrent. The following paragraphs will briefly overview of the evolution of Soviet and NATO thinking on matter. Western (and particularly US) thinking has followed a circular development; Soviet thinking has, roughly speaking, followed in its wake, lagging behind of several years. At the beginning of the nuclear era, deterrence and warfighting were seen as strictly connected. Nuclear weapons were seen as simply the most potent explosive to be employed in otherwise conventional operations.

No later than the first studies revealed the enormity of the collateral damage that any nuclear use, even the most limited, would have caused, doctrine began to move toward a conception of nuclear war as a total war. Under this assumption, nuclear use should not so much influence the development of the battle in the field, but should have primarily served the purpose of inflicting unacceptable damage on the enemy, and thus dissuade him form attack in the first place.
Subsequently, there emerged a problem of credibility with this supreme threat against offenses which might have been serious but not threatening of the vital interests of the attackes party. Strategists returned therefore to think about ways to utilize nuclear weapons in ways somehow proportional to the possible kinds of offences, even just conventional ones. Around the middle of the sixties, both NATO and, a few years later, the USSR, moved to re-couple theater nuclear concepts to the conventional correlation of forces by introducing ever greater flexibility and selectivity in their respective doctrines and operational plans.
The main thesis argued here is that, contrary to these tendencies, it is in the interest of all Europeans to maintain, and possibly to strengthen, a conceptual as well as operational distinction between nuclear and conventional forces. The goal of this should be to retain a high degree of deterrence of any type of conflict, and that can only be associated to the risk of nuclear escalation. This distinction is coherently maintained only by the UK and France. That the US has moved to more flexible options should not come as a surprise: it has tried to minimize the dangers to its own homeland in case of war. But Europeans, including the Soviets, can not make any use of such a distinction: every war in Europe would be "strategic", even if it were not nuclear. Nuclear weapons must be seen only as an instrument to prevent it.

Yet, in an era of rapid political change in Eastern Europe, with the Soviet Union retreating politically and militarily and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) collapsing, perhaps a few words should be said to justify the need for a nuclear deterrent within NATO. The military threat to peace in Europe is not withering away with the disgregation of the Soviet bloc. As one authoritative analyst recently put it, the capability to attack would "vanish only if weapons and soldiers ceased to exist", which is not likely to be the case for a long time indeed. In all other conceivable scenarios, the ability of nuclear weapons to make war unusable as an instrument of policy can not be replaced.

This rather simple concept, which is the basis for nuclear deterrence, has not always received the attention it deserves. Recent changes in the Warsaw Pact have highlighted the three serious mistakes which NATO has made in justifying the maintenance of nuclear arsenals in the past. At times these mistakes have been nothing but a mere bluff. First, NATO has often tied the need for nuclear weapons to the threat of Soviet nuclear weapons, e.g. during the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) debate in the late seventies and early eighties, when these systems were presented as a counter to the Soviet SS-20. Gorbachev disposed of this rationale with relatively little effort by agreeing to sign the INF treaty. A plethora of Soviet nuclear weapons, however, continues to be capable of hitting Western Europe.

Second, NATO has long tied the need for a nuclear deterrent to the unfavorable correlation of conventional forces in Europe. Pointing to the conventional imbalance was the easiest way to win the necessary public support for nuclear weapons. However, both on-going negotiations and budgetary pressures in many countries might soon eliminate this justification as well. NATO must therefore now prepare to argue the nuclear case differently. At lower force levels, it can be argued, force-to-space ratio problems will make the need for a nuclear deterrent more and not less important.

Third, the necessity for a nuclear deterrent has been tied to the political character of the governments in the WTO. Nuclear weapons were often presented as a tool to contain otherwise unmanageable communist expansionism. The logical conclusion is that since these societies are now more pluralistic and open, they will be more peace-loving, and that therefore the West no longer needs military precautions. To varying degrees, all WTO governments are now moving away from orthodox communism toward more pluralistic forms of polities. But it is far from clear that communist ideology, and not the geopolitical preeminence of the USSR in Europe, whatever its system of government, has been the main threat to the security of post-war Western Europe. In addition, rising nationalism and resulting risks to international stability constitute a new and still imponderable menace to peace in Europe.

