26 June 1987

Book review: Obiettivo Difesa, by Luigi Caligaris and Carlo Maria Santoro, ****

this English review was originally published in Survival, Vol XXIX, No 4, July/August 1987.


Recensione

In the last few years, the international economic and political stature of Italy has increased. One domestic repercussion of this has been a generalized concern about security policy. This renewed interest in security has revitalized a dormant debate along different currents of thought which have long characterized Italian defense thinking. At the risk of oversimplifying, three currents of thought can be identified. At one end of the spectrum there are the nationalists, who want Italy to assume an independent role above and beyond its Alliance commitments In the middle is a group, the "mediators", who want Italy to remain closely aligned with its Western partners, while simultaneously assuming a high diplomatic profile world-wide. At the other end one finds the "integrationists", who stake everything on European and Atlantic cohesion The work of Santoro and Caligaris falls somewhere between the first two groups.

While presented as a cooperative effort, the book is divided into three quide distinct and separately authored parts. The first part, written by Santoro, addresses the broad issue of the geopolitical context of Italy. What transpires here is the desire for both a greater national assertiveness at the regional lever - mainly in the Mediterranean - and a more active involvement in Alliance security and foreign policies at the global level. Santoro sees the world as fundamentally bipolar (p.14), but the implications he draws from that bipolarity are not wholly clear. On the one hand, he believes that should a medium power choose "not to belong to one of the two blocs ... instead of gaining in terms of independence it would see its task become more difficult", because its operating area would remain under the control of one or the other of superpower. He cites India and Yugoslavia as two such medium powers (p.15).

On the other hand, he recognizes that for a medium power the coordination of national interests and alliance obligations can often be problematic, and cites the crises of Suez in 1956, Cyprus in 1974 and Libya in 1986 as examples (p.29).

The implications for Italy are ambiguous: should it attach itself more tightly to NATO, in order to safeguard its freedom within world bipolarism, or should it disregard NATO whenever its national interests conflict with American ones? It does not seem possible to do both, as Santoro seems to wish. Also, it would have been helpful if he had explained why Indian or Yugoslavian foreign polity might have been more "independent" had those countries belonged to one of the two blocs; or how the medium powers involved in the afore-mentioned crises might have been at an advantage had they disregarded their respective blocs.

Santoro points to a possible answer when he writes that Italy should pursue national interests at the regional level in the Mediterranean area while framing its global interests within NATO (p.106). This however poses another set of unanswered questions. First, Italian national interests in a region may be global interests for one or both of the supposedly omnipresent superpowers, thus restricting its room for manoeuvre. Santoro does write that Italy needs a "more manoeuvrable and flexible tactical room for manoeuvre" (p.32) but the meaning of that phrase remains rather enigmatic to this reviewer.

Second, he states the need for Italy to develop a "package of national strategic objectives" which should "stress its natural role as a thermoregulator of the Mediterranean" (p.48). Again, it would have been interesting to read what he has in mind when he speaks of such objectives, and how Italy could impose them upon the Alliance and US, even if only at the regional level.

Finally, some elaboration would have been welcome as to why, in order to perform its thermoregulating function, Italy could "no longer maintain a low-profile political and military position" (p.42).

The difficulty of defining, before pursuing, national security interests is clearly recognized by Gen. Caligaris in the second part of the book, devoted to an analysis of the problems facing the italian political leadership. But, he points out, this is only one of the challenges facing the Italian leadership. Others include improving a highly deficient defense legislation (it is unclear, for instance, who would hold the High Command in case of war (p.202); creating an environment - for example, in the universities - where a security culture might flourish (p.205); refurbishing the now rather inadequately structured decision-making apparatus, both for day-to-day and for crisis-management purposes; restoring the position of Chief of Defense Staff above the service chiefs (p.287).

Unless these problems are satisfactorily solved, so the main thrust of Caligaris' argument implies, Italy will remain confined to its parochial dimension, wherein it is constantly seeking not to be excluded from international bodies and meetings - especially those restricted to the major industrialized countries - quite irrespective of what it can "say, deny or offer" as its own contributions (p.190).

The last part of the book, also by Caligaris, addresses specifically the issue of the military instrument, seen as an "extremely critical aspect of a national security policy" (p.243). Throughout this part he points to the dual function of force for both the "successful resolution of otherwise unresolvable crises" (war fighting) and the "catalization of effectively mediated solutions" (deterrence) (p.243).

Caligaris, however, betrays an overall uneasiness with the fact that, because of deterrence, military strategy has acquired an "unusual dimension" to the point of having both "lost its identity" (p.249), and weakened the military's commitment to force preparation. Moreover, nuclear deterrence in NATO has brought along a "deresponsibilization" and a "denationalization" of defense, as many countries, including Italy, found it easier to passively accept American protection (p.250).