NAVAL FORCES
Unlike nuclear forces, the study of naval forces in the South-Eastern Europe can and must be considered separately from rest of continent. This is because of the peculiar situation which characterizes that theater of operations, the actors involves and the nature of naval forces themselves.

The Soviet Union vigorously insists that NATO--and particularly US--naval forces in the Mediterranean constitute a threat to its homeland which it can not afford not to address in the process of arms control. In addition, Moscow argues that, just as it gave in to Western requests for asymmetrical cuts on land forces where it was clearly superior, NATO should now accept asymmetrical cuts of naval forces, where the East is qualitatively and quantitatively outdone. Marshall Akhromeev, personal adviser to Gorbaciov, in a testimony to the US Congress in 1989 has even explicitely stated that the successful conclusion of the CFE talks depends upon their expansion to naval forces. It remains to be seen whether the Soviets will be so inflexible after all, but it is likely that it will be necessary to deal with the issue in the future.

The West, however, still refuses to include naval forces in any formal negotiation. As will be discussed below, this stance stems from both military and political considerations. Nonetheless, both formal and informal discussions about the issue continue, both between East and West and within the Western Alliance. It must not be forgotten that some measures of naval arms control have already been implemented for a long time (as in the case of the US-USSR agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea and, more recently, of the analogous Soviet-French and Italian-French treaties).

Aside from the two superpowers, it hardly needs to be said that naval arms control is particularly relevant for the countries at the flanks of NATO. Inasmuch as naval arms influence the conventional balance on land, they affect the riparian regions more directly. This is particularly true at the conventional level, since naval nuclear arms tend to have a longer range and are therefore less restricted to operate at the rims of the European landmass.

It is also immediately apparent that the problem of naval arms control presents not only military but also political aspects, particularly in a region like the Mediterranean where the East-West confrontation is intermingled with several other conflictual relationship between riparian and adjacent countries and where the superpowers are involved as well. In addition, the political role of the US naval presence in the Mediterranean can hardly be overemphasized.

It is less often considered, moreover, that naval arms control in the Mediterranean involves important legal aspects which stem from the fact that the jurisdiction over the seas is much more subject to controversy than the land areas which are involved in current arms control negotiations in Europe.

In light of the complex issued outlined above, the paper purports to do the following. First, it will explore the potential of naval arms control in the Mediterranean for improving military security in Europe, and particularly in Southern Europe. It will do so by assessing the naval military balance in the region and how it affects the correlation of forces on land.

Second, it will explore alternative negotiating scenarios. Should naval issues be included in the CFE talks at all? Should progress in one area be made contingent on progress on other areas of arms control?

Third, it will assess the political implications of possible East-West naval agreements for East-West relations, inter-allied relations in NATO, and relations of the members of the two alliances with other states in the Mediterranean region.

Finally, it will analyze the legal implications of possible naval arms control regimes with reference to their infringement on international customary law regarding access to and navigation through Mediterranean waters.

Military Significance Because of the inherent flexibility which stems out of fleet mobility, superpower negotiations on levels of naval weapons will necessarily have to be conducted on a global scale, though regional sub-ceilings are also conceivable. The Mediterranean region could be one of these. Regional sub-ceilings would entail negotiated limitation to fleet mobility in the region covered by the talks. This issue is particularly complicated in the Mediterranean due to the non-homogeneous claims of riparian states. Several factors contribute to make naval arms control a more complex and delicate issue when compared to other conventional arms control negotiations.

One important factor which would make any East-West naval negotiations intrinsically difficult is that the importance of naval forces for NATO is far greater than it is for the Warsaw Pact, and it is much greater for the US than it is for the USSR. This is not only a matter of force or deployment asymmetry, as for the land and air forces, but also of grand strategy. NATO is an alliance divided between two continents with many insular or peninsular member states. On the contrary, the Warsaw Pact is a geographically solid bloc of contiguous states. In addition, the US is a maritime power with vital sea lines of communication, while the USSR is a continental power with no such maritime interests. Moreover, US naval forces in the Mediterranean constitute the only effective link among the several NATO operational theaters and the bulk of time-urgent reinforcements. These forces also perform a crucial intelligence and communication mission for the whole Southern region of the alliance. This is not the case for the Warsaw Pact, which performs these same missions with land-based systems.

A paramount aim of the study should therefore be to define possible alternative goals of future naval negotiations, if any. Aside from the classical goals of arms control--save economic resources, improve crisis and arms race stability, reduce tensions--it is important to assess whether and to what extent the grand strategies of the two alliances, and of the two superpowers in particular, could adjust to possible negotiating scenarios.

A second complicating factor of naval arms control is the difficulty of verification. In order to be effective, any verification scheme would have to be extremely intrusive, much more so than either East or West would probably be willing to accept. While remote sensing might play a role as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, conventional limitations would have to be conducted through painstakingly complex fine-combing of the vessels involved.

There is also a special problem for submarines, which could easily hide in the unevenly warm, shallow and salty waters of the Mediterranean, where they can mask their sound emissions more easily than in blue-water oceans.

Another important factor of complexity is that the role of third countries in the East-West correlation of forces is more pronounced for naval forces than it is for land forces in Europe. Several Arab states possess significant naval--including submarine--forces, and so does Israel, and their weight would be significantly increased should the US and Soviet fleets in the region be substantially reduced or withdrawn altogether. In fact, naval forces in the Mediterranean are not solely oriented toward East-West missions, but also perform important crisis-management and peace-making missions.

In light of these complexities, naval arms control might initially achieve more rapid results in the field of Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) than through actual force reductions. Naval CSBMs might differ from analogous land measures because they would have to take into account both the inherently greater mobility of naval forces and the difficulty of establishing clear-cut limits in terms of force levels participating in maneuvers and force movements.

Nonetheless, because of their lesser political sensitivity, naval CSBMs clearly represent the path of least resistance toward militarily significant naval arms control in the Mediterranean. After the US-Soviet agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea of 1972, France and Italy concluded their own agreements with the Soviet Union. This study will explore the hypothesis of making these treaties into a multilateral and homogeneous agreement, involving the largest possible number of participants.

16 December 1989

Book Review: China - Tradition and Transformation, by J. Fairbank and E. Reischauer, *****

Synopsis
"China" divides naturally into two phases: the evolution of traditional Chinese civilization in relative isolation over three thousand years, and the upheavals and transformation of that civilization in recent times, partly in response to contact with the modern western world. "China: tradition and transformation" is essential reading for all historians of China and for anyone wishing to understand modern China. The authors have worked together as part of a remarkable team at Harvard University. Edwin O. Reischauer was US Ambassador to Japan and John K. Fairbank is Director of Harvard's East Asian Research Centre.

08 October 1989

Inizio corso di volo in aliante

Non mi ricordo bene perché ho iniziato a volare in aliante. Non c'era un progetto, un obiettivo. Qualche anno fa avevo pensato di volare in deltaplano, ma poi mi ero convinto, chissà perché, che fosse troppo pericoloso ed allo stesso tempo limitato nelle prestazioni. Invece un aliante è un vero aereo. Non sono molto convinto che questo ragionamento abbia molto senso, anche il parapendio, che è ancora più limitato nelle prestazioni di un deltaplano, può dare grandi soddisfazioni. In un certo senso, anzi, più il mezzo è piccolo, limitato, più si è simili a veri volatili! Con un deltaplano si può andare più lenti e più vicino alla terra rispetto ad un aliante, e con un parapendio ancora di più rispetto ad un deltaplano.

Comunque sia eccomi qui, oggi si comincia, al secondo tentativo. La prima volta che sono andato all'aeroclub di Rieti con due amici pure intenzionati a brevettarsi, abbiamo trovato tutto chiuso, c'era un nebbione fitto sulla valle e non volava nessuno. Era qualche settimana fa, e finì tutto con una gran magnata al ristorante del "Nido del Corvo", a Greccio, sui monti che spero presto sorvolerò con le mie ali silenziose...



Idee di lettura sul volo a vela qui su Amazon.