With Caligaris' concluding chapter the book comes full circle. The main theme that emerges throughout is the perception on the part of the authors that Italy is not playing a role in the management of international security - particularly at the regional level - that is commensurate with its rising international profile, and that this role should increase. On this score, most Italians concerned will agree.

However, he means through which to achieve this end are more varied than the book would lead one to believe. Gen Caligaris does highlight several areas where Italy's defense posture is wanting, and his work is a useful contribution in the rather desolate panorama of Italian security literature. However, the book fails to provide clear prescriptions in terms of security policy objectives. It also does not convince that a higher military - and particularly nuclear (p.160) - profile is needed for Italy to be able to provide a better contribution to international security.



15 April 1987

NON PRIMO USO E CONGELAMENTO DELLE ARMI NUCLEARI

Contributo di Marco Carnovale al progetto "Unilateralismo: Opzioni per l'Italia", dell'Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) e dell'Istituto per le Ricerche sul Disarmo, lo Sviluppo e la Pace (IRDISP).

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Nell'ambito delle possibili iniziative unilaterali (e non) che le potenze nucleari potrebbero intraprendere nel settore del controllo degli armamenti nucleari, si possono distinguere due grandi categorie: le iniziative volte al controllo della quantità e della qualità delle armi spiegate sul campo, e quelle volte al controllo dei criteri per il possibile uso delle stesse armi.

Nella prima categoria, che potremmo definire di controllo dell' hardware nucleare, cadono la maggioranza degli accordi sinora negoziati tra potenze nucleari esistenti (SALT, Trattato ABM) o potenziali (Trattato di Nonproliferazione). In questa categoria si trovano anche quasi tutte le proposte al momento sul tavolo dei negoziati di Ginevra.

25 January 1986

Conferenza ai club Rotary e Lions su Guerre Stellari

Sono stato invitato ad una conferenza sulle "Guerre Stellari" a Grottaferrata.

(post da completare)



13 July 1985

Book review: The Russian War (1978), ed. by D. Mrazkova and V. Remes, *****

Synopsis

From the time of the German invasion of Russia in June 1941 until the Soviet armies marched into Berlin in 1945, six million Russian soldiers were killed and 14 million civilians were murdered by the Germans. 

In the West, we forget that for most of the war Soviet armies contended against nine-tenths of the German army and never against less than three-quarters of it. Throughout this war a brave band of Soviet photographers were recording the events at a remarkable closeness to the field of action - often alternating between lens and pistol. These photographs have been arranged to form a story that begins with the Nazi assault along a 1200-mile Russian front and ends four years later when the Red Flag was raised over the Reichstag. A J P Taylor introduces each chapter with a brief narrative and an account of the photographers particularly involved. "Those who look at the photographs assembled here will, I hope, be moved," he writes. "They are a twentieth-century equivalent of War and Peace, transmuting human experiences into a vision of grandeur."


Review

This is an exceptional collection of 143 B&W Soviet photographs from throughout the course of WW II. Some pictures have been so widely reproduced that they will be familiar to any student of the war, like Khaldei's shot of the Soviet soldier raising the red flag on the Reichstag, or Alpert's photo of a Commissar leading the troops into action, which is the cover of the book. Others are much less known.

Photographers like Lipskerov and Zelma were at the frontline of Stalingrad, and Kudoyarov spent the whole of the 900 days of Leningrad's siege in the city.

This book is the work of two Czechoslovak editors, and for some reason it has not been published in the USSR itself. Interestingly, most of the pictures were taken with a 35mm German Leica camera, the standard at the time.

In my view, several pictures have been staged, but this is normal in wartime and one must remember that the USSR, like all other countries, used photography as a wartime propaganda tool, during and after the duration of the war.

Read an interesting article on Soviet photography here






13 August 1984

Rafting in the Red River

Marco in first from left

12 July 1984

The World According to Ronald Reagan

Click on the image to enlarge


Note in 2012:
I bought this poster at the M.I.T. bookstore, "the Coop", and it has been following me ever since. I still can't help but chuckle every time I look at it!

27 March 1981

Article by Dan Lubin in "The Hoya", newspaper of G.U. on Polish Seminar


At the end of the month, Georgetown University will be the forum for a unique and unprecedented program. The United States International Communication Agency (USICA) has agreed to sponsor a seminar between the Warsaw School of Planning and Statistics (Polish acronym: SGPiS) and Georgetown University. The seminar, conceived and organized by Georgetown juniors Andrew Menard and Marco Carnovale, is designed to promote extensive exchanges of knowledge on different political and economic issues.