23 August 1989

In Estonia, Momentum is Building Up

Today, 23 August 1989, marks the 50th anniversary of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1939. In its secret protocol, the parties agreed to spheres of influence in certain areas of Eastern Europe. The independent states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania fell within the Soviet sphere. Beginning on this 23 August, and throughout 8 August 1990--fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Soviet's "acceptance" of the then Baltic states' "request" to join the USSR--a series of emotional fiftieth anniversaries is coming up. Preparations for massive demonstrations and other types of action to mark them have been meticulously carried out for months by the Popular Fronts, mass organizations which looks more and more like full-fledged political parties.

Today, amidst waves of resurgent nationalism throughout the country, the Baltic republics are likely to cause the greatest problems for Moscow. They have been among the most vociferous and certainly the most articulated in their claims, and their leaders enjoy greater support and more popular participation in their initiatives than those of any other republic.

Estonia is the most active of the three. The year 1939 is indeed the most pervasive obsession in the minds of Estonians today. It is nothing less than astounding for the foreign observer to note the degree of unanimity and excitement which exists on this score. Cooperation with the Latvian and Lithuanian Popular Fronts is comprehensive.

The fundamental demand which is being floated is that the Soviet government declares the 1939 secret protocol null and void, because it violated the rights of third parties.Incidentally, is also contravened Lenin's denunciation of secret diplomacy. Unlike what is often said, Estonians are not seeking to "leave" or "secede from" the USSR. Thus, they are not seeking to make use of the provisions which exist to that effect in the Soviet Constitution. If the annexation of 1940 is declared illegitimate, which all have always known it is, they can no longer "secede" from the USSR because they never lawfully "joined". Their relations with Moscow would then go back to being regulated by the 1922 Peace Treaty of Tarttu, signed by the Soviets after Estonia's first bid for independence.

Unlike in 1988, today Estonians are no longer asking "only" for increased economic or legislative autonomy, but for full political independence. Their avowed goal is to retain friendly relations with Moscow but on the basis of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, "something like the relations between Eastern Europe and the USSR", one often hears in Tallinn.

The only aspects of sovereignty they are willing to coordinate with Moscow are foreign and defence policies, for which Estonians offer to pay a fixed annual fee to the all-Union government, to be re-negotiated with every five-year plan. This would guarantee that Estonia would contribute its fair share to the common interests of the Union--as long as it is a part of it. This would prevent any wealth produced above and beyond that fee from being diverted to other poorer or less reform-inclined republics.

But even in these two spheres the boundaries of Estonian claims are rather murky. For example, they insist that there should be Estonian trade missions and (yes!) full embassies abroad and that Estonians, and only Estonians, should only serve military duty in Estonian territory.

"Self-Managing Estonia" is the name of the project for economic autonomy which has been developed by Estonian economists. It is based on the assumption that the Baltic republics are the economically most advanced in the Union, and that for this reason it would be both unfair and counterproductive to brake their reforms. Perestrojka has a better chance of success in Estonia, they argue, where everything is on a smaller scale and is more amenable to change. Estonia could serve as a laboratory for experiments which could later be exported elsewhere.

Estonians are of course aware of the fact that about 40% of the population is ethnically non-Estonian--mainly Russian. They believe that these people can be co-opted to the Estonian cause on economic grounds: they, too, would enjoy a better standard of living if Estonia were economically more independent. That line, much to the surprise of very few, does not go down well at all with the ethnic Russians, who are most of all worried with becoming foreigners at home. Russian nationalists, as the recent strikes confirm, have already coalesced around the conservative "International Movement" to counter the independentist demand.

Nor are these ideas popular in Moscow ministries which control over 90% of Estonian industry. The prevailing view there is still that reforms should proceed in parallel in all Republics if at all possible, since this would be a precondition for the continuation of a pivotal role of the all-Union ministries in the allocation of resources. In addition, Moscow argues that the "rich" Baltic republics are net debtors to the rest of the Union because of large investment channeled there in the past.

Estonians counter that this is misleading since they would be better off if they were not obliged to export their products to other republics at artificially low prices. They acknowledge having received subsidies, but in worthless Rubles. Incidentally, monetary independence from the USSR is on top of the list of Estonian requests. It is primarily intended to stop the flow of fellow Soviets coming to fill their bags with merchandise they can not find at home and leaving behind useless bank notes, but it has a political overtone as well. At a talk I gave at the Tallinn Polytechnic I pointed out that the Estonian government could address this problem by allowing Estonians to hold hard currency and opening hard currency stores to anybody who walks in. Scarce goods could then be sold there and would be exported out of Estonia only to the extent that hard currency would be brought in, by whoever. One professor replied that they had not thought of it, but that in any case this would not help solve the sovereignty question like a national currency--for which the name, the pre-war "Crown", has already been agreed upon--would. All others attending agreed.

Thus the bottom line is clear: Estonians are seeking nothing less than the restoration of statehood. They feel the time to act is now, and that they must act as fast as possible, before glasnost and perestrojka might give way to other, less favorable circumstances. On that, they are probably right. Gorbachev may soon be in a no-win situation, where if he cracks down he risks discrediting his "new thinking", and if he does not he risks his losing job. In any case, hardly anybody in Moscow takes the possibility of granting independence seriously, quite aside from the legal details of whether it would be a "secession" or an "annulment" of the 1940 entry.

By all accounts in Moscow, there would be a crack-down if all other ways to prevent a show-down should fail. That their going too fast might precipitate just that eventuality does not seem to concern Estonians. What is most frightening is that there is little the West can do to imbue moderation into the atmosphere of excitement which prevails in Tallinn. We should at least avoid fuelling false expectations.

23 June 1989

Is the range of Soviet SS-23 nuclear missiles short or shorter?

I can not understand how anybody can be confused by the current NATO-Soviet acrimony over nuclear missiles modernization. The USSR wants to exclude SS-23 from INF Treaty limitations. NATO opposes this.

The INF treaty covers medium- (1000-5000km range) and shorter-range (500-1000km) missiles. Short-range missiles (range between 0 and 500 km) are not included.

The Soviet SS-23 has a 480 km range, so its range is shorter than "shorter-range" missiles but the West has argued that it is not short enough to be in the short-range category. This is because in negotiating the INF treaty the Soviets had agreed that the short-range SS-23 had in fact a shorter range, not a short-range, and this placed it in a category of missiles with longer (ie "shorter") ranges than that it should actually belong to.

How could it be clearer?

:-)

22 May 1989

29° g - 22 MAG: panoramica di argomenti all'IMEMO, fine del viaggio

Ieri 28 Maggio giornata di riposo, visite della città, niente da segnalare.

Incontro con l'Accademico Oleg Bogomolov, Direttore dell'Istituto per l'Economia dei Paesi Socialisti dell'Accademia delle Scienze e neo-eletto al Congresso dei Deputati del Popolo dell'URSS.

Gli chiedo di cosa pensa del ruolo del nuovo Congresso. Dice che deve avere il potere supremo, non solo di eleggere il presidente ed in Soviet Supremo ma anche di legiferare. Bisognerà trovare il meccanismo adatto. Comunque dovrà fare uso energico dei poteri già conferiti come quello di modificare la costituzione, ratificare le leggi e creare e dirigere commissioni per la supervisione di tutte le attività dello stato. Ci sono molti che non vogliono questo perché preferiscono trattare con il Soviet Supremo, più piccolo e quindi più facile da manipolare.

20 May 1989

27° g - 20 MAG: incontro mancato alla TASS

Incontro con Anatolij Krasikov, Vice Direttore Generale dell'agenzia TASS. Appuntamento non richiesto procuratomi dell'Accademia, chissà perché. Comunque ho accettato volentieri. Mi hanno detto che parla bene italiano. Mi presento all'appuntamento e la guardia non mi fa entrare, dicendomi che Krasikov non c'è. Mi comunica in serata l'Accademia che per "un imprevisto" l'appuntamento è saltato. ...bei modi!

19 May 1989

26° g - 19 MAG: su questioni militari e progetti di cooperazione tecnologica

Incontro con il Generale (3 stelle) Nikolai Chervov, Capo del Dipartimento Affari Esteri del Ministero della Difesa dell'URSS. Mi riceve arrivando 15 minuti in ritardo e scusandosi perché era stato intrattenuto da Jazov, il ministro della difesa.