The USICA is a federal agency with the purpose of promoting understanding between the U.S. and foreign nations. [NOTE: USICA was created in 1978 by president Carter and closed down in 1982 by president Reagan.]

The program organizers developed the idea for the seminar after participating in the G.U. Spring Program at SGPiS in 1980. Upon their return to the States, they contacted the Georgetown Office of International Programs and received father Bradley's complete support. Later they submitted the project idea to the USICA, which was impressed the the originality of the concept, and agreed to sponsor the project. The total grant will be $ 5000, a kingly sum considering the grantees are only juniors in college. The money will be used to pay for the seminar costs and the Polish delegation's expenses while in the United States.

The format of the program has been carefully laid out: there will be five sessions on agreed topics, during which one Polish student and one Georgetown student will present prepared reports, followed by discussion. Afterwards, the audience will be invited to participate in a question and answer period. The proposed topics are: 1) Pros and Cons of Western Credit to Poland; 2) the Polish Second Economy; 3) Joint Ventures and Foreign-owned Enterprises in Poland; 4) the Links between the Polish and the American economies; 5) the Polish Way to Socialism.

In addition to the scheduled seminars, the Polish students will be treated like visiting royalty. The USICA has granted the Georgetown organizers enough money to take the Polish delegation to New York for a weekend whirl of the "Big Apple". Included in this trip will be hotel accommodations, restaurant expenses and a Broadway show--courtesy of USICA. Upon return to Georgetown, the students will be introduced to Father Healy, President of the university; Dean Peter Krogh of the School of Foreign Service, and other G.U. officials. There will be dinner engagements, cocktail parties, and other special functions in honor of our Polish guests.

All in all, the program should be a tremendous opportunity for both G.U. and SGPiS students to exchange ideas. Moreover, it will give the Polish students a rare opportunity to sample the lifestyle of the West, and to meet American contemporaries.

The five formal sessions will take place between April 21-25 in White Gravenor Building, Room 301-A. All students and interested parties are welcome to attend, and no formal invitation is necessary.

22 January 1981

Book Review: 1984 (1949), by George Orwell, *****

Synopsis

Winston Smith works for the Ministry of Truth in London, chief city of Airstrip One. Big Brother stares out from every poster, the Thought Police uncover every act of betrayal. When Winston finds love with Julia, he discovers that life does not have to be dull and deadening, and awakens to new possibilities. Despite the police helicopters that hover and circle overhead, Winston and Julia begin to question the Party; they are drawn towards conspiracy. Yet Big Brother will not tolerate dissent – even in the mind. For those with original thoughts they invented Room 101... Nineteen Eight-Four is George Orwell’s terrifying vision of a totalitarian future in which everything and everyone is slave to a tyrannical regime.


Review

Too much has been said about this novel to even try to be original in a review. I will underline that this is one of the most important books I have ever read. It taught me the value of freedom, its pricelessness in fact.

The book is written very well, fluent prose and gripping plot, but that is not its main value. The value is its moral about democracy, which we may take for granted now but is to be nourished all the time. The book, of course, was written in the late forties, at the height of Stalinism, so it is obvious it refers to that scenario, at the peak of the Cold War. But too many people seem to forget the value of democracy today, in the information age.

One could argue that Orwell was wrong about the state controlling people through technology, in fact internet has provided all of us with tremendous power of horizontal communication that governments have a hard time controlling. But the game is an ongoing one... not yet over! I think this book should be taught in schools.

A film has been made of this book, the last starring Richard Burton just weeks before he died.




This is a newer edition:

01 August 1980

Windsurfing in Sardegna

Marco a Golfo Aranci, in Sardegna, agosto 1980

24 June 1980

End of the semester abroad in Poland

We spend the morning in Venice, just showing Cathy the highlights. I have some rubles left and manage to change them, at a very unfavorable rate, at a money changer in Piazza San Marco.

After lunch we get back into Giallina one last time for the home stretch to Rome. Mum, dad and my brother Fabio are waiting at our apartment in Via dei Mille, and a genuine Italian home-made dinner prepared by our family chef Anna concludes our trip.

It is over.

But I know it is not really over. I know I will return to Poland in the future, for personal and professional reasons. Borzena is scheduled to come and visit this Summer. Marian and Ewa surely will be in touch and we'll try to make some money together trading goods between Italy and Poland.

It's been the most instructive period of my life. I went to Poland because I was interested in the "real" socialism. Never a socialist myself, as a political scientist in the making I wanted to understand the thinking beyond the wall. I thought better knowledge could foster mutual understanding, and peace.

The problem is, no one in Poland seemed to care about socialism. Those who did speak about it hardly ever said anything positive. It was different in the USSR, where some of those we met did seem to believe in their official ideology.

We'll see, for now it's time to take in a good night sleep in my own bed!