Molto cortese e disponibile, ascolta attentamente le mie domande e risponde puntualmente a tutte. L'incontro dura un'ora e mezzo. Dice che parlerà a titolo personale, non come ufficiale sovietico.

18 May 1989

25° g - 18 MAG: sulle riforme, Estonia

Incontro con Vladimir Pichugin, English Edition Editor di Moskovskie Novosti, settimanale dell'agenzia Novosti Il giornale è considerato all'avanguardia della perestrojka e della glasnost. É stampato in nove lingue in varie città d'Europa. In Italia c'è un sunto mensile pubblicato da Mondadori.

Gli chiedo quali dovrebbero essere secondo lui i limiti della glasnost. Mi dice che è sicuramente troppo limitata adesso, anche perché molti non si rendono ancora conto di quanto si possa già fare ed esitano ad usufruire delle possibilità di espressione che ora ci sono.

17 May 1989

24° g - 17 MAG: a Mosca in albergo

Giornata in albergo, scrivendo e lottando con varie segretarie cercando di combinare appuntamenti per i prossimi giorni. Non mi aiuta nessuno, né dall'ambasciata sovietica in Italia, che tanto aveva promesso, né dall'istituto di cui sono ospite qui. Devo fare tutto da solo. Riesco a contattare l'editor della versione in inglese di Moskovskie Novosti il quale all'inizio è freddino e disinteressato, poi quando gli dico che sono appena tornato da Tallinn mi propone di vederci domani mattina alle 10! Forse farà più domande lui a me che io a lui.

Cena il albergo, poi a prendere un caffè (con formaggio, salame, pane nero e vodka, insomma un'altra cenetta) a casa della moglie di Peter Vares (un accademico estone che vive a Mosta ma che è andato in Svezia per un convegno). Mi chiede se mi piace il caffè forte e quando le dico di sì, la vedo che prende il barattolo di caffè e con un cucchiaio comincia a riempire lo scompartimento del caffè della Moka; mi aspetto che lo riempia ben colmo, magari pressandolo un po', come facciamo noi. Invece ne mette un paio di cucchiaini e si ferma quando è colma la macchinetta è piena solo a metà! Il caffè è merce rara a Mosca...

Comunque già il fatto di essere qui in questo appartamento è notevole, segno dei tempi che cambiano. Gli inviti a casa agli stranieri in passato erano prima vietati e poi malvisti; adesso sono permessi ma ancora molti russi non ci sono abituati.

Parliamo dell'Estonia. Mi dice che la cautela può essere controproducente. Gli Estoni sanno che ora hanno un'occasione di concludere qualcosa, fra qualche anno, se cambia la situazione a Mosca, e tornano al potere i conservatori, potrebbero richiudersi tutte le possibili vie di evoluzione. Ora o mai più.

Gorbaciov superstar

Il telegiornale della sera è interamente dedicato alla visita di Gorbaciov in Cina. Non ci sono altre notizie (eccezion fatta per le previsioni del tempo). Al telegiornale segue la differita della conferenza stampa di Gorbaciov a Pechino. Totale: quasi due ore initerrotte di monologo del grande capo, interrotto solo dalle brevi domande dei giornalisti. Non una parola da nessun altro dei membri della delegazioni sovietica in Cina, e neanche da nessun cinese: solo Gorbaciov con i giovani, con i lavoratori, sulla grande muraglia, ecc. Raissa farfuglia qualcosa, unica eccezione, parlando coon alcuni lavoratori cinesi di ceramica... Mi dice Valentina che non si era mai verificato in passato, anche se c'erano stati lunghi servizi sulle visite in USA, per esempio.

Gorbaciov è ovviamente molto diverso dai suoi predecessori, ma ne sta adottando i metodi di comunicazione, la logorrea infinita in primis. Sembrano i primi sintomi di un pericolo per la perestrojka stessa: sta nascendo un nuovo culto della personalità.

16 May 1989

23° g - 16 MAG: sull'Estonia

Conversazione con Aare Raid [poi risultato, dopo l'indipendenza dell'Estonia, essere un agente del KGB!!] sui risultati del Forum Baltico Il Forum ha avuto lo scopo di coordinare le posizioni dei fronti popolari delle repubbliche baltiche in preparazione di documenti da sottoporre ai Soviet Supremi delle rispettive repubbliche e, se adottati da questi, da essere poi utilizzati nelle trattative con Mosca. Le risoluzioni principali del Forum del 14-15 Maggio possono essere cosí riassunte:

15 May 1989

22° g - 15 MAG: sulla situazione ed il futuro dell'Estonia

Tallinn: Incontro con Aare Raid, Capo del Dipartimento Relazioni Internazionali dell'IPSL e Heiki Lindpere, responsabile delle questioni di diritto internazionale dello stesso istituto. Parliamo prima di zone denuclearizzate, argomento di interesse per Aare Raid. L'allora presidente finlandese Kekkonen aveva proposta una zona denuclearizzata in Europa settentrionale nel 1963, quando sembrava che la NATO stesse per creare la MLF, che avrebbe dovuto includere Svezia, Norvegia, Finlandia e Danimarca. Poi la Finlandia chiese di includere la penisola di Kola, che i sovietici rifiutarono. Mosca rifiutava allora anche di includere il Baltico, ma nel 1986 Gorbaciov ha detto che la cosa poteva essere studiata. Aare Raid crede che una NFZ oggi contribuirebbe ad un accordo anche in Europa centrale.

14 May 1989

21° g - 14 MAG: visita di Tallinn, Estonia

Tour della città con Mare Haab dell'Accademia. Non ci sono molti taxi statali, cosí i taxi privati proliferano ma spesso sono inesperti e non sanno la strada...

Conosco Sibilla, una vecchietta della Società Dante Alighieri di Estonia. Sta lavorando alla traduzione in estone della Divina Commedia, mi fa vedere una tessera di accesso gratis ai musei capitolini di Roma, dove non è mai stata e forse non andrà mai!

Pranzo nuovamente da Peter Vares. Mare ha bellissimi denti ma si lamenta che in dentisti in Estonia sono piuttosto ricchi, ma mancano le attrezzature, i medicinali, ecc. la solita storia. Mi diceva Marica che mancano anche i contraccettivi, per cui l'aborto è diffusissimo (secondo la rivista TIME in URSS abortiscono il 68% delle gravidanze). La situazione è un po' migliore in Estonia che in Russia.

Visita al Kik-in-de-Kök, museo in una delle torri delle vecchie mura della città: esposizione di turno è una gara fotografica sul nudo femminile, che Mare mi dice essere una novità per questi posti. Le foto, soprattutto estoni ma anche di altre repubbliche, non sono niente male, tutte in B&N.

Concerto di canti estoni nella chiesa luterana, con inni patriottici, bandiere della città ai tempi della Lega Anseatica. Dopo il concerto si ripete il solito peregrinare, inutile, per trovare un caffè aperto.

13 May 1989

20° g - 13 MAG: arrivo a Tallinn, Estonia, incontri Accademia e giornalista

Tallinn, Estonia. Arrivo in mattinata alla stazione. Scendo dal treno e mi guardo intorno: una strana sensazione, come di essere a casa anche se io qui non ci sono mai stato. Ci penso su. Mi sento in Europa, a casa, cosa che non mi capitava in Russia. Non saprei definire il perché. Gli edifici forse, il modo di vestirsi delle persone, gli sguardi, le espressioni. Anche se ovviamente non capisco una parola di estone mentre qualcosa di russo per strada riesco a cogliere.

12 May 1989

19° g - 12 MAG: sulle armi nucleari, le riforme, partenza per Tallinn

A colazione da qualche giorno c'è una nuova cameriera, sulla quarantacinquina, curata e anche ben truccata, che è l'eccezione che conferma la regola dei servizi statali sovietici: lavora di gran lena, con precisione, sorridendo e si muove addirittura con eleganza, per esempio quando fa correre le palline sull'abaco. Ci sono ancora gli "entusiasti" del comunismo?